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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

MUNICIPAL INTEGRATION OF SOUTHERN UKRAINE JEWS AT THE END OF THE XVIII – THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURIES: SETTLEMENT, MODERNIZATION AND PARTICIPATION IN SELF-GOVERNMENT

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Abstract

The article is dedicated to the research of Jewish population conditions in southern towns of Ukraine during the end of the XVIII – beginning of the XX centuries. Jewish population constituted a substantial part of southern towns' population during the studied period. That is why the participation of the Jews in cultural, national and municipal life of southern Ukrainian towns is analyzed. Employment of the Jews in towns is characterized, too. The South of Ukraine from a legal point of view of the Russian Empire was marked as a limit for Jewish settlement, so the details of their participation in self-government are analyzed. The problem of the Jews' participation in urbanization and modernization of the Southern Ukraine region is studied taken separately. Demographic changes in a part of Jewish population and in regard to their correlation in municipal councils are also characterized. The conclusions are made concerning the role of the Jews in urbanization of the Southern Ukraine region and their activity in municipal self-government.

Key words: *The South of Ukraine, Jewish population, municipal self-government, local government, the limits of settlement*

Introduction

In the second half of the XVIII century serious geopolitical changes took place which were related directly to the incorporation of the northern Black Sea region into the Russian Empire, making its borderline alongside the Black Sea coast, founding new towns and establishing new trading relationships: both international and home. After the above incorporation of the Southern Ukraine region into the Russian Empire previous or former military settlements became bases for a plenty of Southern Ukraine towns. Eventually they were regarded as "cities", at the time the power was transferred from military command to civil administrations, which completed towns' formation and their obtaining civil power.

The building of military fortresses and new towns became a stimulus for economic, industrial and trading development of the region (Atanelishvili and Silagadze, 2018). Soon in the Southern Ukraine new towns were built on a basis of old Cossacks' and Crimean tartars' fortresses and settlements. Towns in the region were founded, first of all, as military-administrative centers, on which following primary

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tasks were put: to hold a territory, to populate it, to form administrations and only in due course to develop economically.

International relationships became more tolerant, old conflicts were forgotten and stereotypes were changed. Those who were enemies in their homelands, here in the South of Ukraine got married. At the crossroads of Jewish, Russian and Ukrainian languages a specific “Odessa’s language” was borne. The South of Ukraine became the most tolerant region among others both in Ukraine and Russia in social, national, religious and cultural aspects. Thus, “new life” in the Southern Ukraine changed and modernized all social groups and nationalities, having produced new thinking and behavioural stereotypes as being Liberal-European and civilized. The above mentioned had an impact on social and political life which was more intensive here in comparison with neighbour regions of the Empire (Kozyrev, 2016).

The most characteristic feature of the Southern Ukraine was that from the very beginning it was an area of intensive international process. An active part in the process was taken by representatives of numerous ethnic groups, substantially different from each other by customs, national character, level of national self-conscience, economic and cultural development. According to the report of Kherson Gubernator from 1852: “No province represented such a plenty of nationalities as Kherson one. Here apart from merchants of different nationalities, who constituted a substantial number, permanently there lived the Malorusians, the Great Russians, the Belarusians, the Serbians, the Bulgarians, the Moldavians, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Germans, the Karaims and the Jews” (Russian State Historical Archive, 2018). Further in the documents the following nationalities are mentioned: the Polish, the Swedes, the Gipsy, the Lithuanians, the Georgians, the Crimean Tatars, the Nogajans, the Kazakhs, the Italians, the French and the Mordovians; 22 nationalities in total. Each of these nationalities left a distinctive feature on the region’s variegated cultural life as well as on its economic activity.

Defining the status of representatives of different nationalities in the Southern Ukraine

The re-settlement of representatives of different nationalities onto the territory of the Southern Ukraine put a problem of defining their status (Bondaletov, 2015). The author shares V. Kolisnyk’s thought that on a basis of the colonization process in the South of Ukraine the Russian Government developed a classification system of state subjects who were divided into three groups (national-ethnic factor was taken as a criterion). The first group consisted of natural subjects among whom nobility, clergy, townspeople and countrymen were distinguished. The second group according to official terminology consisted of heterogeneous population. The third group, the separated one, consisted of Finnish population. Depending on belonging to this or that subject category, the legislation varied substantially in relation to legal status of a person (Kolisnyk, 2001: 70-77).

In fact, the attitude of the Russian Government to colonists of various nationalities was different, which was reflected on the legislation level. In particular:

- Jewish population was separated into a group for which on the territory of the South of Ukraine a limit of settlement was ordered.

- Jews were obliged to carry out military obligations paying in kind, even more than other groups of population;
- Jews were prohibited to take part in local self-government until 1870.

After the colonization of the region, its national formation was basically completed. The Ukrainians, the Russians and the Jews constituted a majority of population in the region (Kabuzan, 1976: 136-149).

According to the researches of O. Donik (2011) and O. Danylchenko (2009), the Russians were the most numerous population group in the Southern Ukraine towns. To the greater extent, they represented military officers, officials, nobility, tradesmen, townspeople, clergy and others. Their number increased substantially at the expense of natural migration from inner regions. The characteristic feature of the colonization of the South of Ukraine was that the Ukrainians settled in the countryside working on farms, whereas the Russians lived in towns. There are a lot of Crimean Tatars who lived in the countryside on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. The Jews constituted a competitive number for the Russians in towns, which corresponded to military-administrative and commercial specifics of southern towns. Foreign colonists settled mostly in the countryside forming their own communities. In towns, they settled in small groups. For example, the Germans lived compactly in Sudak, Feodosija and other towns. The Greeks lived in Kherson, Mariupol, in the Crimean peninsular towns. The Jews constituted the most compact municipal communities in all towns of the South, especially in Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kerch, Elisavetgrad, as the territory marked the limit of settlement. The Moldavians lived in all towns of the south, but the most populous group lived in Odessa. Communities of the Ukrainians, the Bulgarians, the Polish, the Greeks, the Swedes, the French, the Czechs, the Serbians, the Estonians, the Italians, the Lithuanians, the Belarusians, the Georgians, the Armenians and others were not populous in the Southern Ukraine towns.

The documents testified that on the territory of the Southern Ukraine all nationalities became modernized. It was indicated that the Russians learnt a lot of Ukrainian words, idiomatic expressions, sayings and other peculiarities of Ukrainian language. The Moldovan population, although having preserved its native language, knew Ukrainian well. The Serbs nearly merged with Ukrainian population. Besides, it was indicated that the Ukrainians of the Southern Ukraine differed from those living on other territories. The former was more mobile, and unlike the Ukrainians from the Left or the Right bank Ukraine, they did not suffer from serfdom's influence. They could go to the Crimea freely or to Moldova in order to earn money in towns, or to work on fields of other farmers or just to run away. Sometimes runaway Ukrainian serfs formed criminal groups who fought against Russian landlords and the Jews, which reflected old memory of Hydamacks movement. In general, there is a widespread opinion that the Ukrainians worked on farms mostly. So it was. Apart from that town Ukrainian residents worked in fishing co-operatives, salt enterprises or worked as cabmen (especially in port towns), when free from working on farms or as shepherds – feeding cattle (Maykov, 1868).

Representatives of the *Russian nationality* – the nobility and the merchantry – took official posts in the state, they were also engaged in commerce and industries.

Although Russian peasants settled in villages, they did not stay permanently there but went to towns the way they did in Russia. The *Belarusians* were not numerous, usually they were busy with farming and transportation. The *Polish* were divided into two categories. The first one took part in the colonization process of the end of the XVIII century. Representatives of this category belonged to higher social strata and served in the state or private service. Representatives of the second category – re-settled by the government in 1847 – were busy with cattle and agriculture farming. The *Bulgarians*, the *Moldavians* and the *Greeks* were busy mostly with cattle and agriculture farming and commerce. The *Germans* worked as teachers in towns, engaged in commerce, they were also industrialists, artisans and officials. The *Swedes* lived in colonies preserving their mother tongue and customs and regarded themselves as subjects of Russia; they studied Russian language in towns (Maykov, 1868).

The *Armenians* lived in towns forming small groups. They were busy with commerce and various trades. But the rich were not numerous, as the Jews were competitive with them in commerce. The *Jews* constituted one of the most numerous population groups in the Southern Ukraine towns. Their main activities were commerce and trading. There were also artisans, but rarely. They possessed main capitals of the region. They found it more profitable to deal with the Ukrainians or foreigners. Among Russian population they were known as renters or buyers of bankrupted estates, where they grew wheat or flax on fields and then sold crops abroad. In commerce they were not competitive only with the Russians (Maykov, 1868).

It is known that the Jews re-settling to modernized Southern Ukraine from Podolje and Volyn provinces, where their relatives still lived in traditional towns-ghettoes, forgot their traditional lifestyle very quickly. As a result, they began to get ready 2-3 months before visiting relatives looking for old-fashioned suits, yarmulkes and other articles of traditional Jewish cloth; they also grew paces to look themselves their parents wanted them to (Turchenko and Turchenko, 2003).

Analysis of statistical data of representatives of different nationalities of the Southern Ukraine

Statistical data of Tavria province from 1865 indicated that the Russians (the Great Russians, the Malorusians) lived in towns in the quantity of 58 900 people (10.2% total population of the province). Their quantity was nearly the same on the Crimean peninsular. The Crimean Tatars were 4.7% (lived exceptionally on the Crimean peninsular). The Jews were 2.2%, the Greeks were 1.9%, and other nationalities were less than 1%. In total, townspeople constituted 20.3% in the province (Ravesskiy, 1865).

According to statistics of Katherinoslav province, the Great Russians constituted a majority of population in the south-east part (80 thousand people), whereas the Malorusians – in the north-west part. It was also indicated that the Serbs adopted completely traditions, customs and language of the Ukrainians and nearly merged into one nationality. The Jews (23 thousand people) lived in all towns of the province, were busy with commerce, the Greeks lived compactly in Mariupol district. The Armenians

(up to 20 thousand people) were mostly merchants or townspeople and were engaged in commerce in different towns of the south (Vilson, 1863).

According to the census of population from 1987, town's population were 28.87% of the total in the province. The most populated towns were Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Elisavetgrad. In the column "mother-tongue" it was indicated that the Ukrainians were 1 462 039 people, whereas the Russians were 545 375 in the province; there were no distribution data for towns. It was indicated, as a result, that the Russians prevailed in the western districts of the province, the Jews and the other nationalities prevailed in the east. In Odessa lived 55.6% Jews of all towns in the province. According to group distribution middle-classes constituted the most numerous group – 62%, peasants – 25%, merchants – 1.26%, foreigners – 2.88%, other groups – 8%. According to occupations of townspeople it was indicated that the Jews prevailed in commerce, whereas the Russians and the Ukrainians were engaged mostly in various industries (Troynitskiy, 1904).

In Tavria province according to the census of population from 1897 townspeople constituted 20% of the total. In the column "the Russians" there were subdivisions for nationalities: The Great Russians (49.1%), the Malorusians (10.4%) and the Belarusians (0.2%). As for other nationalities, there were following percentages: The Crimean Tatars in towns were 14.2%, the Jews – 11%, the Karaims – 3%, the Greeks – 3.6%, other nationalities – less than 1%. In the countryside the Ukrainians constituted a majority in comparison with towns (42.2%). In total, the Crimean Tatars in the province were about 34%, whereas the Russians – 28% (Troynitskiy, 1904).

According to the census of population from 1897, in Katherinoslav province townspeople were represented by their nationalities as following. In total in the province:

- the Ukrainians constituted a majority – 68.9%;
- the Russians – 17.27%;
- the Jews – 4.69%;
- the Germans – 3.83%;
- the Greeks – 2.31%;
- the Crimean Tatars – 0.82%;
- the others nationalities (the Poles, the Belarusians, the Moldavians, the Turks, the Gypsies, the French) – less than 1%.

In towns representatives of the abovementioned nationalities were distributed as following: in Katherinoslav the Russians constituted a majority (41.78%), the Jews – 35.43%, whereas the Ukrainians – only 15.76%. In Lugansk the Russians prevailed – 68.16%. Mariupol was populated mostly by the Russians (63.22%), the Jews were 15.14%, the Ukrainians – 10.4%. Other nationalities constituted the absolute minority. In particular, the Ukrainians were 19.2%, the Jews – 7.1%, other nationalities – less than 1%. Nearly a half the Russians (51.47%) and the Ukrainians (42.99%) lived in Slovjanoserbsk. In Pavlograd the Ukrainians were 33.43%, whereas the Russians – 34.36%, the Jews – 27%. In Oleksandrovska (42.98%), Novomoskovsk (77%), Verchnedniprovsk (56%), Bachmut (61.78%) the Ukrainian population prevailed. The Russians and the Jews constituted a minority there (Table 1).

Table 1: National representation in municipal self-government of the Southern Ukraine (Troynitskiy, 1904)

Town	Russians	Ukrainians	Jews	Poles	Romanians	Greeks	Crimean Tatars
Kherson	75,4	15	1,5	8,4			
Berislav	10	83,3					
Mykolaiv	90,4	3,6	0,6	7,4			
Olexandria	35	58,8					
Novogeorgievsk	63,3	36,4					
Ananjiv	41,6	35		15,6	6,5		
Elisavetgrad	59,8	28,4	2,9	7,8			
Bobrinetz	28,6	61,9		4,8	4,8		
Voznesensk	42,8	38,1		9,5			
Novomirgorod	95,6	4,4					
Olviopol	44,4	55,6					
Odessa	72,8	7,6	6,4	8,7			
Majaki	44,4	55,6					
Ovidiopol	63,3	27,2		9			
Ochakiv	44,4	55,6					
Katerinoslav	63	25	13				
Oleksandrivsk	37,7	58	3,8				
Bachmut	22,2	68,9	4,4				
Verchnedniprovsk	39	60,7					
Mariupol	67,8	7,1				14,3	
Novomoskovsk	38	53	3				
Pavlograd	64,6	29,2	6,3				
Slovjanoserbsk	50	50					
Lugansk	83,3	13,3					
Simferopol	71,6	9,2	2,6				5,5
Bachtchisarai	11,8	5,8					40,5
Karasubazar	42,1	5,2	10,5				31,5
Berdjansk	67,9	21,5					
Nogaïsk	85,7	14,3					
Orchiv	18,2	81,8					
Oleshki	91,3	6,5					
Eupatoria	63	6,5					15,2
Melitopol	76,9	13,5					
Perekop	77,8	3,7					11,1
Jalta	82,7	6,8					
Feodosia	69,2	5,7					5,7
Staryi Krym	80						
Kertch	84,3	4,7	4,7				1,5

According to the calculations of O. Danylchenko (2009), the national formation situation in towns at the beginning of the XX century had certain characteristic features. During the first decade, the percentage of towns' population surpassed that in other regions of Ukraine. In the South of Ukraine, it constituted 21.7%, whereas on an average for Ukraine it was 18.3%. Towns of the south remained multinational with

the prevalence of the Russians – 43%, the Jews – 26%, the Ukrainians – 24% and 7% for other nationalities.

The above mentioned period may be considered as the first in urbanization of the South of Ukraine. The most populous national groups were the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Jews, which was a result of solving military-administrative and trading-commercial tasks. At the beginning of the XX century, the national formation situation changed, but not substantially: the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Jews constituted a majority of population of southern Ukrainian towns. So the towns can be reasonably called *Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish*.

For example, V. Zhabotinskiy, a famous Jewish public figure from Odessa of the beginning of the XX century, wrote in his memoirs: “Even though it (Odessa) was in Russia and at my time it was russified linguistically, Odessa was not a Russian town in fact. It was not a Jewish either, although the Jews were a prevalent ethnic group, especially, if we consider that the so-called Russians were the Ukrainians indeed, that is to say the people who differed from the Russians like the Americans differ from the English or the English from the Irish” (Gerligi, 1999).

The Emperor Alexander I regarded the book of Englishman Robert Lyall “Travels in Russia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Georgia” (1825) as hostile for the Russian Empire. In the traveler’s works around Kherson, Katherinoslav and Tavria Provinces the Russians looked corrupted, the Jews – swindles. He calls the South of Ukraine a separate country, whose population consisted of the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Jews and foreigners. Robert Lyall describes the region’s history in detail; he also characterizes the activity of Peter I and his dreams of a civilizing mission on the Black Sea’s coasts. Then he analyses the reasons why it failed and the region was civilized by representatives of the Western Europe instead. His attention is drawn onto the fact that southern Ukrainian towns developed very quickly. It was difficult do recognize them within 5 years. He considered the Government’s activity concerning economical development as insufficient; he also criticized commercial activity with West Europe in particular. He drew a conclusion that Odessa should be one of the best ports of the world and that the Government blocked its quick development (Gutri, 2012).

It should be mentioned that Jewish language had a great impact on the southern Ukrainian inhabitants and served as a basis for creating a special “Odessa’s language”. For example, V. Shyshkov noted: “«Odessa’s language» was not a collection of random irregularities of Russian language; it had deep roots and lasting traditions, its «norms» and «rules»... Russian language of middle classes was influenced greatly by Ukrainian and Jewish language elements” (Shyshov, 1998). Russian was spoken in towns of the South of Ukraine indeed, but according to statistic data of the beginning of the XX century the Russians were not considered as erudites of Russian language, whereas the Jews (51%) knew Russian.

Cultural influence of the Jewish population was distinctive in periodicals. For example, the most popular newspapers and magazines were published in French, German and English. Even the periodical “Vestnik of Southern Russia” (1820) was firstly published in French. The attempts to publish “Vestnik” in Russian for merchnts ended in downfall of its popularity. When the editorial board addressed to

police asking for help in widespreading the newspaper, they could find even with the above help only 5 people wishing to buy the newspaper in Russian. In reply to it local merchants said they could learn better and fresher news from the Jews, notwithstanding the fact that Russian merchants outnumbered Jewish thrice (Skalkovskiy, 1894).

These examples could be regarded as signs of the region's renewal and modernity, which proves that in the South of Ukraine the modernization was going on quickly, whereas traditionalism did not keep pace with "new" rhythms of life. New social, national, cultural, commercial-industrial conditions created faster tempos of modernization in comparison with other regions.

Local self-government of Southern Ukraine provinces was multinational in its formation. According to ethnical representation, the Poles, the Romanians, the French, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Crimean Tatars, the Jews, the re-baptized Jews, the Germans were represented in public establishments, though the Russians and Ukrainians constituted the most substantial part.

Despite the fact that the Jewish population in Southern Ukraine towns constituted one of the most populous ethnic groups, the Jews were not numerous in municipal self-government. Only Odessa could be proud of Jews' most numerous representation – 6.4%, and the least – in Mykolaiv – 0.6%. In Kherson 1.5% were elected to public establishments, in Elisavetgrad – 2.9%. The Romanians were elected mostly in 2 towns – Ananjev (6.5%) and Bobrinets (4.8%). The Jews were in the absolute minority in all self-government structures of Katherinoslav province. The representatives from the Jewish ethnos were also in the minority in all towns of Tavria province. From 2% to 10% of the Jews were elected in different towns. The deputies from the Armenians, the Greeks, the Germans and others had from 2% to 4% (Troynitskiy, 1904).

The Jews were permitted to be elected to bodies of public government only after 1870, before that they could be elected to municipal self-government only through re-baptizing. After 1870, the Jews were elected to municipal councils, though their number was substantial only in Odessa. They were in a minority in other Southern Ukraine towns: from 2-3 to 10 persons depending on a town's status. They were absent in some towns of the region.

For example, in self-government of Kherson city there were few who supported deputies from the Jews, even their colleague deputies did not like their presence in the city council and they spread ideas among their electorate that it would make no good, because the Jewish deputies were not responsible before them (Khaustova, 2018). Thus, in a majority of municipal councils of the South of Ukraine the representatives of the Russian nationality prevailed. In self-government bodies representatives from the Ukrainians, the Jews, the Armenians, the Greeks and others were not numerous.

At the same time, in spite of their inconsiderable presence in city councils, the Jewish contribution to the development of municipal self-government was rather significant. For example, one of the most notable figures of Odessa city council was a Jew O. Pergament (he had university education and was a honored citizen of Odessa), who was elected the president of the Odessa republic during eventful revolutionary years of 1905-1907, and after its end he was elected a deputy of the State Duma.

