UDC: 81'42:811.111'06

Masalova T. M.

postgraduate student

of the Department of the English language

and methods of its teaching

Kherson State University

IMLICIT SPEECH ACTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH PROTESTANT SERMONS

Abstract

The article describes explicit and implicit speech acts and touches upon the role of implicit information in the texts of English protestant sermons. It is emphasized that the manipulative strategy of the preacher is implemented through the use of indirect and implicit directives, assertives and expressives.

Key words: implicit information, indirect speech act, implicit speech act, manipulative strategy, English protestant sermon.

The problem of the implicit way of conveying communicative meanings in communication has become the object of modern linguistic researches carried out within the communicative and cognitive paradigm. Numerous investigations of the phenomenon of implicitness and indirect speech are held by foreign and domestic scientists of different linguistic studios (F. S. Batsevych, L. R. Bezuhla, K. A. Dolinin, V. Erich, V. A. Kukharenko, V. N. Moroz, M. V. Nikitin, J. M. Sadock, A. N. Starikova). Language peculiarities of discursive implicatures, indirect speech means of realization of speech intentions in various discourses and implicit speech acts of various illocutionary types are investigated in the field of linguistic pragmatics.

The understanding of communication as an activity makes possible the analysis of any speech utterance as an act of this activity, which changes the relations between partners and creates the prerequisites for further interaction. The activity principle of language analysis was introduced by the English logician J. Austin [2] and the American philosopher J. Searl [12] and as a result the theory of speech acts appeared.

Key thesis of the theory of speech acts is a declaration of a speech act as a minimal unit of language communication. The speech act is understood as "the speech interaction of communicants in discourse, based on their collective intentions and in the process of which they construct meanings – propositional, illocutive and perlocutive" [3, p. 329]; as a minimal pragmatic unit of speech communication and normative social speech behavior, which is viewed through the prism of a pragmatic situation [1, p. 412]; as a situational and intentional utterance of the speaker focused on the addressee and his reaction [13, p. 55].

In our research we adhere to the classification of illocutionary acts according to which seven basic types of illocutionary acts are distinguished: assertives, directives, expressives, declaratives, comissives, quesitives and phatic speech acts [4, p. 128]. Such an approach of distinguishing illocutionary acts is based on the classification of illocutionary acts by J. R. Searle [12, p. 6]. In addition, following L. R. Bezuhla, we consider the illocutionary act as analogous to the speech act as a whole [3, p. 160], and therefore the classification of illocutionary acts may be treated as a classification of speech acts [3, c. 163].

Speech acts are also divided into explicit and implicit ones. Explicit speech acts are speech acts the intentional meaning of which coincides with the expressed one and understood by communicants from the meanings of linguistic units [4, p. 131]. So in other words the linguistic semantics of such speech acts corresponds the illocutionary orientation.

An implicit speech act is a speech interaction of communicants in the process of which they construct implicit meanings [4, p. 133].

Implicit meanings "constitute an important and indispensable, informationally extremely capacious component of verbal communication which supplements and

modifies the explicit meaning of speech and inscribes them into the notional aggregate structure of communication" [11, p. 646]. The existence in the language of hidden, implicit categories reflects the asymmetry of the relationship between the units of the content and expression planes [14, p. 3], the discrepancy between the categories of language and the forms of thinking [14, p. 14].

Implicit information is not formally expressed. It is deduced by the addressee in the process of the sermon interpretation and is based on knowledge of the features of the given language or other semiotic systems, knowledge of the world and social stereotypes, ideas about the preacher's intentions [6, p. 111].

An implicit way of conveying information can be caused by the unwillingness of the addresser to disclose his intentions [8, p. 53] or harm the addresser or addressee's good name. The use of implicit utterances by the preacher allows him to avoid some judgments, namely negative comments or assessments, or to convert them into a way of more general, universally recognized knowledge and thoughts for which the speaker is not responsible [4, p. 139]. It increases the etiquette of the communicative act and thereby it is inextricably related to the postulates of G. P. Grice's cooperative principles [7], G. N. Leech's maxims of politeness [10], P. Brown, S. K. Levinson's [5] and R. T. Lakoff's [9] rules of politeness.