It is worth to mention that the leader of Kherson city council was Jews-millionaire Rabinovich. In 1908 Kherson deputies defended their views concerning development of the sea port. The then civil gubernator did not consider the activity of deputies as professional, as they were representatives of different professions (dentists, lawyers and others). He regarded himself as an expert, so his ideas of the port's development (orientation onto inner markets – Olexandrivskiy and Donetskii) were quite rational, because it was possible to trade cheap char coals. In future the port would be competitive with Mykolaiv's (Kostruba, 2018). According to the deputies' plan it was necessary to build a rail-way from the station to the port. The gubernator's plan was postponed after almost a year of long debates. He was extremely annoyed that dentist Rjabkov was against the head of the province and the others took millionaire Rabinovich's advice. The leaders of the city council turned the public to their side and received a support from the Ministry of Trade. The Council of Ministers stood aside in this matter, but it ordered the deputies to co-ordinate their activity with the Gubernator, not addressing directly to the ministries, which caused misunderstandings (The report from the Senate's case...: 30-60).

Thanks to the *Jews* the case of bribery both in municipal self-government ranks and in the structures of Kherson provincial administration was revealed to the public in 1820-1830. During the investigation a public questioning was carried out concerning bribery in the province. In all towns local inhabitants proved that the provincial officials were "great bribe-takers who were very harmful and put the fear into a majority of the community with their unlawful deeds". During the trial in a court session the gubernator did not evidence any relation to it and even looked like a weak person not able to control his own officials who made advantage of it. However, a suspicion arose that the gubernator was defended and protected and, as a matter of fact, he was not found guilty. At the time there were no direct evidences of the gubernator's guilt. Everything happened, when the gubernator went on business trips. All the guilty persons were sentenced to different terms, except for the ober-prosecutor of the Senate, the guilt of whose was not ever proved. The top rank person to be sentenced was the vice-gubernator of Kherson province A. Rewl. In fact, the case started with beating a baptized Jew who had been forced to enter the army and did not want to give a bribe of 500 rubles. The prosecutor Shulzenko and A. Rula extorted the biggest fixed bribe from a Jew Fanung (8 000 rubles) for closing a criminal case against him, in which the latter was supposedly guilty of protecting some runaways (The case of accusation of bribery and abuse...: 21-45).

Not taking into consideration rather special relationships the Jews had with self-government bodies of the South of Ukraine, they did not manage to work out a programme aimed at further development of municipalities. They were more interested in problems of their own self-determination.

The parties of national minorities were engaged in problems of political future of their own nationalities. In particular, Jewish social-democratic workers' party "Poaley-Scion" (the first organization in Ukraine was founded in Katherinoslav in 1900-1901, and later – in other towns) tried to combine socialistic ideas with Zionism. The party defended a priority of territorial solution of the Jewish problem by the way of establishing a centre in Palestine. The party also set a task of liquidating capitalism'

system and breaking dominance of the bourgeoisie over proletariat. In 1904 in Odessa a part of the representatives broke off and eliminated the issues concerning Palestine, they began to call oneself Zionistic-socialistic workers' party. Its members considered a national autonomy as insufficient for solving the Jewish problem and broadened their demands including national equality. In 1905, another part of the party founded Jewish social-democratic party and proclaimed establishing national autonomy on a basis of self-governed communities. Nothing was mentioned in the programme documents concerning development of self-government in Ukraine or in the south, as the most actual problem for the party was solving the national issue (Fomin, 1996).

Conclusions

Thus, we can draw a conclusion that the Jews took an active part in the colonization and urbanization processes of the South of Ukraine at the end XVIII of the XX century, turning themselves into one of the numerous population groups of the region. For the greater part the Jews actively integrated in cities' life of the region, quickly self-modernized and got an access to patterns of "new life" of the region, that is why towns of the South of Ukraine may be considered as Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish. The Jews quickly created necessary images of towns' population: merchants, traders, bankers, shipbuilders and others. They had a great influence on social-economic development of the region. At the same time the Jews' integration into self-government bodies was not so active. They always approached tolerantly to administrative structures either in the province or in the centre. No documents have been found to evidence their criticism of local self-government or provincial administration. They could take part in municipal councils until 1870 by the only way – re-baptizing. After 1870 they were allowed to be elected to municipal structures. At the time the Jewish population almost did not make use of this right. Notwithstanding the fact that the Jewish population constituted one of the largest inhabitant groups of the region, they were few in municipal self-government bodies. However, they were among the most influential figures in towns of Kherson province. At the same time, their political views did not go far beyond the borders of national self-determination.

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**KING CAROL II'S NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY
AND THE "CONCENTRATION GOVERNMENT"
LED BY GHEORGHE TĂTĂRESCU (NOVEMBER 1939 – MAY 1940)**

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Abstract

At the end of 1939 and in the first part of the next year, Carol II tried to adopt a reconciliation policy, which determined the appointment of Gheorghe Tătărescu as the President of the Council of Ministers from Romania. Depicting the internal and external context that led to the formation of Tătărescu Cabinet or finding the main reasons for the "government of concentration" are some of the most important issues that will be taken into consideration in the next pages, another concern being to identify the main aspects of Carol II's reconciliation policy. Moreover, by analysing the above-mentioned topics, it will be very important to highlight the role played in the monarchic authority regime by the Tătărescu Government.

Key words: *King Carol II, reconciliation policy, Gheorghe Tătărescu, Government, Romanian former politicians*

Introduction

When writing about the end of the year 1939 and the first half of the year 1940, one must consider two relevant aspects for understanding the context of Gheorghe Tătărescu's appointment as Prime Minister of Romania – on the one hand, the way that Carol II exercised his royal privileges and, on the other hand, the government instability that characterized the regime of monarchical authority.

King Carol II is known for his tendency of leading the state according to his own will, a fact that the Sovereign demonstrated along his reign. The authoritarian regime that the Monarch established on February 10th/11th, 1938 allowed him to have a wider impact decision regarding the state affairs.

As it was mentioned before, the second relevant aspect is the government instability. It is true that during the interwar period there were only two governments that lasted four years (a full mandate), but the period from February 1938 to September 1940 exceeded any "expectations" in this respect. Thus, if during the first decade of the interwar period one can find 11 governments, and in the next decade 14 more, during the period of monarchical authority – that lasted two years and a half – 9 governments were created. Another negative aspect of these frequent government changes was the lack of consistency for the governmental programs during the years 1938 to 1940.

Regarding the Government that will be analysed in this article, it is important to underline how Gheorghe Tătărescu was appointed as President of the Council of Ministers, in November 1939. The loss of one of the main supporters of the authoritarian regime, Armand Călinescu, assassinated on September 21st, 1939

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(Chivulescu, 1998: 300-301), who at the time of the assassination was Prime Minister, put the King in an unexpected and quite unpleasant situation (Carol, 1997: 226). The governmental policies and the incipient cohesiveness that the great strategist Călinescu had begun to give to the Sovereign's plans were suddenly interrupted by the death of the President of the Council of Ministers.

At the beginning, the Monarch wanted revenge and appointed General Gheorghe Argeșeanu as Prime Minister for only one week (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri*, file no. 167/1939: 77-79); later, for a period of two months, the King appointed Constantin Argetoianu as the head of the Government (Historic National Archives of Romania, fund: *Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri*, file no 167/1939: 85-86; Argetoianu, 2003: 168-169). The collaboration with Argetoianu didn't have the expected results and, thus, the Prime Minister resigned after Carol II provoked a government crisis, by staging a "farse" or "comedy", as the King himself called it (Carol, 1997: 286-290).

The person to replace Argetoianu had been found in advance, and his name was Gheorghe Tătărescu (Nedelea, 1991: 129). The reasons for choosing him are not difficult to identify – Tătărescu was an older collaborator of the Monarch (Gafencu, 1991: 344-345); he was also the only President of the Council of Ministers that was in office a full mandate during Carol II's reign (Chistol, 2007). The good collaboration between the King and Tătărescu was obviously based on the Prime Minister's obedience.

King Carol II's decisions and actions must be seen in a wider context, and they were influenced by external and internal factors. In Europe, World War II had begun a few months earlier; the rapid conquest of Poland and its division between Germany and the Soviet Union (Buzatu, Cîrstea, 2007: 192) demonstrated, on the one hand, the toughness of the terms in which the two totalitarian states seemed appropriate to act in the new conflict and, on the other hand, it revealed the weakness of Western democracies. This extremely difficult context put King Carol II in the ingrained position of reshaping Romania's foreign policy (Lungu, Negreanu, 2003: passim).

Obviously, Romania's traditional foreign policy was based on the cooperation with France and Great Britain, but the danger represented by the neighbouring revisionist states, headed by the Soviet Union and implicitly the force they demonstrated, instilled to the King and to the Romanian people as well to a strong sense of insecurity. That was the reason why the Sovereign tried to slightly change Romania's position in Europe, which to some extent was reflected in the appointment of the Government members.

In Romania, the situation seemed far from being clear and calm. What was the internal context? The authoritarian regime had been imposed on February 10th/11th, 1938, a new constitution had been adopted and the political background had also been redefined by removing traditional political parties out of the law (*Monitorul Oficial*, no 75 from March 31st, 1938) and by establishing the first single Romanian political party, in December 1938 (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 1/1939: 8). Theoretically, things seemed to follow the King's plans; however, on the one hand, the lack of the popular adherence and, on the other hand, the preservation of the intransigent positions of some political leaders who did not

agree to play according to the “royal script”, made Carol II’s original ideas of ruling impossible to put into practice.

Moreover, the Sovereign realised that some politicians did not trust his political vision and more than that, they engaged in some sort of uncoordinated campaign of denigrating and criticising King’s actions. The opposition that the Monarch had to face at end of 1937 never ceased and it was obvious that neither the introduction of the new regime nor the legislative changes could stop it.

If during Călinescu Government an important part of the political decisions had been made by the Prime Minister, after his assassination, all the responsibility of the leadership fell on King Carol II’s shoulders. The two short Governments – Argeșeanu and Argetoianu – made the Sovereign aware of the necessity of improving the political internal situation. Carol II’s solution was to find support for his regime from as many politicians and citizens as possible. This attempt was put into practice by what historians called “the policy of national reconciliation” (Savu, 1970: 341).

The new Government

The establishment of the new Government seems to have been reflecting, on the one hand, the direction that the King was trying to give to the foreign policy and, on the other hand, the reconciliation strategy with the internal political factors. Thus, regarding the foreign policy, the Sovereign sought to maintain Romania’s loyalty to traditional allies and, at the same time, tried to improve relations with Germany by intensifying trade links.

Therefore, the Council of Ministers was composed mostly of politicians with an Anglo-French vision, but the new team gathered also politicians who saw the benefits of a closer relation between Romania and Germany. Regarding the internal affairs, the main concern of the Sovereign seems to have been the balance of the situation between the political factors. Thus, in choosing the members of the new Cabinet, the Monarch took into consideration two criteria: the first was the affiliation to the old political parties and the other was the position of those elected to enter the Government towards the two main combatants in the war that had recently begun in Europe.

Taking into account his wish to attract as many politicians as possible for the authoritarian regime, Carol II placed in the new Government, different politicians from the entire political spectrum and, in theory, managed to create, as he himself wrote, “the most ideal (sic!) Government of concentration” (Carol, 1997: 293).

Gheorghe Tătărescu was appointed as President of the Council of Ministers (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri*, file no. 167/1939: 102, 104); before this nomination he was Ambassador of Romania to Paris from December 1938 to August 1939 (Chistol, 2007; 146). One can observe that the leadership of the Government was entrusted to a liberal who had close ties with France. Trying not to be judge by his former political views, Tătărescu assured the German ambassador to Bucharest that Romania will remain neutral and that the economic cooperation with the Reich will increase (Haynes, 2003: 131). Regarding the appointment of Tătărescu, Horia Sima, the leader of the Legionnaires, considered it to

be a sign of improving the Suveran's attitude towards the movement he was leading (Sima, 1977: 55-56).

Contrary to expectations, the new Cabinet has maintained many of Argetoianu's Government Ministers. Thus, 11 of the 19 Ministers of that Government remained in the new governmental team, 10 of them maintaining their posts, and one – Mihail Ghelmegeanu – being moved from the Ministry of Public Works and Communications to the Ministry of Interior.

According to the Royal Decree No. 4277 from November 24th, 1939, the Royal Counselor Gheorghe Tătărescu was appointed as President of the Council of Ministers and interim of the Ministry of Interior (Fund: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, File No. 167/ 1939: 102); the members of the Government were: Ion Nistor – Minister of Cults and Arts, Gheorghe Ionescu Sisești – Minister of Agriculture and Domains, Victor Slăvescu – Minister of Endowment of the Army, Istrate Micescu – Minister of Justice, Ion Gigurtu – Minister of Public Works and Communications, Silviu Dragomir – Minister responsible for the Minorities, Constantin Angelescu – Minister of National Economy, Mitita Constantinescu – Minister of Finance (he was also Governor of the National Bank), Deputy General Paul Teodorescu – Minister of Air and Navy, Mihail Ralea – Minister of Labor, Grigore Gafencu – Minister of Foreign Affairs and interim at the Ministry of National Propaganda, Petre Andrei – Minister of National Education, Traian Pop – Minister responsible for the inventory of public wealth, General Ion Ilcușu – Minister of National Defense, Constantin C. Giurescu – Minister responsible for the organization of the National Renaissance Front, Nicolae Hortolomei – Minister of Health and Welfare, Mihail Șerban – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Agriculture and Domains, Petre Topa – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Health and Welfare, Radu Portocală – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Interior, DV Toni – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Education, Gheorghe Grigorovici – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Labor, Gheorghe G. Vântu – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Interior, Titus Popovici – Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Economy, N. Sibiceanu – Undersecretary of State attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (fund: *Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri*, file no. 167/1939: 105; Carol, 1997: 292-293; Andrei, 1993: 82). In February 1940 a new Ministry was created – the Ministry of Foreign Trade headed by Ion Christu (Carol, 1998: 60, 62).

The structure of the new Government demonstrates that the idea of national reconciliation must be sought rather in the actions of the Government and not so much in its composition; as one may observe, most of the ministers were former members of the National Liberal Party or National Peasants Party.

In order to create the impression of “government of concentration”, the additions made to the Government team belonged to the extremes of the political spectrum. Thus, from the extreme right was included in the Council of Ministers Ion Gigurtu as the Minister of Public Works and Communications. By this appointment, the Monarch believed that he could demonstrate to the Berlin leadership the willingness of Romania to negotiate with Germany. In the category of right-wing extremists, the Sovereign also included Istrate Micescu (Carol, 1997: 293), who served

as Minister of Justice and who had an anti-Semitic view; but one may also take into consideration that being a graduate of a Parisian University, where he also obtained a Doctorate in Law, Micescu had, in terms of foreign policy, a much more nuanced position. The effect of these two nominations was not the one expected by the King; from the reaction that some of the German leaders had, it can be concluded that they would have wanted a new governmental team with many more Ministers having a pro-German political view (Savu, 1970: 342-343).

From the left part of the political spectrum, the King included in the Government the last President of the Social Democratic Party – Gheorghe Grigorovici (Titel Petrescu, 2003: 456, 463-464; Carol, 1997: 292), who was entrusted with the position of Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Labour.

The attempt of the reconciliation with the political leaders

Considering the complicated general context, Carol II's position can be better understood – the King attempted to develop a cautious and slightly duplicitous policy. By analysing the governmental composition, one can observe that the Sovereign – unable to control the external situation – focused its attention on improving relations with the Romanian political leaders in an effort to obtain the widest approval from all internal political groups.

In addition to broadening the government's political base, the reconciliation policy can also be seen in the actions that the King and the Government undertook, and which converged towards attracting all the political forces, which, although outlawed by the Low-Decree from March 30th, 1938, continued to exist and influence the public opinion.

The most important political groups at that time in Romania were National Liberal Party, National Peasants Party and the Legionary Movement; thus, it is understandable that the Monarch's attention turned towards the leaders and important members of those former political parties. If at the establishment of the authoritarian regime, and later at the establishment of the National Renaissance Front, Carol had probably wanted a sincere involvement of the politicians, with the launch of the national reconciliation policy, the Sovereign became more realistic in his intentions. Thus, in order to create the impression of a consensus regarding his political direction, the Monarch tried to obtain the enrolment of former politicians in the National Renaissance Front. One of the main supporters of this strategy was the Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu; thus, since taking office, Tătărescu presented this policy as part of his governmental program (Carol, 1998: 24).

The immediate response of the national-liberal and national-peasant leaders to the request of the Prime Minister was to refuse the proposal; furthermore, Constantin I.C. Brătianu, the President of the National Liberal Party, sent a written response in which he severely criticized the new regime (C.I.C. Brătianu, Carol II, Ion Antonescu, 1992: 81-82). Also, Constantin I.C. Brătianu continued the series of written statements of contesting the actions of the King and of the President of the Council of Ministers (C.I. Brătianu, Carol II, Ion Antonescu, 1992: 83-85, 90-95); Iuliu Maniu, the President of the National Peasants Party acted in a similar way. Moreover, together they sent to the Sovereign a joint statement requesting that, in order to remedy the

very difficult situation of the country, to allow the traditional political parties to re-enter into legality (Gridan, Oncescu, 2010: 183-184).

In order to diminish the influence that their opinion could have on the citizens, on February 20th, 1940, the Law Decree regarding the Clandestine Publications was adopted. It established, on the one hand, the strict control of all opposition publications that denigrated the authoritarian regime and, on the other hand, allowed the authorities to establish a compulsory domicile for those who were acting or even planning actions prohibited by the law (Dima, 2010: 224-225).

The only one of the three political leaders of the “opposition” who responded to the Sovereign’s call to join the new regime was the national peasant Ion Mihalache, who, however, unwilling to join the National Renaissance Front, only served as the Royal Counsellor (*Monitorul Oficial* no 93 of April 18th, 1940). That decision led to heated discussions between Maniu and Mihalache (Hudiță, 1998: 124) and brought to the last harsh criticism from some of his national peasants colleagues (Hudiță, 1998: 125-128).

According to Gabriel Marinescu’s statements that can be found in Ioan Hudiță’s journal, Mihalache’s appointment as Royal Counsellor was linked to his position as a one of the most important opinion leaders of the Romanian peasants. Ion Mihalache’s role was very important during that period if we consider the fact that, for a variety of reasons, many of the peasants enrolled in the army began to desert. According to Marinescu, the situation of the garrisons was so bad that if he had accepted, Ion Mihalache could have even been offered the leadership of the Ministry of Interior (Hudita, 1998: 114).

In order to ease tensions with the representatives of the Iron Guard (Țiu, 2007: 164-172), on April 26th, 1940, the Law Decree regarding the amnesty of political crimes was adopted (Dima, 2010: 223). Thus, in their approach of attracting political leaders, the Sovereign together with the Prime Minister Tătărescu have achieved, at least in theory, an important victory over the Legionnaires and managed to obtain from many of them declarations of loyalty to the King.

Many professors, lawyers, doctors, priests, teachers and students, members of the Legionary Movement sign such statements in which they confess their “love and faith to the Sovereign” (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 262/1939-1940: 1-4). It is true that the authorities have succeeded in doing this by releasing the members of the Legionary Movement from prisons or by adopting a benevolent attitude towards the legionnaires (Țiu, 2007: 170-171). As evidence that many of the legionnaires, at least formally, changed their position regarding the Sovereign was the attitude adopted by some of the intellectuals associated with the extremist right-wing movement (Mircea Eliade, Nichifor Crainic and Radu Gyr) (Boia, 2011: 151).

Tătărescu Cabinet in action

At the beginning of his mandate, Gheorghe Tătărescu announced his governance plan by a Program Manifesto (*Libertatea* from December 5th, 1939). In addition to reaffirming the implementation of such policies as public order, censorship, support for the families of those enrolled in the army (Dima, 2010: 221), two central ideas

come out of the new Government program. The first idea was the solidarity of all Romanians both with the King and the regime imposed by him; for achieving this goal it was created a climate of “political relaxation” (*Libertatea* from December 5th, 1939), which later was translated into the reconciliation policy. The second idea referred to the endowment of the army for the defense of the country borders (Dima, 2010: 221).

The same conception of solidarity was reaffirmed by the Sovereign in his New Year’s Eve speech from 1940, where he evoked “the feeling of national solidarity and of unity around one thought and one idea” (*Universul* from January 3rd, 1940). As it was stated above, historians who wrote about this subject mentioned it as a “reconciliation policy”, a concept that underlines King Carol II’s political intentions.

Gheorghe Tătărescu’s appointment as the President of Council of Ministers gave the Monarch the necessary confidence for a first NRF (National Renaissance Front) Parliament meeting (Preda, 2011: 177-183) since the inaugural session (Constantinescu, 1973: 416). During this brief parliamentary session (November 23rd – December 20th, 1939), 260 law decrees were ratified (Constantinescu, 1973: 424-425). The next parliamentary session, not much longer than the other, took place also during Tătărescu Government (March 7th – April 19th, 1940) and had the same purpose – the ratification of the decrees adopted by the Government; this time the number of adopted law decrees was 163 (Scurtu, Buzatu, 1999: 357; Constantinescu, 1973: 226).

The lack of effective involvement of the Parliament in the process of elaborating and adopting laws emphasizes the importance of the Government within the state leadership. Under these circumstances, it is essential to thoroughly analyse the Council of Ministers led by Gheorghe Tătărescu, as this institution has effectively exercised both executive and legislative power.

Along with the reconciliation policy, a reorganization of the National Renaissance Front took place. This important point of the Government program led by Gheorghe Tătărescu was a continuation of the action initiated by the King in October 1939, at the same time with the launch of the NRF Manifesto (National Historical Archives of Romania, fund: *Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa internă*, file no. 403/1939: 120-125). In this respect, the main action was the adoption of the Decree Law on the reorganization of the FRN on January 20th, 1940 (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 2/ 1939-1940: 8-26).

Regarding the single political party, Gheorghe Tătărescu tried to finalize the stage of appointing the political leaders of the National Renaissance Front, both at the central and local level (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*, file no. 141/1940: 177); moreover, he tried to enrol in NRF as many representatives of former traditional parties as possible. Regarding the legionaries’ adhesion to NRF, Carol II seemed to have at least a puerile vision of the situation; the King trusted in their sincere enrolment in the Front and, moreover, he believed that he could use their “dynamism and spiritual sacrifice” to implement the “moral and spiritual regeneration of the nation”, that he promised on February, 10th/11th, 1938 (Carol II, 1998: 96-97, 119).

As expected, that type of wishful thinking was unrealistic and after a short period of time the Monarch realised that he would not receive from the Legionnaires the much needed help to impose the authoritarian regime; moreover, he had to face a new

problem when the Legionnaires that enrolled in NRF tried to regroup and impose their one politics from inside the royal political party (Carol II, 1998: 145, 154).

The on-going war in Europe has made the Government led by Tătărescu pay special attention to the army. The supply of weapons and the training of troops were the main directions followed by the Government (Dima, 2010: 228-230). However, the army was poorly trained and insufficiently equipped because of the lack of funds and the uncoordinated administrative actions. The Sovereign's involvement in the army seems to have been more of a facade. The participation of the King in various actions seemed to be more likely to create the idyllic image of the leader (Buzatu, 2012) than to find concrete solutions to solving the many problems faced by the army leaders (Midan, 2008: passim).

A difficult situation and the attempts to redefine the authoritarian regime

The formation of Tătărescu Cabinet did not lead to major changes in foreign policy promoted by Romania until November 1939; King Carol still wanted to build a Neutral Block in Europe (Calafeteanu, 1980: 191-239). This policy was not appreciated by Germany, which saw in this situation an action against the Reich (Haynes, 2003: 127, Gafencu, 1991: 340). The victorious offensive recorded both by Germany and the Soviet Union on the battlefield in the early 1940s, forced the Sovereign to accept the new reality.

Under these circumstances, fearing of the possible territorial demands from the Soviet Union and realizing that the traditional partners – Great Britain and France – could not be very helpful, Carol began promoting a rapprochement with Germany (Haynes, 2003: 134-136). Speaking from a position of strength and having the guarantee that Romania could not find another big ally in Europe, the Nazi leaders managed to establish a very advantageous relationship with Romania. The international situation left the King a single alternative – to accept a partner who imposed its point of view.

Romania's problems were acute in the internal affairs as well. Among the most important were the economic difficulties (Scurtu, 2001: 285) which led to a sharp depreciation of the national currency in the early 1940s (Scurtu, Otu, 2003: 409). One more reason for the financial problems faced by the Government was represented by the large funds allocated to the army's endowment. The measures taken by the Cabinet to manage the difficult situation, including increasing the working day to 10 hours (Scurtu, Otu, 2003: 410), led to discontent among the population.

At the same time, the state of dissatisfaction of the population was triggered and accentuated primarily by the territorial claims that the neighbours – the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria had (Historical National Archives of Romania, fund: *Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei*, file no. 32/ 1940: 4; file no. 59/1940: 13).

The victories recorded by both Germany and the Soviet Union in northern Europe, the defeat of the English troops by the Germans and the expectant position promoted by France (Berstein, Milza, 1998: 139-141) led Carol II to a collaboration with Germany. In this respect there are two major actions that the Sovereign put into practice. On May 10th, 1940, a major government reshuffle took place and Gheorghe Tătărescu was charged with forming the new Cabinet (Carol, 1998: 166). From the old

governmental team, some of those supporting a collaborative policy with England and France were replaced by ministers with pro-German vision (*Libertatea* from May 10th, 1940). The King's second action was more eloquent in the sense of approaching the Reich; thus, after long delays, on May 27th, 1940 Romania signed with Germany the pact "petrol for arms" (Haynes, 2003: 136).

Conclusions

The uncertainty that was dominating both the internal and external affairs, put King Carol II in a very difficult position; the fact that the Monarch didn't had a realistic plan regarding the state affairs can be seen by analysing his inconsistent actions. If King's duplicitous attitude in terms of foreign policy can be blamed, the cautious position he tried to adopt regarding the Romanian politicians is easier to understand. The actions that the Monarch undertook were influenced to a great extent by the war that had started a few months earlier.

In addition to the extremely difficult external context, another fact explaining the reconciliation policy can be the dreadful concern that Carol II expressed quite often in his notes – the concern that "the Crown must be defended". What did that mean? No matter how dominant his political ideas regarding the decision-making process were, Carol always wanted to have something or someone to hide behind; in other words, although he was the one making the decisions, he wanted someone else to take the responsibility. Therefore, the new policy of national reconciliation could be seen as a Sovereign's attempt to receive the approval of both politicians and common people regarding his actions.

From this point of view, Gheorghe Tătărescu's Government must have been one of the last attempts to maintain the pro-Western policy, an optimistic experiment based on the supposition that the traditional allies could have supported Romania and could have defeated their opponents very quickly. This type of optimism was irreversibly scattered in the summer of 1940, with the surrender of France on June 22nd and with the ultimatum that Romania received from the Soviet Union on June 26th-27th. Therefore, one may conclude that the reconciliation policy promoted by the King and implemented by the Government Tătărescu did not reach its main purpose, although important steps have been made, such as the Legionnaires' fidelity declarations or the fact that Ion Mihalache accepted the position of Royal Counsellor.

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THE CASE OF THE “DISPLACEMENT” OF SERBS FROM KOSOVO DURING WORLD WAR TWO

*Haxhi Ademi**

Abstract

In Albanian historiography, the case of Serbs leaving Kosovo during World War II, which we refer to by the term “displacement”, but in quotes, is rarely addressed and always in the context of other issues.

This may be so because the displacement of the Albanian population between the two wars (1918-1941) has gained more attention from researchers for at least three reasons: 1. Because the displacement of the Albanian population during the two wars (1918-1941) reaches incredibly high figures (up to 240 thousand), without adding the displacement from 1912 to 1918, as well as the plans for displacement during World War II which reached over half a million; 2. Because the case of “the displacement of the Serbian population” during the Second World War has been contested by the Albanian intellectual and scientific forums; and 3. Because of the lack of interest and will, always for nationalist reasons, to reflect on a problem that was not useful for Albanians. However, regardless of the reasons or justifications we can make today for Albanian historiography, we consider that it is now necessary to treat it as a separate issue for at least two reasons: 1. To overthrow and deny the thesis of Serbian historiography which consistently claims that during the Second World War a large number of Serbs (60 to 100 thousand) were displaced; and 2. To shed light once and for all on the truth about the movement of the Serbian population from Kosovo in the above mentioned years through the motives, causes and other reasons we will further elaborate.

Key words: *Kosovo, Serbs, migration, Kosovo, World War II*

Introduction

The “displacement” of the Serbian population from Kosovo during World War II cannot be considered as a separate issue without analyzing some data ** about the agrarian reform and colonization (a phenomenon that began with the occupation of Kosovo in 1912 and lasted throughout most of the 20th century)***, through which the

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** Researcher Miranda Vickers, based on a description of Edit Durham on the position of Serbs in the Prizren region in 1908, cites “The school, a beautiful building, recently expanded and repaired, had 100 students. Most of them came from Montenegro, I saw them with grief. It seemed foolish to be building such a huge and costly theological school in an Albanian Muslim town, bringing teachers and students here, while funds were so highly needed for the development of free Serb territories. Miranda Vickers, *Shqiptarët Një histori moderne*. Tiranë: Bota Shqiptare, 2008, 97. Title of the original: *The Albanians – A Modern History*, I. Tauris, London-New York.

*** Kosovo was mainly studied in the framework of the Agrarian Reform in the so-called Southern Serbia, which included Macedonia, Sanxhak, and a part of northern Montenegro, including the regions that were under the Ottoman rule until 1912. For more about the

indigenous Albanian population was displaced from their territories which were later populated with colonies from different countries of Yugoslavia. The national goal of the Serbian government was to change the ethnic structure in Kosovo and other Albanian territories to the detriment of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia which constituted the overwhelming majority in favor of the Slavic element (Abdyli, 1986: 163). This institutional action made an impact, albeit not what the Yugoslav Kingdom wanted because at the time of Albania's declaration of independence, the Albanians in the land outside the state represented over 90% of the population (AMPJ, V.1931, D. 101, 2). In the article "Colonization and Serbianisation of Kosovo" on the Serbian crimes of 1912-1913, Kosta Novakovic writes: "Kosovo is a pure Albanian territory. There are only 10 to 15% Serbs there. Serbian imperialists have used the most barbaric methods for the extermination of the Albanian population". Thus, in 1912 and 1913, Serbs killed 120,000 Albanians while a large number of villages were entirely burned. To escape the Serb massacres, at least 50,000 Albanians were forced to leave their lands and flee to Turkey and Albania (Osmani, 2016: 43-44).

If we refer to the results of the 1921 census in the territory of Kosovo, from a total of 439,010 inhabitants, only 288,907 inhabitants whose mother tongue was Albanian (64%) were enumerated. Also, based on the 1931 census of Kosovo and Dukagjin, in which a total of 552,064 inhabitants were registered, 331,549 (60.1%) stated that Albanian is their native language (Imami, 2016: 452), whereas according to an archive document in 1941, Albanians made up 70% of the population in Kosovo. (AMPJ, V.1931, D. 101, 2) However, based on the 1939 census made by the chiefs of the Kosovo district, there were 645,017 inhabitants living there, which compared to 1931 census is 92,943 more inhabitants. 422.827 (65.6%) were non-Slav residents, 16.896 (25.2%) were Slavs and 59.294 (9.2%) were colonizers. Several thousand Muslims from Gora were counted as "non-Slav elements" (Imami, 2016: 454). Also, referring to the 1953 census, Serbs and Montenegrins accounted for 27% of the population while holding 50% of the party's membership and 68% of the administration and leading positions. They also they accounted for 50% of the workers in factories*.

Regarding the expropriation of Albanians and the settlement of the colonizers in their territories, statistics and official data reports show that during the implementation of the Agrarian Reform until 1939, in Kosovo 192.212,94 ha** of land were seized (Osmani, 2016: 44). According to Jusuf Osman's studies based on archive documents, the lands were taken by 10,717 colonizer families, 248 volunteer families,

agrarian reform and colonization see: Milovan Obradović, *Reforma agrare dhe kolonizimi në Kosovë (1918-1941)*. Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë 2005.

* From 1945 to 1966, 246,000 people from Yugoslavia, mainly from Macedonia and around 100,000 from Kosovo, emigrated to Turkey. For more: Noel Malcolm, *Kosova, Një histori e shkurtër*. Prishtinë: Koha 2011, 407-408.

** Out of this 180.585,01 ha were measured- 148.086,32 ha (66.212, 94 ha exempted and 81.758 ha arable) of fertile land and 32.508, 69 ha of non-fertile land. From these, 100.345, 95 ha was seized state land, 75.502,24 ha was communal land, 246, 14 ha was church and monastery land, 4,530, 43 ha was private land and 4,252, 67 ha was "landed" land. Total 192,212, 94 ha.

80 Chetnik families, 172 optant families and 508 families of convoys, altogether a total of 11,722 families. According to other statistical data, until 1939 in Kosovo 11,383 families with 53,884 members were colonized, out of which 49,244 were Serbs (including Montenegrins) (Obradović, 2005: 263), 5,148 Croats and 163 Slovenes. Other nations were not accepted. From another statistical document, we learn that until 08.04.1940, 13,482 families were colonized in 594 settlements in Kosovo. The colonizers settled in 669 settlements in Kosovo, where the total number of families reached 14,565,1 (Osmani, 2016: 99-100).

If we assume that in each household there was an average of 5 members, then according to this note, about 67,410 inhabitants settled in Kosovo, while according to other data 73,255 inhabitants settled in Kosovo. This number is bigger because many of colonizers in the cities, like those who came through free colonization, many officers, gendarmes, foresters, teachers and others, remained outside the official records of the families that were given land (Abdyli, 1984: 232). On average, every family received 8.45 ha of land. In addition, 5,982 families received land with a surface area of 17,841.35 ha, or an average of 2,98 ha for each family. Most of this land was taken by local Serbs and convoys (Obradović, 2005: 263; Osmani, 2016: 100). In a document dealing with Serbian crimes in Albanian lands, among other things, it is stated that since the invasion of Kosovo and other Albanian lands in 1912, Serbia cultivated hatred against Albanians, which resulted in the burning and destruction of thousands of villages and the removal of the population living in mountains. As a result of these measures, over 100,000 Albanians were forced to emigrate. Furthermore, it is said that over 7,000 families from different Slavic lands settled in Gjakova and Drenica, forcing Albanians to move from their lands (AQSH, F. KMKK, D. 28/3, nr.161, II/1991: 12.02.1921). The process of colonization and displacement of the Albanian population took place not only during the years between the two wars, but unfortunately continued even further. Thus, after 1941, Serbian circles did not hesitate during the Second World War* to design plans and ideas based on Ilia Grassani's project** for the colonization of Kosovo with the Slavic element. Such was the project drafted by Sarajevo lawyer, Stevan Melovic, titled "Homogeneous Serbia"*** of June 30, 1941 (Osmani, 2016: 102). Inspired by Ilia

* During this period, the Serbian government paid special attention to the settlers in Kosovo between the two world wars. Nedić's government always tried to lower the number of the displacement of settlers from the Italian region who emigrated there between the two world wars. Izber Hoti, Çështja e kolonizimit të Kosovës gjatë Luftës së Dytë Botërore, Fjala, Prishtinë 5 korrik, 1993, 8.

** Ilia Garashani's project is the basis for the Serb-majority union policy, which wanted to cover the name of the Slavs with the name of the Serbs! His views, expressed in the 1844 "Načertanian", which is called the first detailed political platform of Belgrade's governing circles, is also the ideological basis of the "Greater Serbia" chauvinistic program.

*** The creation of the project "Greater Serbia" or "homogeneous" by Stevan Molevic starts with the idea that Serbs should be homogenous in the Balkans and should secure their domination in Yugoslavia. According to him, the fundamental error in state regulation was that of 1918 (Creation of Yugoslavia) when Serbia's borders were set. Therefore he considered that this error should be improved today or never. Serbia's borders should be up to where they live

Garashani's project, Draž Mihajlović's Chetnik Movement began in the Second World War with the aim "*Chetniks will liberate Kosovo from the Albanians and they will all disappear without leaving anyone alive*" (Braha, 1992, 207). Serbia's position on the colonization of Kosovo and the changing of its ethnic structure did not change even after the departure of the German occupation. Vasa Çubrillović's "The Problem of Minorities in New Yugoslavia"* considered that all minority groups in Yugoslavia such as Germans, Hungarians, Albanians, Italians and Romanians, have "denied themselves their civic rights by openly presenting themselves as an enemy to the state in which they live".

According to him that's why all these "minorities" must be removed from the state, because they deserve it. (Osmani, 2016: 107) According to Çubrillović's program "when dealing with the minority problem, we must at all costs ethnically conquer Boçka, Kosovo and Metohija"*** by expelling hundreds of Hungarians and Albanians. In order to implement the Çubrillović project, on 8 February 1945, the Yugoslav government ordered the deployment of military power in Kosovo (Osmani, 2016: 109-110).

As a result of the agrarian reform and colonization, which developed on the basis of the above-mentioned Serbian projects, a large number of autochthonous Albanians were forced to leave their lands to be deployed mainly in Turkey (Abdyli, 1984: 232) and Albania. However, in addition to these state-owned enterprises (agrarian reform

with free exit to the seas. From this we can say that under this project, Serbian political claims were made not only Kosovo but also a large part of Albania. Jusuf Osmani, *op.cit.*, 102.

* Vaso Çubrillović's project was not only for Albanians but about all the nationalities in the new Yugoslavia. In this project he foresaw the mass migration of millions of people because, according to him, "the only and just solution of this issue is the displacement of minorities." As an example of such actions he uses the Third Reich and the colonizations of many people in the Soviet Union and other European countries. Çubrillović provided details of the implementation of this project, as well as the time and the manner of the implementation of this project. According to Çubrillović, the army had a decisive role so he proposed that the UNSC Headquarters form a special section on this issue. In cases where physical protection was not achieved, other measures were foreseen, such as the denial of all rights, the creation of concentration camps, the looting of evidence, the exclusion of intelligent and rich societies, and the immediate colonization of the areas with the Slavic element. Muhamete Shatri, *Kosova në Luftën e Dytë Botërore 1941-1945*. Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë 1997. 209; Jusuf Osmani, *op.cit.*, 107.

** The term Metohia – at the beginning of the 20th century, well-known Serbian scholars St.Novaković and J.Cvijić, relying on historical sources, raised the thesis for the existence of the name Metohija, which meant the territory between Prizren and Peja. This thesis was supported by the fact that the term "metohion" or "metohija" means the property of the monasteries in Greek, and in this respect many villages of the territory in question have been the property of monasteries. With this thesis that did not provide any scientific arguments, they have surprised the scientific world, because today's territory of Peja, Gjakova and Prizren until 1945, has never had the geographical meaning of Metohija, but since the 15th until 1945 it preserved the geographical concept of Dukagjin Plain, or Dukagjin. Jahja Drançolli, *Rrënjët e qytetërimit ilir -shqiptar në Kosovë*, Buletini i Fakultetit Filozofik, Nr.XXV-1995, Prishtinë, 1998, 175.

and colonization) that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia implemented to deploy Albanians and populate their lands with Slavic population, always with the aim of changing the ethnic structure, there was also a number of Serbs, mostly colonizers, who left Kosovo during World War II. But what were the real reasons they left? What was their real number? And were there elements of retaliation from Albanians against them? To these and other questions, we tried to give scientific answers based on primary sources, all to put down the efforts that the Serbian historiography (Slavic in general) consistently put into creating the myth of mass expulsions of Serbs from Kosovo during World War II.

The invasion of Yugoslavia and the division of Kosovo

After the invasion of Yugoslavia, respectively Kosovo by the allied army, Kosovo was divided into three invasive zones by the Vienna agreement (18-23 April 1941). Under this agreement in August 1941, the unification of most of Kosovo* was made, but not only with Albania (Hadri, 1971: 106; Shatrit, 1997: 17) since some of the Albanian lands remained under Serbia and Bulgaria. In August 1941, two prefectures with headquarters in Prizren and Prishtina were set up in the area of the Italian invasion, while on September 22nd the High Commission of Civil Affairs formed the Prefecture of Peja (Historia e Popullit Shqiptar IV, 2008:131). Since the study object of this paper is the “large Serbian displacement” from Kosovo, apart from the prefectures of Peja, Prizren and Prishtina (Italian area) we will include the areas of the German and Bulgarian occupation.