The use of implicit information in texts of the sermons is pragmatically conditioned as it facilitates the realization of the preacher's communicative purpose which predetermines changes of the behavior, consciousness and model of the recipients' world in accordance with the Protestant religious doctrine.

Implicit information bypasses analytical processing procedures, so the addressee is not inclined to analyze and evaluate it, but he perceives it unconditionally [6, p. 112]. It can be a source of false conclusions that are imposed on the recipient on the basis of formally correct information. This is done by presenting the connotative semes or signs of words as denotative meanings, choosing a positively evaluated interpretation in opposition to any other, mixing related or correlated concepts, transferring negative characteristics to adherents of a different faith.

Unlike the explicitly presented, the implicit information is less controlled by the recipient's consciousness, since the information received by the addressee through the text interpretation is perceived as his own conclusion, which, as a rule, cannot be estimated, because the knowledge gained by one's own intellectual efforts is perceived as his own and is beyond doubt.

These properties of implicit information are deliberately used by the preacher to implement a manipulation strategy, because the expected conclusions, the religious vision of reality and the corresponding behavior are imposed precisely in that part of the content of the statement that is the least controlled.

In speech acts that have an implicit expression, the implicit meaning is derived by the recipient from the meanings of the linguistic units under the influence of the concrete situation and the context of communication [4, p. 139].

Implicit speech acts are further subdivided into indirect and implicative speech acts [4, p. 133].

Indirect speech acts require a rethinking of the illocution of the utterance. One of the most common means of implementing indirect speech acts is the use of interrogative constructions. For example, the communicative sense of the next question is not to receive a positive or negative response from the flock. This is the preacher's attempt to set the audience to perceive important information. The preacher speaking in front of the House of Representatives expresses excitement about such an extremely responsible mission with the help of an indirect assertive. The implicit proposition, which follows discursively, is explicated after a corresponding utterance with the help of a logical sign. $+>$: *And is it strange that I should tremble in being called to declare the word of the Lord to such an audience? $+> I'm$ exited to preach in front of such an audience: Q(p)+>A(p)* [15, p. 5].

There are also indirect expressives and indirect directives fixed in English protestant sermons, for example: *What shall we say, when gold has usurped the authority of trueth, when votes have been bought and sold, and interests of a faction allowed to outweigh the rights and interests of people? Q(p)+>E(p)* (condemnation, anger) [16, p. 29]; *The only safe course for us is to go into the depth of our hearts,*

and bring out and destroy all the forms of iniquity that lurk there. +>Let's get rid of our sins: A(p)+>D(p) [15, p. 10].

In the examples above the indirect meaning is the product of the literal meaning of the utterance. The indirect meaning of illocutionary acts is potentially present in the statement itself and it can be determined by the lexical composition of the sentence.

Implicative speech acts are the speech acts containing implicative meanings, that is, such meanings, which require a chain of conclusions based on the discursive context [4, p. 133]. The addressee produces a series of inferences that allow him to derive the implicit meaning of the utterance – implicatures. In other words in the case of implicative speech acts explicit and implicit senses are simultaneously activated. Identification of their meaning is the result of a combination of factors, namely, the analysis of the propositional content of the utterance, the peculiarities of the communication situation, the individual characteristics of the speaker and the addressee, prepositional factors and the general knowledge of the communicants [8, p. 54-55]. Implicative speech acts are characterized by the inferential communicative intention of the addressee and complicated interpretative activity of the addressee [8, p. 54].