According to Serbian historiography, during the periods of 1941-1945 thousands of Serbs, who came from other countries of Yugoslavia during the implementation of the agrarian reform of the 20s and 30s, were displaced from Kosovo. However, with regard to the number of displaced people, Serbian sources provide different data ranging from 60,000 to 100,000. Among these numbers, Serbs and Montenegrins who were displaced from Kosovo in World War II are included (Barajović- Gjuro: 1997: 50-54; Gjaković, 1984; Александр, 2011, 77). According to them, the figures of displaced people from all over Yugoslavia to Serbia reach up to half a million (Hadri, 1978: 52). Furthermore, according to Serbian historiography, the small increase of the population in Kosovo during the 1940s and 1948s had been due to the influx of Albanians from the Albanian state (this figure varies from 70,000 to 260,000) (Александр. 2011) However, not only does Albanian historiography disagree with these results and “scientific” statistics, but the international academia categorically negates it. Here it is worth mentioning the scholar and historian Noel Malcolm who writes that this data is not based on facts. Among other things, he says: “*There is no*

* Under this agreement, Italy would take most of Kosovo with cities such as Prishtina, Ferizaj, Gjiilan, Kamenica, Drenica region, Dukagjini plain with Peja, Gjakova, Prizren, northwestern plains of Plavë, Gucci, Rozhajë, Tutan then Ulqin, Tuzi, eastern ethnic Albanian areas: Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo, Struga and a part of Prespa etc. On the other hand, a territory with an area of 11,780 km with a population of 820,000 was united with Albania. So, with the mother country of Albania, 19 prefectures, 13 municipalities, 141 communes, 1,501 villages were united. AQS, F. 267, V. 1945, D. 46, f. 32; Ali Hadri, *Lëvizja Nacionalçlirimtare në Kosovë (1941-1945)*. Prishtinë: Rilindja 1971, 106; Muhamet Shatri, *op.cit.*, 17.

evidence that shows any major migration during the war. It is likely that several thousand people have come from Albania to Kosovo: some of them were officers who came with the Italians and Germans, some were Kosovars who had migrated to Albania between the two wars, but we cannot speak of such a large placement of Albanians in Kosovo that could have caused any demographic change” (Malcolm, 2011: 397).

As for the number of Serbs displaced from Kosovo, according to Noel Malcom, the number was much smaller than the total number of settlers who arrived in Kosovo during the 1930s of the 20th century (Malcolm, 2011: 397; Fischer, 309). In a telegram sent by German officer Hermann Neubacher on April 25, 1944 to the General Consulate in Tirana, among other things it is said that the number of Serbs and Montenegrins displaced from Kosovo in the time frame from May 1941 to April 1944, should be around 40,000 (Fischer: 309).

But what is the stance of Albanian historiography on this issue? Has it done enough properly to uncover the truth behind this issue? We can say that in Albanian historiography, with or without reason, the issue of the displacement of the Serbian population from Kosovo during World War II is found only in a few scientific works or in wider studies in which not enough information is given on the issue (Hadri, 1978: 3-79; Hashani, 1978: 383-405; Imami, 2016: 516). Noticing this lack of information in Albanian historiography, as well as the need to handle it scientifically, I decided to deal with this extremely important and complex issue myself.

Since the areas of the Italian invasion were divided into prefectures, we will provide the data according to the prefectures which include today's territory of Kosovo. In the Prefecture of Pristina, according to archival sources, the position of Serbs was equal to that of the Albanians who constituted the majority. According to the circuits of the Prefecture of Prishtina, dated May 16, 1944 and addressed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the security of the Serbs was stable. Even in this circuit, it is said that the number of killings for revenge between Serbs and Albanians was much lower compared to those before the war. As for the emigration of Serbs from these areas, we assure that no coercive measure had been used, but only that a small number of Serb families who had come to Kosovo during its colonization had requested permission to move back to Serbia because they had relatives there (AMPJ, V.16.V.1944, D.48, 49).

Unlike the sources that reflect the real situation, Albanian historiography, first of all, does not provide clear and accurate data. Because of this, researcher Izber Hoti in his paper on the Prefecture of Pristina does not provide data regarding the displacement of Serbs from this prefecture (Hoti, 1978: 345-360). Scholar Shaban Hashani, in his work about the sub-prefecture of Ferizaj which was divided into two occupation zones (Italian-German), does not provide detailed data on the displacement of Serbs from Kosovo but only adds that “Serb colonizers faced some forms of violence as a form of retaliation because they acted the same way when they settled in the area during the colonization phase” (Hashani, 1978: 383-403). The author does not specify the extent of that violence, but sources from that time say that the violent and retaliatory actions of Albanians against Serbs during the Second World War were rather individual and not in high numbers.

Moreover, from the sources of that time, we learn that the Serbs were the ones who voluntarily sought permit to leave from the German command. Thus, in a letter by Hysen Azemi (Prefect of Pristina) addressed to the Correspondence Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tirana, it is said that the property of Serbs was previously property of the Albanians which was taken by the agrarian law and passed on to Serbs. Therefore, Serb settlers who expressed their desire to leave Kosovo, were given easier access to the passage, as opposed to local Serbs, who in some cases in coordination with the German command, were denied the permit (AMPJ, V.1944, D. 48, 50). Unlike the Prefecture of Pristina, where colonial Serbs sought permission to pass, in the Peja Prefecture, the situation of Serbs was better than that of Albanians. However, the violence and the killings of Albanians by the Serbian side did not stop. Over 55 Albanians had been killed in various settlements, among them women, children and old people. The massacres against the innocent population took place even in the depths of Albania, as well as highlands of Gjakova, Shalë, Shosh and highlands of Mbishkodra (Shatri, 1997: 17-18). Serbs who were armed, terrorized and murdered others allegedly “to rescue Serbs and preserve the rule” even though the Yugoslav police and units were still present (Hadri, 1978: 12).

Though the Serb-Slavic forces massacred the Albanian civilian population, the latter did not pursue the same politics or reciprocate in the war years; moreover Albanians helped and sheltered Serbs in some areas. Indeed, there were cases of Albanians who protected Serbian and Montenegrin families who settled as colonists, helping them cross the border from Rugova to Montenegro (Shatri, 1997: 19).

We learn more about the situation of Serbs and Montenegrins in this prefecture from a letter that the representative of the Prefecture of Peja* sent to the Correspondence Directorate of Ministry of Internal Affairs. Through this letter, he asked for them to show compassion for the families who wished to voluntarily leave Kosovo, and to not cause any issues for them in order to solve this problem of great importance. Among other things regarding the displacement of Serbs from the Prefecture of Peja, in this letter it was stated: “In agreement with Ortskommandantur** we have formed a commission for solving the issues related to the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Albania. With the exceptions of the Serbs, who we do not know if they will send someone from Serbia or someone local, this commission was formally established because according to the Ortskommandantur here, the Serbian government does not want to deal with this issue”. Likewise, the German representative did not want to take on this issue because it considered it to be too costly. It is further stated in the letter no. 1320/1 of 22/5/1944, dealing with this issue no. 3707/5 of 5/5/1944, that the Peja Prefecture had issued nearly 850 passes for the Serbo-Montenegrin element, who voluntarily and also through petitions had requested definitive displacement. “All these passing

* The Peja Prefecture included these sub-prefectures: Plavë, Rozhaje, Tutin, Istog and Skenderaj and there were 26 townships. For more: Muhamet Sadiku, *Qëndresa nacionaliste e Pejës 1941-1946*, Dukagjini, 21.

** Historically used in Wehrmacht, it implies the commanding authority responsible for a particular country.

permits are located at the German Command here (except 220 pieces) and these families, hoping to move just as the ones before them, have sold all their belongings, so please have kindness in solving this issue” (AMPJ, V.1944, D. 48, 63).

It should be added that within the Prefecture of Peja, five sub-prefectures and 26 communes were included.* From the documentation of that time, it is stated that 850 passing permits had been given from this prefecture, and if we divide this with 5 members for each family it turns out that 4,250 Serb-Montenegrin colonizers left this prefecture. Also, according to the documents, it was said that 220 families were waiting for passing permits. If we split this figure by 5 (it was estimated that each family had an average of five members) it turns out that 1,100 people were expected to leave this prefecture. After reviewing archival resources and historiographic literature, it turned out that the number of settlers in this region is much larger than the number of displaced persons.**

It is also worth mentioning the Prefecture of Prizren, which included 4 sub-prefectures (Gjakova, Suhareka, Rahovec and Dragash) and 38 communes (Shatri, 1978: 406). Unlike the Prefecture of Peja, based on primary and secondary sources we do not encounter any data proving the massive displacement of Serbs who came as colonizers in this prefecture. On the contrary, according to studies by Ali Hadri, many murders occurred in Peja between both sides for ethnic and political issues, but in Prizren we have no information about any murders (Hadri, 1978: 68). An unclear situation also appears in the German invasion zone (Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Podujeva, and the Pazari i Ri***), which in administrative terms was subordinated to the Serbian government of Nedić (Bislimi, 1997: 162-163). Because of this, during 1941 there was a clash between Albanians and Serbs, and the Germans intervened to put the situation under control. In order to have fewer problems with the population, the German representative organized several gatherings for reconciliation between the Albanian representation and the quisling government in Belgrade. Here we will mention only the names of the consultants of Nis, where the German side was represented by

* The Peja Prefecture included these sub-prefectures: Plavë, Rozhaje, Tutin, Istog and Skenderaj and there were 26 townships. For more: Muhamet Sadiku, *Qëndresa nacionaliste e Pejës 1941-1946*, Dukagjini, 21.

** In the district of Peja, 1,570 colonizer families settled, in the district of Istog 1,168 colonizer families settled, in Drenica (a part of this region in the period 1941-1944 was included in the Prefecture of Peja) 547 colonizer families settled, in Gjakova (a part of this the region in the period 1941-1944 was included in the Prefecture of Peja) and its district 2,638 colonizer families settled. If we divide them with 5 members for each family, it turns out that there were 26,880 people in this area. From these data it can be seen that the number of refugees from Kosovo in this period is much smaller than the number of settlers on during the 20s -30s of the 20th century. Obradović, M. (2005). *Reforma agrare dhe kolonizimi në Kosovë (1918-1941)*. Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë, 263; Osmani, J. (2016). *Kolonizimi, reforma Agrare dhe shpërngulja e shqiptarëve nga Kosova, I 1912-1941*. Prishtinë, 270-279; AMPJ, D. 48, Kërkesë drejtuar Ministrisë së Punëve të Jashtme, Tiranë, 23 qershor 1944, 63.

*** Pazari i Ri was part of the German area, but as we know, this Albanian settlement was not part of the territory of Kosovo.

Colonel Bothem, the Albanian side by Xhafer Deva, and Serbian side by Kosta Millanović-Pečanac (Mekaj, 2004:415-418).

After September 1943-44, there was an increased mobility of Serb settlers in the German area from Vushtrri region to Mitrovica, towards the northern part of Kosovo, but the reasons for this movement should be carefully studied and revised. This is because the reasons for their departure from these territories could not be related to their security or to national purposes. Indeed, it was the Albanian population in those territories who was subjected to systematic violence (AMPJ, V.1944, D. 172, 49). The Serbs moved to the north of the country because that part was confined to Serbia and because the Serbian side had plans to massively displace about 100,000 Albanians from this area. Fortunately, the departure of Albanians from this area was not done for reasons of war (Bajrami, 1978: 312). In Albanian historiography we find some data that shows the murders and persecutions of Albanians, Serbs (members of the Crusades) and Jews, by the Germans as well as by the Drazha Mihalovic's followers (Hadri, 1971: 331), but no data is available for the displacement of Serbs from this region. The Albanians of the Anamorava region,* who from 1941 to 1944 were part of the Bulgarian rule, were in almost the same situation. From all the documentation of time (AQSh, V. 1941, F. 149, D. I-1170, 93; AQSh, V.1941. F. 23, D. 25, 236; AQSh, V.1941: F. 167, D. 72, 45-46; AMPJ, V.1944, F.151, D.99, 14; AMPJ, V.1944, F.151, D.99, 45-51 and scientific literature*, we find no evidence of the displacement of Serbs from this Kosovo region. On the contrary, it was not only the Serbs but also the Albanians who were interned, imprisoned and persecuted by the regime (<http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/ejis.v9i1.p125-131>).

Based on this data, it cannot be said that there have been large displacements of Serbs from Kosovo, but the historical truth says that a large number of Serbs had fled Kosovo, not as a result of Albanian violence but as a result of other circumstances not related to their ethnic identity. Moreover, from what we have previously reviewed, we can say that Albanians did not exercise any violence over Serbs during this period, but moreover, they were victims.

In the end, we can say that if all the documents of time are analyzed, it would turn out that there was no mass displacement of Serbs from Kosovo, but there were individual cases of displacement for personal or other reasons, none as a result of violence or pressure from the Albanian side who was under the Italian and German rule.

* Gjilan is the center of Anamorava. Anamorava includes southeastern parts of Kosovo's territory. In the south it is bordered by R. Macedonia, in the east and north by R. Serbia, while the west is bordered by the municipalities of Prishtina, Lipjan, Ferizaj and Kaçanik. For more see: Mark Krasniqi, *Savremane drustavene geografске promene na Kosovu i Metohiji*, Prishtina, 1963, 169.

** Ali Hadri, *Lëvizjet Nacionalçlirimtare* vep.cit. 138; Idriz Halabaku, *Zona pushtuese bullgare në Kosovë dhe sistemi pushtues (1941-1944)*, Kosova, Nr.7, Instituti i Historisë së Kosovës, 1978, 467-473; Fehmi Rexhepi, *Gjilani me rrethinë gjatë Luftës së Dytë Botërore (1941-1945)*, Instituti i Historisë, Prishtinë, 1998; Muhamet Shatri, *op.cit.*, 31.

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**THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX AUTOCEPHALOUS MOVEMENT
DURING THE YEARS OF GERMAN OCCUPATION**

*Andrii Smyrnov**

Abstract

The article deals with the development of the Ukrainian autocephalous movement during the German-Soviet War. The subsequent German occupation of Ukraine led to a spontaneous revival in church life. The Archbishop Oleksii Hromadskyi created the Autonomous Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. The Metropolitan Dionisii Valedynskyi of Warsaw gave his blessing for the establishment of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and designated Archbishop Polikarp Sikorskyi as administrator of the church. In February 1942 Sikorsky consecrated the first two bishops of the UAOC on Ukrainian territory (Nykanor Abramovych and Ihor Huba), and in May 1942 the Kyiv Council of UAOC bishops elected Dionisii as locum tenens of the Metropolitan See of Kyiv. It should be emphasized that the hierarchs of both jurisdictions were forced to sign archpastoral appeals containing obeisance towards the occupiers, to pray for the German authorities and army during worships, and to encourage young people to go and work in Germany. The UAOC of the 1940s is not a sectarian and collaboracionist group, but an independent Church with canonical bishops, which through the Warsaw Metropolitanate was in eucharistic communion with other local churches.

Key words: *the Orthodox Church, autocephaly, hierarchy, canonicity, occupation*

Introduction

Throughout the XX century, the autocephaly was a kind of apple of discord in Ukraine's Orthodox Church. This applies to autocephaly both proclaimed in 1921 by the Local Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in Kyiv, and the Polish Autocephaly granted by the Tomos of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to the Orthodox Church in Poland (where most of the Orthodox parishes were Ukrainian) in 1924. During the Second World War, the issue of the ways to achieve autocephaly came to the forefront in Ukraine, which also caused an institutional split within the Orthodox Church. The development of the Ukrainian movement for autocephaly during the period of German occupation remains a poorly researched page in the history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. It is necessary to analyze more deeply the historical myths and stereotypes used to describe the Ukrainian autocephalous movement, around which clichés were formed both by Soviet propaganda ("UAOC is a true servant of fascism") and the Church ("UAOC is a non-canonical, schismatic, self-consecrated trend"), which has been circulating in public discourse up to now.

The process of constitution of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of 1942 was closely linked to the activities of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that rejected the possibility of subjection of the Orthodox parishes of Ukraine to the Moscow

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Patriarchate. Immediately after the establishment of the German occupation authorities, many regions of Ukraine saw self-governing social and religious organizations spontaneously arising; they were often called parochial initiative groups or church commissions. In big cities, as a rule, they used to be called *Church Councils*. By the end of 1941, there were already eight diocesan church councils in the cities of Ukraine. Former ministers and Orthodox intellectuals, who were the majority in their composition, took care of the premises for worship and everything else needed to set up a full parish life (Stokolos, 2003: 317).

In the autumn of 1941, the Ukrainian Church Council in Rivne was formed under the leadership of Ivan Karnaukhov, a lawyer and activist in the Ukrainian National Republic, whose activity was rather skeptically referred to by Yu. Mulyk-Lutsyk, an active participant in those events (Savchuk & Mulyk-Lutsyk, 1984: 498).

The idea of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was also supported by the Ukrainian Council of Trust in Volhynia (UCTV). One of the main issues of particular concern at the meeting of August 31 and September 1, 1941, was the situation of Orthodoxy in Volhynia and liberated Ukrainian territories. The participants of the meeting supported the resolution which emphasized as indisputable the idea that in Ukraine the church, as a powerful factor in the national-religious and moral education of the people, should be national and Ukrainian. Such a condition can be achieved by the Orthodox Church only if it is independent, and autocephalous. Relying on the law of January 1, 1919, as a state act that established the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), the UCTV argued that the center of the church authority of an independent church cannot be in the hands of a foreign hierarchy that is not of the same blood and is situated outside the national territory. That is why the Council strongly opposed the idea of UOC remaining under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate or of the Metropolitanate of Warsaw. By the time of convocation of the All-Ukrainian Church Council, the participants of the meeting considered it necessary to elect a Provisional Administration of the UOC in the liberated territories, which would maintain records of the Church ensuring its national character and would also convene a Council in Kyiv (Smyrnov, 2009: 112-113).

There was also enthusiasm about the autocephaly among the inhabitants of the Kharkiv region. In particular, the church committee at the Kharkiv Public Committee, after discussing church policy in the occupied territory on November 20, 1941, adopted a decree, according to which "... in Ukraine there should be a single Church, autocephalous, based on the principle of territory and statehood rather than territory and ethnicity. Ukraine is a state in which there is the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church" (Voloshyn, 1997: 43).

The euphoria of the first months of the German occupation intensified national and religious processes; initiating within the Ukrainian intelligentsia a desire to create a UAOC, which would be entirely independent of any foreign religious center. However, while the supporters of autocephaly were debating for a considerable time and condemning the activities of their opponents, the most favorable time for the establishment of the UAOC was missed.

On August 18, 1941, at the regional Council in Pochaiv, archbishops Oleksii Hromadskyi, Symon Ivanovskyi, Panteleimon Rudyk and Veniamin Novytskyi

proclaimed the creation of the Autonomous Orthodox Church (AOC) as part of the Moscow Patriarchate headed by Archbishop Oleksii. They decided to base their activity on the principles of autonomy that had been sanctioned by Patriarch Tikhon and the All-Russian Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in 1918. According to the decision of this Council, only the election of the ruling metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia had to be approved by the Patriarch of Moscow. In everything else, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine was given complete independence. Therefore, the AOC used its canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchy only as a nominal cover, and there were no official contacts during the occupation period. According to the Canadian historian Oleh Gerus, Archbishop Oleksii viewed his connection with Moscow as a necessary tactical formality to avoid accusations of non-canoncity (Gerus, 1985-1989: 102). In fact, the Pochaiv resolutions being recognized neither by Warsaw nor by Moscow, marked the beginning of the institutional split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy during the war years.