According to the implicit illocution the implicative speech acts of our data are directives, for example: *There are no powers, whether physical or otherwise, but those which are ordained of Him +> We must rely on the will of God: A(p)+>A(p)&A(q)* [15, p. 7]; assertives, for example: *The preacher cannot inculcate civil obedience, or convict of national sin, without allusions, more or less precise, to the theory and structure of the government. +> Religion and the state function independently: A(p)+>A(p)&A(q)* [16, p. 5] and expressives, for example: *The man who loves an appetite more than the improvement of his spiritual nature, who, for his sake of what is not so excellent ass a mess of pottage, will sell the birthplace of his moral dignity, does he not deserve to die? Is he not essentially low, and would not the thought be monstrous that such a spirit should be found among the children of light?*

+> All sinners deserve to be punished as far as they are wicked: Q(p)+>E(p)&E(q) (condemnation) [15, p. 16].

The propositional content of the given examples merely provides a communicative direction to the utterance, while recognizing the true communicative intention of the preacher occurs on the basis of the implicatures of the discourse of the particular message.

Thus, in our study we contrast speech acts expressing the preacher's intention directly and speech acts that are embodied in the form of a speech act of another illocutionary type. We have fixed indirect and implicative directives, assertives and expressives. Implicit directives are the most frequent ones and, thus, it evidences the manipulative nature of the preacher's influence on the flock.

Prospects for further scientific research are seen in the study of the correlation between tactics which implement a manipulative strategy with explicit and implicit speech acts of various illocutionary types in English protestant sermons.

References

1. Arutiunova N. D. Speech act. Linguistic encyclopedic dictionary. Ch. Ed. V. N. Yartseva. Moscow: Sov. encyclopedia, 1990. P. 412−413.

2. Austin J. L. How to do things with words. Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,1962. 166 p.

3. Bezuhla L. R. Verbalization of implicit senses in the German dialectical discourse. Kharkiv: V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2007. 332 p.

4. Bezuhla L. R., Romanchenko I. O. Linguistic pragmatics of discrimination in publicistic discourse. Kharkiv: FOP Lysenko I. B., 2013. 182 p.

5. Brown P., Levinson S. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: CUP, 1987. 345 p.

6. Dilay M. P. Linguistic pragmatics of English protestant sermons. Dis. … kand. filol. nauk: 10.02.04. Lviv, 2012. 230 p.

7. Grice H. P. Logic and Conversation. Syntax and Semantics. ed. by T. Givon. N.Y.: Academic Press, 1975. Vol. 3: Speech Acts. P. 41–58.

8. Hladush N. F. Implicitness of English verbal behaviour. Studia philologica. 2013. Vol. 2. C. 53-56. URL: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/ stfil_2013_2_12.

9. Lakoff R. Talking Power. The Politeness of Language. Chicago: Basic Books, 1990. 119 p.

10. Leech G. N. Principles of Pragmatic. N.Y.: Longman Linguistic Library, 1983. 250 p.

11. Nikitin M. V. Course of linguistic semantics. Saint Petersburg: Nauchnyi Tsentr Problem Dyaloha, 1996. 760 p.

12. Searle J. R. Speech Acts. Cambridge: CUP, 1969. 306 p.

13. Selivanova E. A. Basics of the linguistic theory of text and communication. Kyiv: Brama, Vovchok O.Yu., 2004. 336 p.

14. Starykova E. N. Implicit predicativeness in modern English. Kyiv: Vyscha Shkola, 1974. 142 p.

Illustrative material sources

15. Thornwell J. H. A Fast-Day Sermon. Columbia, S. C.: Southern Guardian Steam-Power Press, 1860. 51 p. URL: https://babel.hathitrust.org/ cgi/pt?id=dul1.ark:/13960/t04x8bf9p;view=1up;seq=47

16. Thornwell J. H. Judgements, a Call to Repentance. Columbia, S. C.: R. W. Gibbes & Co., State Printers, 1854. 56 p. URL: https://babel.hathitrust.org/ cgi/pt?id=chi.090245535;view=1up;seq=1