The relationship of the UAOC with the Warsaw Metropolitanate

Today, most researchers associate the founding of the UAOC in 1942 with the so-called decree of the Warsaw Metropolitan Dionisii Valedynskyi that was promulgated on the 24th of December, 1941. In his letter to Archbishop Polikarp Sikorskyi, he stated: "At the request of Orthodox Church Councils of Volhynia from this December 14, I decided to create the Temporary Administration of our Holy Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the liberated Ukrainian lands. I appoint your Excellency to be the Temporary Administrator, and I ask you to cooperate with His Eminence Archbishop Olexandr. I ask you to inform me immediately about all your projects and orders to provide them with the final canonical sanction" (AWMP; Smyrnov, 2009: 257–259). The creation of the Administration of Warsaw Metropolitanate during the war initiated the process of the institutionalization of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian lands. In the Ukrainian church historiography, the term "UAOC of 1942" is commonly used to define this ecclesial structure. It was often used by historian Ivan Vlasovskyi in his writings as opposed to the term "UAOC of 1921" (Vlasovsky, 1998: 365, 371).

As for the relations with the Warsaw Metropolitanate, in his opinion, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Dionisii "was reduced to the spiritual guardianship over the Ukrainian autocephalous (de facto) Church" (Vlasovsky, 1998: 226). The official Primate of the Ukrainian Church, Metropolitan Dionisii, was not able to fulfill canonical hierarchical functions. Therefore, even though the UAOC formally remained within the Orthodox Church in the Generalgouvernement, it can be considered a self-contained ecclesiastical body with its Council of Bishops wherein Archbishop Polikarp Sikorskyi as administrator.

I. Vlasovskyi also notes that on July 28, 1942, the UAOC Administration sent the "Temporary Statute of the Orthodox Autocephalous Ukrainian Church" to the Reichskommissariat, and provides a detailed description of this document (Vlasovsky, 1998: 226-227). A copy of the Statute that guided the activities of the UAOC prior to the convening of the first Local Council can be found in the Archives of the Warsaw Metropolitanate. Certain provisions of the document which I. Vlasovskyi passed over,

are worthy of attention. First, as it stated, the Church “in its internal life enjoys the full freedom of government within the limits of the state legislation, and in particular, of this statute.” Second, the administrating Bishop “enjoys the rights of the regional Metropolitan, that is, according to Apostolic Canon 34 he is the first Bishop, its supreme governor and representative in all external and internal relations of the Church.” (AWMP). Thus, the latter gives grounds to assert that the leaders of the national religious movement saw their Church as being local and independent since without an independent Bishop there could not be autocephaly.

At the same time, from the point of view of the canonical law, the UAOC was only a brand. Legally, its canonical status was more similar to autonomy. Unlike the 1920s, autocephaly was never proclaimed in the 1940s, as Ukraine did not have its own statehood. As can be seen from the decree and other historical sources, all major events in the life of the Church, in particular the creation of the hierarchy of the UAOC, took place with the blessing of the canonical leader, the Warsaw Metropolitan Dionisii, whose name was to be mentioned by bishops in all the cathedrals of the UAOC.

The bishops realized that the vulnerability of UAOC’s canonical status required ecumenical recognition, which is why on December 18, 1942, Archbishop Nikanor Abramovych wrote to Metropolitan Dionisii Valedynskyi: “Your Excellency, would you not consider it timely and appropriate to introduce the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to other sister churches as an equal autocephalous unit. At the same time, as it is obvious, that you, as the First Hierarch and the head of our mother's church, ought to bless the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the autocephalous life until the “red patriarch” has blessed it for our Moscow breakaway section.” (AWMP).

Back in late December 1941, Archbishop Palladii Vydybida-Rudenko stated that due to the lack of Ukrainian statehood, Fanar would not dare to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church. Only Valedynskyi, having declared himself Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, can help in this matter (CSAPOU). In his turn, the Metropolitan of Warsaw made known that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is watching with great interest events in the church life of Ukraine and supports the “church-canonical policy” of Dionisii. The latter insisted that autocephaly should only be obtained in a canonical way on the basis of the patriarchal and synodal-canonical *Tomos* of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 1924, but did not propose any model for the constitution of the Ukrainian Church, as he was waiting for the end of the war (AWMP). Furthermore, Fr. T. Minenko believed, it was the different views of the Orthodox hierarchs on the autocephaly of the Polish Church that became the center of discrepancies and the true cause of the institutional split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Dionisii, Hilarion and Oleksii were also inclined to accept that the different views on autocephaly led to antagonistic conceptions during the Church's revival in Ukraine.

Formation of the canonical episcopate and admission of “Lypkivtsi”

The new UAOC relied on the ideologeme of a sustainable development scenario within the Ukrainian Christian community, that recognized the priority of the traditional canonical formation of the episcopate. It renounced the modernizations of the Church in the 1920's and constantly competed with the AOC headed by

Metropolitan Oleksii Hromadskyi, who was positioned as part of the Moscow Patriarchate, but had no connections with it. This long-standing confrontation within Ukrainian Orthodoxy should be regarded as the most consistent and institutionalized conflict of identities in the search for corresponding models of a canonical system. The cardinal political transformations in the modern history of Ukraine inevitably led to the elevation of elements not assimilated by Russian Orthodoxy and the actualization of the problem of the independence of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This kind of process took place during the two world wars, as well as during the collapse of the USSR. It is opportune to note that the centrifugal tendencies in Orthodoxy during the Second World War were observed not only in Ukraine but also in Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Macedonia, Finland, and Croatia (Smyrnov, 2009: 150).

One of the most serious challenges for the UAOC was a catastrophic shortage of bishops. Autocephalists were represented only by Archbishop Polikarp, and the German authorities banned the hierarchs of the Generalgouvernement from visiting Ukraine. Fr. Ilarion Brendzan, the head of the Ukrainian parish in France, was repeatedly considered as a candidate to the position of a Bishop. However, this plan was not implemented due to his illness. The situation on the ground was so critical that Kyiv's "Lypkivtsi" threatened to repeat the 1921 act of ordaining the Bishop, and the Kherson clergy was also ready to send their candidate for episcopal ordination into one of the Orthodox countries of Southeastern Europe (SAKR: 110-110zv; CSASBPGU: 26-26zv).

In this connection, in February 1942 in Pinsk, Archbishop Polikarp, with the help of Olexandr Inozemtsev, the Archbishop of Pinsk and Polissia, initiated the ordaining of bishops for the Ukrainian Church. The first to be ordained were Nykanor Abramovych and Ihor Huba. In May 1942, a new group of hierarchs were consecrated in Kyiv during the Bishops' Council of the UAOC. One of them was Stepan Skrypnyk, the Ambassador to the Polish Sejm from Volhynia in the 1930's, and the future First Hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, the first Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine Mstyslav. The Kyiv Council validated the recognition of the Metropolitan Dionisii Valedynskyi as the Locum tenens of the Kyiv Metropolitan Throne. The protocols of the hierarchical ordination were sent to the Warsaw Metropolitan, and he approved them in his letter dated June 16, 1942 (Vlasovsky, 1998: 223).

Modern Russian religious historiography continues to use the slogans of Soviet propaganda about the non-canonical and graceless nature of the UAOC's hierarchy. Back in 1972, the Moscow Patriarch Pimen in a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras categorically declared: "Mstyslav Skrypnyk obtained the illegal "Episcopal ordination" in May 1942 in Kiev from "bishops" Ihor Huba and Nykanor Abramovych who were ordained in the same non-canonical way (Ap.35), as their ordination was headed by the schismatic defrocked "bishop" Polikarp Sikorskyi" (Zinkevych & Voronyn, 1987: 664). This thesis was repeatedly stressed by the highest hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church.

An attempt to establish the theological and historical justification for the non-canonical nature of the Episcopate of the UAOC was made by the Russian explorer Vladislav Petrushko. However, his arguments are rather tendentious and often

remindful of well-known ideological stamps, such as: “UAOC became the ideological inspirer of the atrocities of Ukrainian separatists, aimed, first of all, against their own people”. The author bases his poorly convincing arguments on the popular myth that in 1940, Bishop Polikarp together with all Orthodox bishops of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus became subordinate to the ROC (<http://archive.li/uU5P>).

Nowadays it is well known that neither Oleksandr Inozemtsev, Archbishop of Polissia and Pinsk, nor Polikarp Sikorskyi, bishop of Lutsk, went to Moscow for the execution of a “prayer-canonical union with the Mother Church of Moscow” nor to sign any written declarations about it. Due to such disloyalty, the first was dismissed, and the other was out of reach to be punished (Mironowicz, 2005: 224; Stokolos, 2003: 291).

Very often, even in the works of such serious authors as the Russian scholar M. Shkarovsky, it is possible to read that the UAOC consecrated married priests to be bishops because it allegedly did not have its own monasteries (Shkarovsky, 2007: 450). In fact, all candidates for the episcopacy without exception took monastic vows, as evidenced by their obtaining a new name. And if, for example, the bishop of Taurida, Serhii Okhotenko did not change it, that was only because on accepting monasticism in 1919, he retained his previous name. Here it is worth recalling that the monasteries of Derman and Bilivski Khutory in Volhynia belonged to the UAOC.

Thus, the analysis of historical sources does not support charges of noncanonical episcopal ordinations of hierarchs of the UAOC. It is worth remembering that after the war when in the ROC, the question arose what to do with Yurii Korenistov, who had become the Bishop of Brest at Pinsk Council, it was decided after some reflection that he was to be admitted to the Moscow Patriarchate without reordination. In 1995, all clergy of the UOC in the United States coming from Metropolitan Mstyslav, without any reservations became a part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Therefore, the validity of their episcopal ordinations should not cause any doubts. Emigrating to the West through Warsaw, in May 1944, all the bishops of the UAOC received special certificates from Metropolitan Dionisii, which stated that they had received canonical ordination with his blessing and, being in canonical unity with him and the holy Orthodox patriarchs, they, “belong to the episcopate of the Holy Ecumenical Orthodox Church” (Dublianskyi, 1962: 46).

Russian historians also blame autocephalists for the admission of the UAOC clerics in 1921 “into their existing rank” (Pospelovsky, 1995: 212). Indeed, such a decision was made at the Council of Pinsk, but, as Bishop Nykanor mentioned, the admission of the “Lypkivtsi” clergy was made through a special procedure of chirotesy. The formal basis for the admission of “lypkivtsi” clergy was Apostolic rule 52, that is based on repentance (Zinkevych & Voronyn, 1987: 687). Archbishop Ihor Isichenko, referring to Fr. Tymofii Minenko claims that under the “existing rank” they meant a rank in which clergy or laity joined the UAOC of Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi. According to the memoirs of the then church figures and the preservation of the accession of the “Lypkivtsi”, the bishop accepted the confession, read a decisive prayer, and then spoke the formula of ordination, “Divine Grace which always heals the sick and supplies what is missing...” (UAA). Autonomists saw this as a departure from Orthodox sacramental practice, that does not permit the

combination of the sacraments of repentance and conscience, however, it was in this way that the “Lypkivtsi” clergy’s consecration “was completed.”

As for Yurii Teslenko and Mykhailo Maliarevskyi, bishops of the UAOC of 1921, we know very little about their activities during the German occupation. According to Fr. Mytrofan Yavdas, they simply refused to repeat the procedure of consecration. Mykhailo Maliarevskyi agreed to conduct worship services with the status of a priest and served as a protopriest in Vasylkiv, near Kyiv. It is also known that Yosyf Oksiuk renounced his priesthood and served punishment in Kolyma until 1945. Metropolitan Dionisii had a wary attitude towards married bishops and refused to admit them “into the existing rank.”

“Lypkivtsi” clergy as a whole were never deemed heretical. Therefore the admission of these clerics to the fold of the Orthodox Church does not seem to be anticanonical, and any succession of the two Autocephalous hierarchies is not the subject of discussion. A vivid confirmation of this is the reconsecration of the last “Lypkivtsi” bishop John Teodorovich, which on August 27, 1949, was carried out by Archbishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk and exarch of the Alexandrian Patriarchate in America, Metropolitan Christopher Contogeorgios. In this regard, it is desirable to avoid exploiting the so-called concept of the three revivals of the UAOC, since it does not correspond to historical reality.

Collaboration with Germans

The main element of the Soviet propaganda aimed against the autocephalous movement was the constant accusation of their collaboration with the Nazis. The topic of Ukrainian collaboration is reflected in the works of Ukrainian and foreign historians. At the same time, the diversity of manifestations, ambiguity and contradictory nature of the phenomenon of collaborationism make it difficult to objectively study and comprehend the socioeconomic and socio-cultural life of the population in the territories occupied by the Nazis and causes some uncertainty and politicization of the very definition of Ukrainian collaborationism. The definition delineates the limits of what behavior is considered collaboration and what is not. It remains debatable whether collaboration was undertaken in the service of the German occupation administration or only due to excessive zeal in this service. Does the collaboration include the work undertaken in assisting committees, publishing houses, church institutions, public organizations? (Motyka, 2002: 211-213).

In this context, it is worth mentioning K. Berkhoff’s advisement to refrain from using the words “collaboration” and “collaborator.” The author rightly points that these words always have the connotation of “betrayal” (Berkhoff, 2004: 4-5) However, if K. Berkhoff tends to avoid the term “collaboration” (which supposedly removes the problem of finding out the whole discourse around it), O. Melnyk seeks to interpret it historically, showing the specificity of its usage in various ideological and socio-political contexts. This approach also involves paying attention to the personality of individual “collaborators” and to the local context in which these people acted. According to O. Melnyk, “in addition to enriching our understanding of the problems of everyday life in Europe under Nazi occupation, such a perspective will help to get rid of the political unidimensionality of the politically colored terms of “resistance”

and “collaboration”, and make more apparent the inadequacy of our present conceptual apparatus” (Melnyk, 2008: 282). It needs to be made more obvious that when considering the activities of each collaborator, it should be found out whether he or she personally did or didn’t commit war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Returning to the UAOC, it is worth noting that it was supported by the Germans only till the spring of 1942. Afterwards they began to carry out an equidistant policy, and gradually the Autonomous Orthodox Church became a favorite (Berkhoff, 2002: 536-540; Heyer, 1953: 212-218). It should be emphasized that the hierarchs of both jurisdictions were forced to sign archpastoral appeals containing obeisance towards the occupiers, to pray for the German authorities and army during worships, and to encourage young people to go and work in Germany. Undoubtedly, these were “forced steps” taken in the struggle for survival after being caught between “the devil and the deep blue sea.” During this time the most persecuted by Hitlerians were autocephalous bishops, in particular, Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Hryhorii Ohiichuk, and Fotii Tymoshchuk, who even had been in German custody for some time.

Ukrainian historians Y. Voloshyn and V. Pashchenko do not rule out that many UAOC clerics who were opponents of the Soviet power, either voluntarily or involuntarily actively collaborated with the Nazis (Voloshyn & Pashchenko, 1996: 21). According to H. Fireside, they were a distinct minority: “In the Ukraine they appear to have been limited to a few of the “carpetbaggers” who had been funneled into the province by Bishops Seraphim, Polikarp, and Hilarion and who had been given their marching orders by Ostministerium officials intending them to be a fifth column for the takeover of the church and initially promoted by the Reichskommissariat in aid of its divisive policies” (Fireside, 1971: 155).

The Collaborationism of UAOC

Analyzing the relationship between the autocephalous clergy and the German occupation authorities, one can hardly agree with the categorical interpretation of their collaborationism as a “treacherous step.” They had to maintain contact with the Nazis, to make favorable mention of the German government during worship services, to publish Pro-Nazi materials in the press, and to sign the pastoral addresses with obeisance towards the occupiers. In particular, we should mention the telegram from Bishops Nykanor, Ihor and Mstyslav to Hitler on June 22, 1942, in which they supported the cause of “defense of the honor of the German people and the liberation of mankind from godless Jewish-communist enslavement” (SAKR: 74; CSASBPGU. F. 4398. Op. 1. Spr. 4. Ark. 180). Back in 1941, Archbishop Polikarp blessed his parishes and urged its members to pray during the liturgy for the authorities in accordance with the following formula: “The Supreme Leader of the German people, the High Government and his Christ-loving army may be remembered by the Lord...” (AWMP). On May 16, 1942, Polikarp published an appeal to the flock, encouraging young people to go to work in Germany: “At the call of the German authorities to leave for work in Germany, the Ukrainian people must massively respond, considering it as their sacred duty and honor to give them a worker for the anti-communist front of labor. I call on my flock for this; and to all the honest clergy I also ask them to explain to their parishioners all the favorable conditions and

rewards, which will benefit not only the workers in Germany but will also enable them to provide for their families that remain in place. May the Ukrainian peasantry and workers know that with their intense work, both at home and in Germany, in these great historical times, they will contribute to a better future of the whole of Ukraine” (SAVR). Undoubtedly, these were forced steps in order to survive and support the national movement under the occupation regime.

The former Autocephalous Bishop Manuil Tarnavskiy, who moved to the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Orthodox Church, was executed by the Security Service of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army for writing denunciations to the Gestapo on Ukrainian activists in Volodymyr-Volynskiy. Deprived of his rank, Fotii Tymoshchuk, the Bishop of Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia, received support from the General Commissioner E. Leiser, who acknowledged him as “the highest representative of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church.” However, having refused to cooperate with the Gestapo, he spent nine months in Zhytomyr prison. In March 1944 he was recruited by the People's Commissariat of State Security for the operational work on priests; later he was sentenced to 10 years in labor camps (SSASSU. F. 6. Op. 1. Spr. 75682fp. Ark. 127).

The autonomists' attitude towards the occupiers

For the sake of justice, it should be noted that representatives of the AOC also cooperated with the German occupation administration. In particular, in September 1941, during the mass pilgrimage to Pochaiv, Archbishop Oleksii prayed for Hitler and the German army. In his sermon, he “demanded that they always remember in their prayers the Führer, the most brilliant leader of today, and the German people. The blood sacrifice of the German people should never be forgotten. He and all Ukrainians, he said, wanted the intentions and thoughts of the Führer to be realized in full.” (Berkhoff, 2002: 536-540). According to Bishop Pankratii Gladkov, at the end of 1941, the Pochaiv Lavra donated the German army 100,000 kilograms of apples, honey, and other products (SSASSU. F. 6. Op. 1. Spr. 75633fp. Ark. 23). The dean of the cathedral in Zhytomir Fr. Yosyf Yakubovskiy gave the police a list of 250 to 300 Jews who wanted to be baptized. After that, they were executed (SSASSU. F. 6. Op. 1. Spr. 71152fp. Ark. 26-27, 34).

In May of 1943, Panteleimon Rudyk, the Administrator of the Kyiv Eparchy of AOC, posted a message “Against the Anarchy of the Evil Spirit” where he emphasized: “*The great German people, led by its Führer, has taken upon itself leadership in the present-day holy war against the bloody violators and enemies of all mankind. This struggle has as its aim the liberation not only of our Ukraine but of all of Europe from the Red serpent that is shedding the blood of innocent and defenseless people, bringing physical and spiritual slavery, injustice and death. It is our duty to help our liberators in any way that we can, above all with conscientious labour, honest observance of all of the authorities' orders and maintenance of order*” (SSASSU. F. 13. Spr. 376. T. 84. Ark. 10-10zv).

In the years of occupation, the priest was in a difficult situation, feeling pressured both by the occupation authorities and by the nationalist and Soviet underground. Therefore, each pastor chose his own model of behavior, which was determined by his convictions, life experiences, general culture, and so on. Newspapers of that time,

especially during the first months of occupation, were stuffed with a number of open letters, appeals, notes, in which the highest clergy expressed their sympathy with the German authorities. The question of how much they corresponded with the true views of the Orthodox hierarchs and influenced the formation of the position of the parish priesthood is rather controversial.

After registering their activities with the occupation authorities on the ground, a large part of the clergy was forced to sign the “the vow of obedience” to the new authorities. Also, the occupiers scrutinized the pastors, recruited informants among their own entourage, who monitored the accuracy of their following the government decrees. However, according to German documents, parish clergy often tried to circumvent the prescripts of the authorities or complied with them “only partially.” The occupiers considered that the main reason for such actions was the negative evaluation of certain “pro-government sermons” of the priests by their congregation. In the first place, these were appeals to help the German Army in the regions where most of the men, sons, and brothers of the parishioners had been mobilized into the Red Army, and to “voluntary consent to leave for Germany.” In such areas, Church attendance declined, and the authority of the priest drastically reduced.

It should be emphasized that often, in private conversations, the failure to obey or partial compliance with government orders was explained by the clergy with their inconsistency with Christian traditions and norms. This was particularly evident in the attitude of the Orthodox clergy towards the destruction of the Jewish population by the occupiers. Despite the prohibition, the priests continued practicing the sacrament of baptizing Jews and giving them Christian names, which greatly complicated the definition of the nationality of the baptized.

Conclusions

Thus, the UAOC of the 1940s is not a sectarian and collaboracionist group, but an independent Church with canonical bishops, which through the Warsaw Metropolitanate was in eucharistic communion with other local churches except the Moscow Patriarchate, which up to 1948, did not recognize the Polish autocephaly. The only one hierarch of the UAOC of 1942, Bishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk returned to Ukraine and was directly involved in the revival of the Autocephalous Church and its new episcopate.

The restoration of the Soviet power led to the destruction of the UAOC and the AOC and the incorporation of their institutional structures into the Moscow Patriarchate. Deprived of the spiritual guidance, isolated from the Diasporic Churches and persecuted by the punitive and repressive system, the autocephalists, unlike the Greek Catholics, were unable to preserve their Church in the underground and were doomed to disappear from the religious map of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

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**WITH VIGILANT CONCERN: THE DEBATE
ARISING FROM THE SPANISH FILM CENSORSHIP LAW OF 1963
IN THE WRITTEN PRESS**

Fátima Gil Gascón, Manuel Gómez Segarra***

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the newspapers and magazine's opinions gathered in relation to the appearance of the censorship laws of 1963. The publication of the code generated an intense debate between two different positions: the official one promoted by García Escudero, general director of cinematography, and the one defended by the most reactionary groups, composed by the parents and some members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The discussion, which never addressed the possible suppression of coercive measures, mainly focused on three aspects: who should exercise censorship, what was the role of the viewer and where were the boundaries of it.

Key words: *Censorship, cinema, mass media, Francoist regime, laws*

Introduction

Cinema was one of the main sources of entertainment for Spaniards during Francoism. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, between 1938 and 1948, thirty-eight screening rooms were built in Madrid, as opposed to only twenty-five churches (Montero, 2002: 180). In a country self-proclaimed as the "spiritual reserve of the West," this circumstance provides abundant proof not only of the silver screen's high popularity, but also, and especially, the huge relevance it was given by the State.

Franco's regime used films as an effective propaganda system. This was a seemingly harmless way to indoctrinate the population with the principles of the "New Spain". To this end, he orchestrated an industrial scheme whose main repressive entity was the Censorship Board, which controlled foreign and Spanish productions. The former were not allowed to be shown in any Spanish cinema without first having undergone scrutiny, and on occasion, censorship. The latter were supervised throughout the entire process. First, the script was examined. Once approved, the film was shot, and then inspected again by the Board.

Although the nationalists established censorship in the middle of the war (1938), it was not until 1963, twenty-five years after its creation, that the first standards regulating its operation were published. The code's approval was fruit of the very evolution of the regime itself. However, the request of different sectors (the industry and family father associations (*asociaciones de padres de familia*), mainly) for a regulatory code, along with the *Viridiana* case (Buñuel, 1961), helped to expedite its proclamation. The regime's apparent and planned opening-up to the outside world,

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beginning in the sixties, included shooting the first film directed by Buñuel in Spain after the Spanish Civil War. *The Dirección General de Cinematografía* (General Cinematography Directorate) believed that the film would be a good example of the changes taking place and would also contribute to the Regime's process of "cleaning up its image". For greater impact, they decided to submit it at Cannes, where it attended as guest film. Although it won the Palme d'Or *ex aequo*, it caused such a scandal in Catholic countries that *L'observatore Romano* and the Vatican condemned it as blasphemous (Salvador, 2004: 10-48).

The controversy sparked by this film centred the debate on the need to regulate film censorship, to avoid, as pointed out in an editorial piece in the newspaper *ABC*, subjective rationale that could ruin a production. Since "there is but one moral law, yet criteria for application may differ", the publication requested that the moral judgements affecting film works be shaped into objective standards (*ABC* 15 October 1961).

An article on the same topic published a few days later emphasised the need to educate and teach through these rules which, far from an imposition, fruit of consensus between the film industry on one side, and the Church and the State on the other, should respect the following: "The important thing is film ethics criteria is not to determine good or evil, but rather to create a righteous awareness of good and evil. An educator's most important task lies not in creating students endowed with impeccability, but students who, and under any circumstances, cultivate a righteous awareness of good or evil and attempt to do good" (*ABC* 3 November 1961).

This newspaper was joined by other voices. In the industry, directors and producers asked that guidelines be published. Even the *Confederación de Padres de Familia* (Confederation of Family Parents) sent a letter to the Director General of Cinematography, requesting the publication of standards sufficiently precise and specific "that, notwithstanding, do not require a meticulous, casuistic breadth, so that both film producers and importers, as the entities entrusted with censorship, have the suitable guiding elements to determine their actions" (Gubern and Font, 1974: 99).

In the summer of 1962, the government was restructured. Manuel Fraga was elected as Minister of Information and Tourism, and he appointed José María García Escudero as Cinematography Director. Six months later, 9 February 1963, the first film censorship laws under Francoism were published.

This article aims to analyse the response of different political and social agents to the publication of this regulation through information gathered from the written press. While abolishing the regulation was never discussed (we must not forget that newspapers were also subject to heavy censorship (Delgado, 2004: 224)), the news did make evident that there were opposing positions. Some defended the project, but others deemed the new regulation as too permissive. This diversity proved that cinema was still relevant in terms of moral education, but it especially revealed the opposing attitudes of different sectors regarding the regime's subtle, yet undeniable, liberalisation.

García Escudero's "spirit"

Fraga's tentative opening up to the world (which mainly took shape in the form of the Press Law of 1966) could also be observed in film. This greater freedom was even more evident when compared with the period under the previous Minister of Information and Tourism. With good reason, these years saw the popularity of the sentence "*con Arias Salgado todo tapado. Con Fraga hasta la braga* (Everything locked down under Arias Salgado. But Fraga even shows panties)" (*ABC*, 8 June 1978). Although vulgar, this sentence exemplified how detractors of the new censorship system felt (they considered those who held control over film to be excessively permissive).

The main architect behind the restructuring of the entities repressing celluloid was García Escudero, who drafted the first words of what would become censorship regulations in different books and articles. Based on the idea that censorship should be a consubstantial element of cinema itself, the Cinematography Director argued for what he deemed intelligent censorship, adapted to its target audience.

Different viewers with different degrees of education and interests required different levels of vigilance. Just as one cannot treat a child the same way as an adult, one cannot be as permissive with neighbourhood film viewers as with film club viewers (García Escudero, 1952: 177-197).

This heterogeneity made general censorship a necessity, one that could encompass all kinds of viewers. It needed to be nuanced by another unofficial censorship, for writers and critics, families and conversations, audiences, and, in short, the entire country's habits of thinking and feeling. This social control should force government control to constantly evolve, so as to expand or moderate: "If social censorship is lax, official censorship should act as a rear-guard, halting it; if censorship is too narrow and fussy, official censorship should attempt to expand it" (García Escudero, 1952: 182)

Intervention in film played an educational role, insofar as it responded to the expression of thought of a Government that could be reactionary, but also innovative (García Escudero, 1958: 65). Broadening or reducing its scope, based on the interests of the government itself, allowed society to modify the scope of what was permissible.

In this regard, cinema was considered a magnificent laboratory, a training field where individuals could contemplate the implications of fictional actions whose real-life could be disastrous. For this reason, depicting evil and its consequences appeared not only pertinent, but also necessary. Far from moralising lessons, unseemly conducts should not be resolved by an ending making them an example to follow; rather, they needed to be shown realistically, but without drawing sympathy or winning over the viewers. In short, this is because "censorship is removal of the danger, when it is morally certain that it will occur, or when found next to good, there are serious probabilities that the worst shall prevail" (García Escudero, 1953: 176).

Censorship standards

The annual directory of Spanish film published in 1963 presaged not only the code's upcoming publication, but also the concept upon which it was based:

"There is an apparently strong trend in Spanish public opinion based on the need or convenience of structuring (standardising) certain bases, a code or regulation for

cinematographic ethics. We believe that it is necessary to find a point of balance in film production, between the necessary freedom of artistic expression and the need to act as guardian over shared feelings on morals and customs. If such an important study were to be materialised, the process would clearly require time and meditation” (Sindicato nacional del espectáculo, 1963: 1173).

To write this regulation, as stated by the magazine *Film Ideal* (num. 117, May 1963), around one hundred representatives from different social, ideological and professional tiers were consulted, with whom all articles were debated. In the same fashion, several drafts were written that defined the ideological principles upon which the text should be based, and the encyclicals *Vigilanti cura* and *Miranda Prorsus* were consulted, as well as regulations in different countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Egypt and Germany (*Dichos y hechos*, num. 330, May 1963).

The regulation did not introduce great changes to previous approaches. In other words, after over two decades of dictatorship, filmmakers were aware of both the essence of the regime, and the limits within which it took action. Notwithstanding, having recourse to a regulation that could be used in the event of a claim or uncertainty was an important progressive development.

The text begins with a statement of intent: the work would not be unnecessarily mutilated, with preference being placed on total prohibition over partial modification. This idea, which may seem negative due to its restrictive nature, was in response to the many attacks launched against the quality of Spanish cinema. They were based on the Board members’ authority to modify the work: “press censorship allowed criticism, at times very harsh, of scenes or situations that were included under recommendation of Censorship Authorities, against the criteria of the director or producer of the film” (Uniespaña).

According to this text, censorship’s intent was still to set an example. Evil was not forbidden from the screen but could be shown provided it was not justifiable or displayed in an attractive fashion, or no attempt was made to resolve it at the end of the plot. It had to be counteracted by positive elements that helped the viewer to understand the difference between them both.

The main issue with these standards was the use of vaguely-defined moral language. General standards used a series of expressions none too objective, such as “morally reproachable” or “individual scourges”, whose meaning could only be understood in relation to a certain context. This ambiguity endowed members of the Board with a certain ability to take action, as once again, they made themselves to be as judges of what was permissible. In this regard, García Escudero’s words are of note, who stated that the regulation, to “to shun trivial, counterproductive and puritan case-by-case analysis, must consist of broad formulas, to guide those who apply them without oppressing freedom of criteria” (García Escudero, 1962: 46).

In addition to these generic provisions, there were applicable standards that were much more specific, focused on aspects susceptible to prohibition and reinforcing the limits of acceptability. Thus, suicide, homicide, divorce, sexual perversion, crime (provided it was detailed) and blasphemy were classified as unacceptable elements, and therefore inadmissible in a film (Official State Gazette 9 February 1963, qtd in Martínez de Salinas y Mendoza: 1965, a).

Reactions to censorship regulations

Under the dictatorship, there were two kinds of newspapers. Official papers, published by the State and including over forty publications (of which *Arriba*, *Pueblo* and a good number of local papers are of note), and private papers. Although all of them were subject to government censorship, the former communicated the regime's ideas, while the latter could have an editorial line, although within very narrow limits set by the people in power. In this regard, *ABC* projected a monarchical conservative ideology, *Arriba* was closer to popular syndicalism, and *El Alcázar* and *Madrid* took positions closer to Opus Dei's Catholicism (Dávara: 2005, 131-147).

Reactions to the long-awaited censorship regulations were immediate. Almost every newspaper wrote different articles on the issue, and opinion on the code became a regular question in the specialised press. Interest remained high even months after publication, when the pertinence of the regulations could be discussed with concrete data.

The press took two opposing positions: those satisfied with the regulations and their content, and those who were clearly against them. This latter sector included two radically different groups who were opposed for very distinct reasons.

Firstly, there was a faction comprising the most critical voices of the regime, especially members of the industry who fought to suppress censorship which, in their eyes, stunted the artistic capacity of filmmakers. From this point of view, although creating regulations was a small step forward when proposing an audio-visual project, because it established a legal framework to which one could have recourse in the event of disagreement, it also helped to strengthen and legitimise the system. This collective's feelings can be seen in the responses given by actor Paco Rabal to the survey conducted by *Pueblo* on the issue. The actor stressed the idea of the Spanish Board's severity, which he considered negative since "censorship that is too demanding and impassable ends up harming works of art, and of course, everyone participating in them". Despite this, Rabal showed his surprise over a text he initially disliked, but which he believed was being implemented in practise with a broader criteria than expected (*Pueblo*, 11 April 1963).

As can be observed, the most critical group voiced its disagreement (we must not forget that the regime could allow certain dissidences, but always perfectly under control) in a shallow way in interviews and comments. Despite this, this sector had not participated in the debate sparked by the code's publication, since discussion was focused on the limits of censorship, not on its abolition, which is what they advocated.

The other extreme consisted of the most conservative Catholics (mainly members of the ecclesiastic hierarchy and the (Family Father Association) (*Asociación de Padres de Familia*) who deemed the text excessively permissive. This group did clearly share their discomfort through the press, the pulpit and church publications. The reactionary concept held by this sector of art (with important figures, such as the bishops of Canary Islands, Bilbao, Caceres and Barbastro) was in stark contrast to the opinion of a large part of the Church. It especially ran against the opinion of priests who were members of the administrative bodies in charge of cinematography. Much more learned in film, their vision was less prude than the other group (Nieto Ferrando,

2012: 855-873).

For its part, the official position had struck a difficult balance. On one hand, the need for control over the silver screen was reaffirmed, but on the other, and as can be seen in statements made in 1964 by Fernández Cuenca, director of the San Sebastian film festival, the progressive nature was grounds to boast: “Today, Spanish censorship is conducted under wholly indulgent criteria. One figure will give you a good idea as to the extent of this. Out of fifty films previously prohibited, forty-six are currently authorised for projection. Moreover, and under no circumstance, do any restrictions or cutting that may occur alter the work’s narrative coherence” (*Film España*, num. 3, 1964).

The debate, a harsh dispute between the most fundamentalist collectives and official stances, was mainly focused on three aspects: who should wield censorship, what the viewer’s responsibility toward censorship was, and what the limits should be. While the movement press (*Pueblo, Sur, Levante*, etc.) defended the administration’s position (Martínez, 2016: 485-507), Catholic publications (*Ecclesia, Signo, SIPE, Diario regional*, etc.) put forward that film was seemingly immoral, and demanded greater participation in decisions over what could be seen and what could not.

They were based on the idea that true control should be exercised by and within the family: “One must be convinced that vigilance and censorship over non-sport spectacles, cinema, theatre, television and reading falls on the primary social body, which is the family. And on each individual’s conscience when they have grown into adults” (*Ecclesia*, num. 1131, 16 March 1963). The control wielded by the administration proved insufficient, since universal measures needed someone to correct and steer them, depending on the different types of viewers. In this regard, the State’s intervention acts as distrust of the social reality that should be exercising the control: the family (*Familia española*, May 1963).

Multiple articles stressed this point, even suggesting the need for different types of vigilance, depending on the viewer’s nature or zeal. With good reason, as stated by the publication *SIPE* (May 1963), “Official state censorship’s mission is to scrutinise and act as guardian in a broad manner, and not in an exclusively religious or moral sense”. In other words, official censorship can err (and does err) on the side of laxness insofar as it must take responsibility for general issues, those that affect the common good of Spaniards, heeding to broader approaches, as opposed to other restrictive methods that should take responsibility for the personal sphere.

“If the State’s duty is to keep watch over public morality, its mission must not reach certain extremes. There is religious censorship, then censorship that must be exercised by parents, and self-censorship, to which the public is not accustomed, perhaps due to the rigour of the previous state censorship” (*SP*, 1 May 1963). Since it did not tower over as a leader of the most conservative Catholic principles, State control was deemed insufficient for a large part of the population, whose desire was for several types of control to exist at once. Given that this issue includes several layers and phases in vigilance, it led to a new idea that revolved not so much around the executor power of censorship as to the very nature of censorship itself: to which extent the viewer (and by extension, society as a whole) must be, and was, responsible for what one viewed.

Given this conflict, the Diocesan Review Board of the Brotherhoods of Madrid commissioned Reverend Martín de Castro with a conference, reported by *Más* in its May 1963 edition. The priest defended self-censorship, meaning personally establishing limits, as the desirable condition when viewing spectacles. However, he stated, that this was currently unthinkable, given the imperfect education of ninety percent of Spaniards (*Más*, May 1963).

Many clamoured for a more active attitude on the public's part. In a certain way, the publication of such broad censorship laws allowed viewers to exercise a minimum of freedom that would be unthinkable in other contexts. This is what the Cinematography Director stated at the 8th International Week of Religious Film and Human Values:

“How many, deep down, would rather not be permitted than to desire, and thus intend that those up top solve all their issues, saving them the effort of properly educating themselves, the responsibility of deciding, the risk of taking the wrong step and even the freedom to obey and disobey, forgetting that, as we were reminded yesterday by a young Italian producer, if truth is freedom, then freedom is truth or (if we wish to be specific), and might we say that one must go to truth in freedom?” (*Revista internacional del cine*, num. 42, July 1963).

For the official stance, the censorship enacted in Spain was pertinent, at least after regulation, because it provided the individual with a certain autonomy, although they were also asked to recognise their own responsibility. As journalist Cecilio Alonso defended, the intent was to impose “adult cinema for adult minds” (*La marina*, 15 May 1963). His attitude was therefore less paternalistic, insofar as he considered the viewer of legal age to make and come to terms with their own decisions. Decisions that the viewer made, we must not forget, within a completely watched-over and controlled context. This new way of understanding the public, as an individual capable of discerning between right and wrong, is also to be observed, as stated in the publication *Sur* (3 April 1963), in forsaking the pretence that viewers were suddenly scandalised, when minutes before they were criticising how parts of films had been cut: “I believe that what censors are asking of the Spanish people is that we not be so spiteful, have more good faith and not be so moralising: they are more competent than we, and we are just fine in their hands”.

With this system, being scandalised after selecting, paying for, and viewing a film rated by the Church as a four, was clearly hypocritical. This was the statement made in an article entitled “*Padre de familia* (Family Father)”, published by the newspaper *Pueblo* after the note sent by this collective to the press, sharing their alarm over existing freedoms in this regard. This text is a good example of the confrontation between the two opposing stances: “Parents of families are getting all alarmed. Is their fear justifiable...? Let us calmly examine the issue. As far as their children are concerned, parents of families can still rest just as easy, given that the shows that may be deemed dangerous are not “suitable for minors”. As far as their sons who are already grown are concerned, and along with their respective wives, the ratings “3R” (adults with caution) and “4” (seriously dangerous), already warn possible viewers. All fathers of families must do is refrain from taking them to view films or theatre plays thus rated so they can remain just as calm as ever” (*Pueblo*, 4 April 1963).

The underestimation of a seemingly undereducated audience inevitably meant that control was required over the films being shown. Very deeply-rooted in the most conservative sectors, this idea was defended by Father Espinosa Cañizares, and others: "... These projections are viewed by those would call themselves front-line Catholics. With their attendance, they lead so many other simple people astray, for whom the argument of authority remains entirely in force" (*Informaciones*, 12 April 1963). Especially bearing in mind that, as stated by *La Vanguardia* (num. 164, June 1963) "the audience fond of film is none too scrupulous with morals and their conscience".

The code was mainly criticised for its permissiveness. According to some newspapers, Spanish screens were suddenly filled with immoral acts, even before it was physically possible for a film censored under the new regulation to be screened. These accusations opened up an old debate the directly alluded to the limits of censorship. Specifically, the suitability of showing evil, or not.

Articles published in the press show the huge difference in opinion as far as this issue is concerned. For some, censorship's main mission should be to prevent viewers from seeing situations that could disturb or make them uncomfortable. These situations could also incite the viewer to commit a sin or a crime. For this reason, a great number of opinions called for suppression of what was called at the time "*asuntos fuertes* (heavy issues)". "For those to whom they are unknown, we run the risk that these moral blemishes may become something to be desired by beings who are not well-instructed and with a deficient mind" (*Isla*, 6 May 1963). Some were much more critical and were truly indignant over what they considered to be rubbish that "repulses, wounds and offends": "We are perhaps being told of aesthetic values, of hidden messages amongst the poison, of a delicate fragrance in pestiferous scenes. So, is this art? So, is this beauty? This is lewdness, shamelessness, and, in many cases, scandal" (*Diario regional*, 3 March 1963).

Some even say it is a scourge, responsible for all of society's ills: "Because family life registers the decisions of public power as a subtle seismograph: this deluge of suppressed or scandalous divorces, and the most original of calamities of our times (one of the most serious of all times), childhood delinquency, especially feeds off the defects of censorship" (*Hoja Diocesana*, Barcelona, 31 March 1963). This sort of cantankerous comment was not so much an opinion on the state of cinema as it was a devastating critique of the Board's action, since it was the Board, after all, who permitted these stories to be shown.

The attitude of others was not so inflexible, and they understood that the brazenness lay more in the observer's desire to criticise than in the very object being observed. "Given the new attitude of censors, we believe that the correct course of action would be to allow this outbreak of measles to spread in its total and logical virulence, leaving behind our fear of this deluge of "heavy issues", which, if observed with dispassion and a clean spirit, without worn-out nonsense, we will see that they are not worthy of the uproar they have caused" (*Pueblo*, 2 May 1963).

For its part, the *Estafeta literaria* proved itself to be truly pragmatic. Since the media had erased borders and it was now possible to become "infected" with what was happening abroad, the proper course of action according to the article was to adapt to what was out there, because it was truly not worth so much fuss: "Freedoms,

in the sense of the roughness of stone or unpolished rock or a pebble of a scandal, should not be the subject of so much ado if compared with what is circulating everywhere outside our country” (*La estafeta literaria*, num. 269, 6 July 1963).

During these months of upheaval, some priests, mainly Father César Vaca and Father Carlos María Staehlin, both spokespersons of free appointment for the Censorship Board, published different texts explaining and defending the body’s stance regarding the three issues raised. For Father Staehlin, state censorship must necessarily be different from ecclesiastic censorship. Firstly, because the state censorship decided whether or not the project was to be carried out, including the modifications it deemed pertinent, while religious censorship was limited to classifying the material already filmed. One had to take action on the very elements inherent to cinematography, while the other could focus exclusively on decency. Moreover, because the target subject is different: the population as a whole, or members of the flock (*Razón y fe*, May 1963).

For his part, Father Vaca, in a series of articles appearing between March and July 1963 in the newspaper *Ya*, explored the idea of self-censorship in further depth, with one’s individual conscience as a transcendental element to resist falling into temptation. He wrote, “All Catholics in the world, and non-Catholics but men who wish to be moral, know that they must sidestep and avoid treading certain lands, regardless of how legally permitted they may be” (*Ya*, 29 March 1963). According to the priest, this temptation should not be viewed as the inevitable possibility of sin, as those who criticised the presence of complex issues on the screen seemed to view it, but rather as an opportunity to overcome said temptation (*Ya*, 24 May 1963).

Although he did not defend relativism, the clergyman believed that immorality was oftentimes in the mind of the person qualifying the action, especially when it was simplified and the circumstance not interpreted in its fair context (*Ya*, 5 July 1963). For this reason, those who rose up as standard bearers oftentimes did not understand that they were more dangerous than those demanding greater freedom since, unbeknownst to them, they were erring on the side of excess (*Ya*, 10 July 1963).

Staehlin was clearly in favour of showing sin on the screen, because just as in real life, the viewer should not be deprived of choosing between good and evil. For this reason, it was necessary to confront certain human problems (and what better way than in film) to discover (and thus be able to avoid) certain stumbling blocks. When this idea is applied, a risqué film can teach a better moral lesson than an apparently harmless film. Thus, it should not be considered that a film was immoral just because one scene or image was, just as scandal could not be limited to the visual plane alone. It was necessary to judge and view the work as a whole to ascertain its suitability.

Conclusions

García Escudero’s appointment as Cinematography Director ended a period marked by a tendency toward the apostolate, where whitewashing works appeared to take priority over the film’s qualities (Martínez-Bretón, 1987: 155). The 1960s baptised a sort of cinema that not only used new technical resources, but that also began to address, even in Spain, unheard-of issues such as divorce, abortion and nudity. Although the films shown on the big screen were always under ironclad control, new

times (and new regulations) permitted topics that had previously been forbidden. As long as they were condemned at one point in the story.

Thanks to the publication of censorship laws, film came to push the limits of what was permitted under Francoism, at least on moral issues. In the way and in the location where its limits could be pushed. Therefore, films were nothing more than the visual manifestation of a dispute that actually revolved around acceptance or non-acceptance of the apparent change in a regime that was slowly settling for administrative support, and whose approaches began to bear new times and new realities in mind. Underlying these debates was the concept of freedom, or more specifically, the boundaries of freedom. This was because, barring exceptions, social agents were engaged in dialogue in and around the limits of the small degree of autonomy allowed by the dictatorship.

In the same fashion, the reactions of different groups, not only to the censorship law itself, but also to its practical application, made further evident the existence of different opinions that were controlled, yet still real. Their publication in newspapers is especially relevant, since this media, just like film, was not only for expressing opinions. They also formed said opinions. In this regard, it should be stated that the censorship regulation gave way to a debate that would be more evident and tangible after publication of the 1966 press law. For good reason, control over film, along with informational policy or propaganda efforts, was one of the few spheres where power disputes were permitted during the dictatorship (Sevillano, 1999: 147-166).

Different collectives pressuring the Board and its need to regulate was one of the reasons behind creation of the regulation, and later publication of the new 1964 cinematography standards. While it is true that both texts were in response to popular request, it is also true that they were part of the new Ministry team's orchestrated policy that was meant to be seen as progressive.

The sixties were times of upheaval. In Spain, including political groups that aimed to promote a new image of the country abroad led to a certain turmoil in different sectors. The different stances taken on what would be one of the first slightly innovative measures provide a glimpse of the internal dissent. These measures were minimal, given the characteristics of Franco's political system. On one hand, those most like-minded with the regime gave their acquiescence and respect to the policy, with the understanding that it fell under accepted boundaries. On the other, the most conservative saw their foundations begin to shudder, due to what they considered to be excess independence. Publishing censorship regulations based on example more than concealment pushed the two factions apart. Even though they essentially thought the same, they were competing for the same slices of power. These differences grew clearer as the decade wore on, and the clergy crisis highlighted even further the most reactionary approaches in certain priestly sectors (Moreno Seco, 2002: 111-130). In this circumstance, those most critical of the regime accepted the option as a lesser evil while awaiting removal of the dictatorship.

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**THE CONFERENCE IN MALTA (2-3 DECEMBER 1989)
AND THE END OF THE “COLD WAR” – PERCEPTIONS
IN EASTERN EUROPE**

*Adi Horațiu Schwarz**

Abstract

At the beginning of December 2019, there will be three decades of one of the international conferences that have been written in historiography that “have changed the fate of the world.” The leaders of the two superpowers of the moment, US President George Herbert Walker Bush (George Bush Sr.) and General Secretary of the PCUS, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the USSR leader, decided to hold a bilateral meeting in the context of the changes that had begun to take place in Central and Southeast Europe. This article will attempt to explain to what extent the Conference in Malta (2-3 December 1989) led to the end of the “Cold War” and the way in which talks and decisions concerning Central and Southeast Europe were perceived between the two leaders in Malta. The article brings to light a series of interviews, documentary testimonies, memoirs and historiographical analyses carried out by Romanian and foreign historians on the events that occurred 30 years ago.

Key words: *Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush, Malta, Cold War, Eastern Europe, decisions*

Preliminaries

It is generally considered that the Malta Summit was the moment when political foundations for the “Cold War” were concluded. In support of this idea, we believe it is necessary to understand the geopolitical situation in the world during 1989. The USSR has undoubtedly lost ground both in economic terms and also in terms of military action. Since 1975, when the American government decided not to fund the national committees formed by representatives of the Central and South Eastern European Diaspora, Washington DC’s strategies initiated economic development through large-scale investments. They adopted this measure because the diplomatic reports, syntheses, and analyses received by White House officials from US government agencies based on data gathered on the ground by their agents showed that the centralized Soviet economy, so praised by the official Kremlin propaganda, demonstrated its limits of capacity and performance, entering a downward slope, culminating in the crisis of the early 1980s, which the new leader of the Kremlin, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985, had tried to counter it. In Afghanistan, US-led logistics forces (the Mujahedin of the People) had resisted successfully in front of the Red Army, Afghanistan being for the Soviet Union exactly what had represented Vietnam for the United States of America. Hence, the USSR was to withdraw from Afghanistan. In 1988, the war between Iran and Iraq ended, with Iran backed by the Soviets while Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein had benefited from US support. In Washington DC, Vice President George Herbert Bush

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replaced Ronald Reagan. The former was a combatant in World War II, and then head of the CIA. Already on June 12, 1987, US President Ronald Reagan had spoken at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, the famous speech that gave the following message: “Secretary-General Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you want prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe if you seek liberalization: come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” (<http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/reagan-tear-down.htm>). And things began to move to the detriment of Moscow. In the Kremlin, “Glasnosti” and “Perestroika,” those measures by which the reformist leader Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev hoped to “humanize” the communism that had entered into agony, did not produce the expected results. The Soviets were facing an economic crisis, as well as the failure in Afghanistan. However, the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev had given hope to the peoples of the “socialist camp”, being considered a true “Messiah”. It is good to quote here a fragment from the interview given by the poet Mircea Dinescu to the French newspaper “Liberation” on March 17, 1989. The newspaper was a center-left one, which attracted Mircea Dinescu the forced domicile in the Dămăroaia neighbourhood in Bucharest: “For years we have been told, in a low voice and around the bush, that the Romanian system would be liberalized, but it cannot because of the bear from the east. And the people believed. Soviet troops are manoeuvring at the border of Romania. This is the phrase by which our officials fooled us whenever we tried to move a little. Gorbachev’s emergence, with his stunning reforms, brought to light the fact that the pretext of the Moscow-based scarecrow met marvellously with the dogmatic rulers of the other socialist countries, for holding back any opposition and preserving their own Stalinism. I do not know whether Gorbachev is or not considered a good tsar by the peoples beyond the Prut, but for millions of people who have been silent for decades in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, R.D.G. and Romania, he is a harbinger of good, a Messiah of socialism. If he takes into account the theory of that physicist who says that an egg does not boil in ten tons of warm water but in a pot of boiling water, that is, it will have the courage to carry through its ardent vision of history, we will see worlds reborn, people resurrecting (...)” (Gilles Schiller (Noel Stern): Mircea Dinescu, *Le desespoir de la caserne Ceausescu*, Libération, 32-33, Paris, 17 March 1989).

Being of recent history, there is also a good “oral tradition.” Soviet external espionage had done its job well enough, the image of the Kremlin leader was a very popular one behind the Iron Curtain. In 1987, the Soviet leader had paid a visit to his younger “brother”, Nicolae Ceaușescu, in Bucharest. In addition, the AEROFLOT Agency in Bucharest had begun to sell books about Mikhail Gorbachev’s political thought, translated into Romanian, which obviously “were sold under hand”. At the USSR Embassy in Bucharest, those who could understand Russian (and not few, especially politicians) could go to read Pravda and other Soviet publications. The latter were made in very good graphical conditions, on a paper of special quality, contrasting with the “gray” of Romanian communism. The 1987 meeting between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Mihail Sergeevich Gorbachev did not go too well for the Bucharest leader. Whoever has the curiosity to watch ephemeral pictures and videos, can see that the Kremlin leader was applauded at an open, unconstrained scene that Nicolae Ceaușescu did not agree at all. It is enough to see a video shooting with Nicolae Ceaușescu on a working visit in the country comparing to the 1987 film shooting of the official visit of Soviet leader Mihail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Bucharest and to

notice the differences. It is certain that later, in the interviews given, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev (Gorbachev, 1994: 106-112) would mention that he had told Nicolae Ceaușescu to reform and put an end to austerity. Mihail Serghievich Gorbachev said that half of the products imported from socialist Romania, based on CAER quotas, were discarded or re-used, a fact that nowadays does not suit nostalgic who are still spreading the false picture of the “competitiveness of the socialist industry”. Nicolae Ceaușescu was the most conservative communist leader in 1989. Nicolae Ceaușescu was the most conservative Communist leader in 1989. His “Battalion Fighters” Erich Honecker (GDR), General Wojciech Jaruzelski (PRL), Gustav Husak (CSFR), Miklos Nemeth (RPU) and Todor Jivkov (NRB) were trying in those years to win the sympathy of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev and to launch some reforms. RSF Yugoslavia was for many years “a little socialist heaven”, being totally broken by Moscow. The neighbouring countries of Western Europe made the leaders of Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia more realistic.

Returning to Nicolae Ceaușescu, the oral tradition mentions that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev had made it clear that Nicolae Ceaușescu was no longer “in grace”. A clue about gestural semiotics being that at Otopeni Airport where the handshake between Gorbachev and Constantin Dăscălescu, the Prime Minister of the Romanian Government lasted longer than the handshake between Gorbachev and Ceaușescu.

Whatever it is written in specialized papers but also in contemporary tradition, the idea is that, in 1989, Nicolae Ceaușescu’s foreign policy had deteriorated, both in relation to the East and in relation to the West. The strike of the workers in Brașov in November 1987, dissatisfied with the wage cuts and labour and living conditions in socialist Romania, had also been silenced by the authorities, but “Radio Europa Liberă” was a source of information for the Romanians, showing that the regime in Bucharest did not intend to make any economic and social reform. The economic representatives of the states that had economic relations with socialist Romania in those years mentioned in their reports the extent of the protest in 1987. In March 1989, to show that the 1987 strike had been an attempt to destabilize socialist Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu announced that Romania had paid its foreign debt, so the Romanian people were “masters of their destiny”. The population hoped to start better days but everything was in vain. 1989 was the year of the XIVth Congress of the PCR, and official propaganda put it on any publication, no matter if it was scientific, artistic, information, cultural, etc.

In November 1989, when Nicolae Ceaușescu was re-elected General Secretary of the Communist Party, the enthusiasm of the most optimistic Romanians, hoping for a swap between Nicolae Ceaușescu and his son Nicu, evaporated. On the contrary, Nicolae Ceaușescu’s speech of “re-election” showed how broken by reality he was, locked in the ivory tower of the manipulation of his “loyal army,” which controlled the levers of responsibility in the Romanian socialist state.

On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, a fact obscured by the official press. But this was understood by all the Romanians who were listening at home secretly “Radio Europa Liberă”. With a billion dollars of infusion, USSR accepted to open the Berlin Wall. Hungary demolished its fortifications on the border with Austria (30,000

East Germans traveling to Hungary in September 1989 went to the West), and a group of tourists from the GDR left Prague to the FRG on October 1, 1989. On October 18, 1989, Erich Honecker was asked to resign from Egon Krenz and his colleagues from the Political Bureau. On 10 November 1989, Todor Jivkov was dismissed in Bulgaria. Gustav Husak resigned on November 24, 1989. In Hungary, Janos Kadar withdrew on May 22, 1988, succumbing to reformist Karoly Grosz, who on November 24, 1988, will be replaced by Miklos Nemeth. On July 11-13, 1989, US President George Bush visited Budapest, which did not stir up Moscow's reaction. General Wojciech Jaruzelski resigned in 1990, but in Poland the Communists had lost their real power long ago.

Brent Scowcorft, who, among other positions, also served as National Security Adviser for US President, George H. W. Bush (Scurtu, 2006: 337). He noted that the United States first exploited the "dissidence" of Nicolae Ceaușescu in the interest of American politics but, with the arrival of the reformist Mihail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in 1985 at the leadership of the Soviet Union, after 21 years of conservative leadership (Brezhnev, Andropov, Cernenko-1964-1985), the American strategy changed, in the sense of getting distance from the leader in Bucharest, amid his conservatism and defiant attitude towards both the Americans and the Soviets. Brent Scowcorft, along with Condoleezza Rice, James Baker, and others, were part of the American delegation that attended the Malta Summit (Năstase, 2006: 7-14). So, Romania was, at the date of the Summit in Malta, the only redoubt of Communist totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. At that time, except for Romania, all the socialist states had made radical changes.

The Opportunity of Malta Summit. Synthesis of Soviet-American bilateral talks

Practically, the United States was in a dominant position. The Soviet Union noticed how reformism had expanded into states in its political orbit. Mikhail Gorbachev hoped the United States would support his plan for political reform in the Soviet Union.

Around this Summit, an oral history has been developed in which many statements have been made, some of which are difficult to verify. One of these was the assertion that Mihai Gorbachev had said it was decided to end the Cold War, which has not yet been conclusively proven.

Condoleezza Rice, a member of the US delegation in Malta (as expert on Soviet issues) and subsequently a former US State Secretary, said in an interview (<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/interviews/episode-24/rice1.html>) that George Bush Sr. has been advised by many European leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher (British Prime Minister), Francois Mitterrand (President of France), as well as American Congress and Senate exponents to meet and had talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, especially that in 1989, NATO celebrated 45 years of existence: *"(...) And so there was a period of resisting an early summit, putting first the trip to Eastern Europe, to affirm American support for democracy in Eastern Europe; second, to get through the NATO 45th anniversary celebration, where there were a lot of very sticky issues with the Germans about short-range nuclear forces; and then, only after those relationships had been stabilized, to think about how*

to deal with the Soviet Union in a summit. But European leaders – I believe in particular Francois Mitterrand – really prevailed upon President Bush to meet with Gorbachev, and I believe that Mrs. Thatcher also felt that that would be a good idea. There were those in the Congress who also were pressuring, and I think that President Bush, after seeing what was happening in Eastern Europe, believed it was time for a face-to-face meeting. And my understanding was that he, on the plane back from the trip in July to Eastern Europe, decided he should meet with Gorbachev. And then it took a long time to get it arranged, finding a place, a place that would not be ceremonial, a place where you didn't have to do a lot of other bilaterals. And fortunately – or unfortunately – they chose Malta, which turned out to be a really horrible place to be in December. Although the Maltese were wonderful, the weather was really bad”.

Malta, a small insular island state of the Mediterranean, was chosen as a neutral place, equidistant from the North and South, which had several successive dominations, the most important being the British one. In addition, Malta enjoys neutrality. Furthermore, as a former combatant in the world's last conflagration, George Bush developed a special interest and passion for former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's personality, for latter's ability to plan meetings with the Allies during the war. F.D. Roosevelt had met the discussion partners aboard a naval ship. In addition, on February 2, 1945, before going to Yalta, Winston Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt had met in Malta to establish a common agenda for future talks with USSR leader I.V. Stalin.

Although initially it was agreed that the meetings would be alternate between an American and Soviet warship, bad weather made the meeting place to be on a Soviet one, the Maksim Gorki Cruiser, anchored in the Marsaxlokk Bay. All the interallied meetings from 1943-1945 had taken place either in a territory either close to the Soviet Union (Tehran) or a Soviet one (Yalta), or on the territory occupied by the Soviets (Potsdam). The US Delegation stationed aboard USS Belknap whilst the Soviet one aboard the Soviet Cruiser “Slava”.

The two leaders, George Bush Sr. and Mihail S. Gorbachev, discussed issues related to further developments that would overcome inflexibility and abolish the “Iron Curtain”. In a symbolic manner, the US President presented a piece of reinforced concrete that had shaped the “Berlin Wall” by 1989.

Mihail Gorbachev decided that before coming to Malta to visit Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, a redoubtable anti-totalitarian warrior who, in 1981, had escaped a Vatican bomb linked to the Soviet secret services. Mikhail Gorbachev accredited the idea that NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to meet under the umbrella of the OSCE. President George Bush exposed the elements of his political thinking (Blanton: 2010, 627): *“I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have been going on, the United States has not engaged in condescending declarations aimed at damaging [the prestige of] the Soviet Union. There are people in the United States who accuse me of being too cautious. It is true, I am a prudent man, but I'm not a coward, and my Administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position in the world. But I was insistently advised to do something of that sort – to climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations. My Administration, however is avoiding these steps, we are in favour of reserved behaviour”.*

Mihail Gorbachev insisted on a number of issues such as (<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf>): *“That*

is very important for us. Fundamental changes are happening, people are coming together. That is the most important thing. I see that on East European soil, ways of resolving problems that involve a different system--in the fields of economics, technology, etc.--are becoming established. That is natural. If we share a common understanding, then all our practical actions undertaken under changing conditions will be appropriate and will come to acquire a positive character (...) That is very important. You see, as I said, the most important thing is that the changes lead to greater openness even in our relations with each other. We are beginning to become organically integrated, freeing ourselves from everything that divided us. What will this be called in the final analysis? I think it is a new level of relations. For that reason, for my part, I support your proposal; let us not conduct the discussion at the level of the Church. In history this has always led to religious wars”.

At the joint press conference, superpower leaders said (<http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/40> (accessed February 27 2019) as follows: George Herbert Walker Bush: *“I’m especially glad we had this meeting. And we did gain a deeper understanding of each other’s views. We set the stage for progress across a broad range of issues. ... And there is virtually no problem in the world, and certainly no problem in Europe, that improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship will not help to ameliorate. A better U.S.-Soviet relationship is to be valued in and of itself, but it also should be an instrument of positive change for the world (...) [N]ow, with reform underway in the Soviet Union, we stand at the threshold of a brand-new era of U.S.-Soviet relations...”*

Mihail Sergheevici Gorbaciov: *“In the first place, I assured the President of the United States that the Soviet Union would never start a hot war against the United States of America, and we would like our relations to develop in such a way that they would open greater possibilities for cooperation. Naturally, the President and I had a wide discussion -- rather, we sought the answer to the question where we stand now. We stated, both of us, that the world leaves one epoch of cold war and enters another epoch. This is just the beginning. We’re just at the very beginning of our long road to a long-lasting peaceful period”.*

The general line of the two leaders’ speeches can be synthesized by a statement by Mikhail Gorbachev (Bush, 1989: 1627): *“We should be very responsive to the challenges of today’s world. And the leaders of our two countries cannot act as a fire brigade, although fire brigades are very useful. We have to keep it in mind too. This element was also present”.*

Historian Ioan Scurtu, summarizing Mikhail Sergheevich’s memoirs, Gorbachev concluded that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was aware of the necessity of moving to a multi-polar system, of the necessity of European integration and unification, that India, China, Japan were to be emerging powers, being agree, in principle, that the Soviet Union was no longer the second pole of power. In turn, George Herbert Walker Bush admitted that the US would be involved in Central Europe, while Eastern Europe somehow remained in the Soviet sphere of interest, and the USSR recognized its role as a “catalyst” (<http://www.ioanscurtu.ro/the-Malta-summit/>): *“The talks were held both in the presence of the delegations and on the eye-to-eye basis. The issues touched: disarmament, bilateral cooperation, the international situation. The American president expressed his support for perestroika, reassuring him that he was dealing with an American Administration and a Congress that was hopeful his reforms would be successful. Gorbachev said he believed there were important changes in the world in terms of balance of forces. He said it was obvious that the world was on the verge of passing a bi-to a multi-polar system; that willingly or not Europe would be united and integrated economically; He mentioned further that other centres of international*

politics were Japan, China, India. Gorbachev was in fact recognizing that the Soviet Union was no longer the second pole of power of the world. The leader of the Kremlin believed it was important to discuss what lessons should be drawn from past experience from the Cold War. George Bush, in turn, said he was interested in the developments in Eastern Europe (that used to be under Soviet influence); Gorbachev emphasized he pursued no goals in Central (accepting US pre-eminence in that region) Europe. The American leader praised the Soviet one saying it was the catalyst of the changes in Eastern Europe, which were positive. Gorbachev in turn said they had to work together, in a responsible spirit and with caution in a time when Europe was so troubled. Bush agreed?

There was also a discussion about Romania, George Herbert Walker Bush, considering that Romania, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia had to enjoy the right of self-determination. On the occasion of his last visit to Budapest, George Herbert Walker Bush saw that there was a strong protest movement in Hungary over what they called the “ethnic terror” to which Ceaușescu would have subjected the Hungarians in Romania.

Central and Southeast European perceptions of the Malta Summit

A first problem found by contemporary historiography shows that at the Malta Summit no issues related to nuclear weapons were discussed. This issue, underlines the Hungarian historian Béla Révész, came to public attention in the middle of 1990 when the Soviets began to withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe because the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons was presumed on the basis of syntheses made by the American secret services (Békés, Révész, Vajda: 2015 <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-malta-summit-1989-hungarian-perspective-related-sources-after-25-years>): “*The Eastern European*” atom scandal ‘broke at the beginning of the 1990s in the midst of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the region. Some information became public that, in sharp contrast to the semi-official standpoint, the Soviet Army was stationing its nuclear arsenal not only in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, but also in Poland and Hungary too. “The Soviet troops stationed in Poland do not have nuclear weapons.” This was how the Polish government commissioner in charge of the Soviet troops’ withdrawal attempted to deny the news in April 1991. This was however disproved by Victor P. Dubynin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces in Poland, when he admitted: the Soviet Union had indeed stationed nuclear warheads in Poland until mid-1990. In Eastern Europe, there were rocket units, and there were also nuclear warheads too. But in the first half of 1990 they were all transferred back to the Soviet Union – as the general added. The news from Poland stirred up the Hungarian public and demanded clarification of the situation in Hungary”.

In Czechoslovakia, for example, the press reported little about the meeting in Malta. In addition, historian Barnabas Vajda states that the Kremlin leader was not fully informed about the pro-Western attitude of Central European citizens. In his conception, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was an idealist who believed in the creation of “communism with a human face”: “*If people read only the central political newspapers, then Czechoslovak readers knew very little about the fundamental changes in 1989. Among others they could not know that Mikhail Gorbachev miscalculated the situation in their region. Eastern Europeans did not know that Gorbachev was not sufficiently briefed on Eastern Europe. As a great fan of euro communism, Gorbachev believed that unreformable systems in the region could be reformed. He was totally unaware of the egoism among the Eastern European*

communist leaders, whose nationalism and mutual hatred was hiding under jovial smiles at every meeting initiated by the Soviet comrades. In fact, Eastern European comrades have always had different economic motives, and by mounting pressure on their economy, they have become more and more selfish. Gorbachev miscalculated the growing pro-Western orientation of Eastern Europe too. He relied on his aging fellow-leaders, and he did not get the point that every buying panic, every devalued currency, every revolt, every increase in energy price was a potential landmine under the structure of local pocket-communism. He was certainly informed of the most common demands made by the marginalized political dissent (such as more democracy, giving up the monopoly of political power, freedom of speech, etc.), but he did not understand their importance in the Eastern European context. On the contrary, even at the end of 1989 he still used singular ('party') when speaking about Eastern European political systems. Gorbachev was not aware of the hidden pro-Western attitudes of the peoples in Eastern Europe. He did not understand that even a rock concert could serve as a protest against the political system throughout the whole of Eastern Europe, creating a challenge for local leaders".

In Romania, the document presented in the Annex revealed to Nicolae Ceaușescu on December 1, 1989 that the USSR was to offer US concessions in exchange for the infusion of US capital in the Soviet economy, which was on a share of damage. In addition, the synthesis by the Romanian Securitate insists that the leaders George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev were to initiate pressure actions in China, Cuba, Romania, to impose real reforms. The document showed that nuclear weapons issues were not to be discussed. In addition, it was expressed the idea that France and England did not want a seizure of leadership of Western Europe by reunified Germany.

Epilogue

Nicolae Ceaușescu decided to visit Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on December 4, 1989. It is certain that this last meeting of the Romanian leader with a Soviet leader would be unfortunate for Nicolae Ceaușescu. He urged Mikhail Gorbachev to be involved and stop the transformations in Central and South Eastern Europe, which in his view would have contributed to the destruction of the socialist system.

Historian Ioan Scurtu analyses this meeting: "*Gorbachev said that in a socialist country, how could we go into a broader meeting without first defining our position in our own affairs? Ceaușescu expressed his concern for what is happening in some socialist countries in Europe. We understand improvement, renewal, but this is not what I want to talk about now. But the way things are done is seriously endangering not only socialism but the very existence of the communist parties in the respective countries. That's why he had proposed a meeting of our socialist countries and our parties to see how things are done in some countries. Gorbachev did not share that point of view, stating that the modernization process should have begun long before; he talked about Honecker, who did not speak to me anymore. The Soviet leader did not spare Ceaușescu: On the other hand, I know you have criticized me together. Of course, Ceaușescu denied: Well, we have not criticized you. On the contrary, we said it would be good to meet sooner and discuss how we should work better. Gorbachev continued, Frankly speaking, I'm really concerned about the co-worker Honecker. The Soviet leader concluded: It is important to strengthen socialism. As for the rest, it is every man for himself. It is not clear that by saying the words Gorbachev meant he really believed the reforms he started reinforced socialism or he just wanted to soften the blow. Then bilateral*

relations were approached. The Romanian leader tried to get promises for more supplies of oil and gas from the Soviet Union for Romania. The two prime ministers agreed to meet on January 9 to discuss. Then Gorbachev said something with many implications: "Will you live until January 9?" (Olteanu, 1999: 234-243).

Returning to Bucharest, Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to relax on December 10, 1989, on a last hunt. Contemporaries testify that the Romanian leader showed a gloomy appearance. His hunting colleagues said that at that hunting he did not stay to count the hunting, as he usually did. He had 15 days remain to live and 12 days to be the head of the Romanian Communist Party and Socialist Romania. After the start of the troubles in Timisoara, Nicolae Ceaușescu made a last visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran on 18-20 December 1989, signing certain economic treaties with Iran. On December 21, 1989, the last rally in Bucharest turned against him. The next day he left the Central Committee headquarters on a helicopter, then was captured, alongside his wife, Elena Ceaușescu, in Târgoviște and executed on 25 December 1989.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev awakened many discontents with his reformist attitude. The USSR continued the reform program, although the course of history was another. The Union Republics were planning to break out of the USSR, while an ultra-conservative CPSU group led by Ghenadi Yanaev decided to take power in the summer of 1991, more precisely in August 1991. Isolated in the Crimea, Mikhail Gorbachev was declared medical incapacity to lead the USSR and the USSR. However, Boris Yeltsin, the leader of the future Russian Federation, managed to restore peace, isolate the opponents and start the dissolution procedures of the USSR, a historic act on 26 December 1991.

George Bush Sr. lost the 1992 presidential election, with Bill Jefferson Bill Clinton winning the election, leading up to 2000, followed by George W. Bush, son of George Bush Sr., Condoleezza Rice being called State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United States.

The European Communities signed the Treaty of Maastricht on February 7, 1992, which provided for the extension of this structure to the Central and Southeast Europe, after the first enlargement represented by the German Unification. Former Yugoslavia, the division of Czechoslovakia, the enlargements of the European Union in 1995, 2004, 2007 (accession of Romania and Bulgaria), 2013 NATO enlargements in 1997, 2004 (including Romania's accession) 2014 made the European Union a global actor.

Until the coming of power of Vladimir Putin in the Russian Federation, there was precept that the Cold War had a detached winner, the United States of America. However, in recent years, amid a conciliatory attitude by the Barack Obama Administration, the Russian Federation has recovered much of its geopolitical terrain, engaging itself as a global player alongside the US and the European Union.

The Malta Summit, three decades ago, remains very important for the history of the Cold War. This summit demonstrated on the one hand Mikhail Gorbachev's idealism and on the other hand George H.W. Bush's pragmatism. The road opened by Ronald Reagan had found a happy ending in Malta in 1989. The turbulent weather in Malta in 2 December 3, 1989, opened the way for equally politically troubled times over the next 30 years.

ANNEX

“Top Secret” report (hand-writing) delivered by General Iulian Vlad (Troncotă, 2003: 207-208), chief of State Security Department, to Nicolae Ceaușescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania on December 1-st, 1989 (<http://www.ioanscurtu.ro/the-malta-summit/>):

“We report the following intelligence collected from different sources, about the Bush and Gorbachev Summit:

1. During the new summit between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., organized upon the Soviets’ initiative, the two parties will make a priority of approaching the issue of redefining the spheres of influence and drawing out a new common strategy meant to ensure, further on, their dominant role in all international matters.

- It is to be expected that they conclude new agreements for the limitation of the areas of direct confrontation, in favour of those where their interests meet.

- According to existing information, U.S.S.R. will make new concessions to the Americans in exchange for economic and financial support.

- They intend to establish a new balance on the European continent, meant to gradually diminish the differences between the political and economic systems of the socialist and capitalist countries and to put into practice the concept of <ideology-free international relations> and creating a so-called <European common house>.

- In this context the problem of the existing two military blocs will be raised to the effect that they will be maintained for a while, at least until the stabilization of the situation in Eastern Europe.

- As to the growing concern of Bonn for the reunification of the two Germany, an agreement will be made to assist the process, which will be delayed for the moment in order to include it in the <European integration process>.

- Both parties will be in favour of accelerating bilateral negotiations for reducing armament and military spending; USSR is interested in allotting more funds to domestic needs while the USA to reduce the great deficit in the balance of payment.

It is possible that during the summit, Bush announce his intention to reduce the American forces stationed in Europe in response to similar measures unilaterally adopted by the USSR

- In terms of bilateral relations, the US President will show his willingness to assist USSR economically, on condition that Soviet reforms will improve further by taking into account implementing free market economy.

- Beside the direct request for financial support, Gorbachev will insist to get MFN for U.S.S.R. as well as a reduction of the restrictions on know-how transfer.

NOTE:

- The existing data imply that during the summit, Bush and Gorbachev will discuss the possibility of setting increased pressure on the socialist countries that had not reached the stage of implementing <real reforms>, namely P.R. China, Cuba and Romania.

- As to our country, Bush will emphasize that N.A.T.O. member states will continue to impose restrictions upon their relations with Romania and will request that USSR do the same, mainly by diminishing the supply of oil, gas and iron.

2. During the consultations of the last days with the Washington Administration, the governments of Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy insisted that:

- U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. avoid adopting final decisions concerning the European military force balance, without prior consultations and consent of the West European countries;
- Armaments and forces stationed in Europe be reduced gradually with the revision of the problem after there will be clear guarantees that the U.S.S.R. is willing to dissolve its military force;
- the U.S. observe all prior agreements with West European countries, namely that each of them will have a greater role in influencing the situation in Eastern Europe, so that they should be able to ensure a long term promotion of their own interests in the area.

France and England requested that, in view of the creation of a Confederation of the two German states, it should be avoided a shift of power from Europe to unified Germany or the political and economic, even military polarization between it and the U.S.S.R. as it used to be before WWII'.

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**THE MODEL OF INTERETHNIC ACCORD
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN (1991-2018):
HISTORICAL RESEARCH ASPECT**

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Abstract

This article examines the population, nationality, ethnic cultural centers as the model of interethnic harmony existing at that time, and the experience of different nationalities living in political stability and peaceful coexistence in the Republic of Kazakhstan during the years of independence. It also describes the foundation, formation and activities of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan. The main principle of sovereignty and political stability of Kazakhstan is interethnic peace and harmony. Taking into account the interethnic accord and political stability – the basis of unity of the people, the work on preservation of peace will continue in the future. At present, representatives of different nationalities live in our country. It is well-known that the future of an independent country, which unites them, is directly related to these interethnic relations. This is why the article examines the model of inter-ethnic accord in the Republic of Kazakhstan from the point of view of historical research and examines the fact that representatives of different nationalities live in political stability and peaceful coexistence. In general, the Republic of Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country in the world map. Over 18 million people live in Kazakhstan these days. Representatives of more than 140 nationalities, who have justified themselves, live in a concrete mutual understanding and agreement. There is every reason to conclude that the existing interethnic accord, mutual peace and stability in the country are just as good examples for the nations of the globe.

Key words: *independence, sovereignty, cooperation, tolerance, understanding, assembly*

Introduction

The representatives of different nationalities, who have settled on the fate of their destiny at different periods of times to Kazakhstan, make the biggest part of the population of the republic. Today, they are living in the world community as citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. When they were persecuted and fired, local Kazakhs,

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despite the complexity of their situation at that time supported them and treated as their siblings. A number of nationalities returned to their homeland at the time of political repression and their rights restored. Many have remained voluntarily placed on the Kazakh land. Today, as citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan they work in all spheres of economy and contribute to the development of the country (Baizakova *et al.*, 2017).

From the time of our country's independence, the Kazakh people live on the basis of actual political stability and interethnic accord with representatives of different nationalities. It has been demonstrated that Kazakhstani model of inter-ethnic relations has been formed over a quarter of a century. And the common homeland fraternity and interethnic accord of the citizens of the country is undoubtedly the result of peaceful and harmonious life. As Kazakhstan is a multiethnic state, it is evident that it has accumulated extensive experience in conducting inter-ethnic policy in the years of independence. Nevertheless, the issue of interethnic policy implementation is crucial for our country.

Today in our country there are more than a hundred ethnicities, about 800 ethno-cultural associations are functioning. That is why maintaining harmonious interethnic relations and establishing a rational intercultural dialogue is one of the main strategic objectives of the state policy. The language, religion, and traditions of any nationality are not being harassed. Therefore, interethnic accord and peace of the republic reflects the example of the international community.

Materials and Methods

From the archive data of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan archives were used as archive data (AP RK), the Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), the National Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NA RK) and the Pavlodar State Archive (SAPR). An analysis of the research works was done in the field of historical demography and references to them. The analysis and the functioning of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, its regional centers were used to prepare a scientific article.

Theoretical, objective, historical comparative analysis and historical sequence methods were used mainly on the theory and methodology of scientific research. Each topic has its own research methodology. It is well known that the historical demography sphere, which we are researching, is a starting point in the post-Soviet era when it is not properly developed and gained its independence. The term "demography" was introduced in 1887 by P. Larussa. He published an article titled "Demography" first for the first time. In Russia this work was published in 1893. This branch emerged as a science in the middle of the twentieth century. Since then, demography has been studied as a special subject in history. That is, in 1967, Russia started using a Demography Course manual. There was a need for this discipline. It was related to the study and the problem of the discipline (Smolensky, 2008: 133).

The Belarusian scientist V.N. Sidortsov in his work "The Methodological Problems of History" used the term "demographic history" in the Russian-speaking environment, while western researchers use a number of terms such as "population research", "historical demography" and "history of the population". However, the

problem solving in this problem is based on the principles used in the research. It is given different answers this question. For example, D.S. Smith: “The methodological style of demography is useful in assessing processes and historical data and explores the development of demographic structure and demographics.” (Sidortsov, 2006: 265).

Russian researcher L.M. Drobizheva has chosen the interdisciplinary course for studying the problem of “Interethnic consent” and has a place in the sociology direction and its methods are similar to western methods. In this work, the author has identified the research areas and also outlined the problems that would be further explored in the future (Drobizheva, 2017: 74). Kazakh scientists M.Kh. Asylbekov and A.I. Kudaibergenova: “The historical demography of Kazakhstan is a young, but very promising and important one, especially in the context of the independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Undoubtedly, in this area the pre-revolutionary and Soviet-era historians have written a number of works.

In the sovereign state, the problem of the historical demography of Kazakhstan from the extreme ideologicalization, politicization to a genuine scientific path, its new problems, from a new conceptual point of view, has become the main task. It should be emphasized that conceptual research of topical problems of historical demography of Kazakhstan is carried out on the basis of known methodological principles and methods of historical science (Jaxybayev, 2018). The reason for this is that there is a tendency to replace methodological principles and methods that had been previously scientifically-critical, to “new” ones, but there is no realistic conclusion. There are also attempts to turn some new approaches into methodological principles.

When re-examining topical issues of Kazakhstan’s historical demography, we rely on the principles of historical, objective, multifaceted and other methodological scientific principles (Asylbekov, 2003). Through such methodological principles and methods, in the context of the independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the demography sphere developed well: banned, secret issues were studied, many faces were revealed, and conceptual reconsideration was possible.

The Russian scientist V.I. Butov says in his work: “Historical demography explores the demographic processes, populations, national composition of nations in the state. And there is another aspect of ethnic demography in this area. Thus he studies the composition, traditions and interethnic accord of ethnic groups” (Butov, 2005: 22). Therefore, when considering the model of inter-ethnic accord in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the issue of inter-ethnic accord will be discovered only when historical-demographic research methods, historical data are analyzed from conceptual point of view on the basis of comprehensive historical principles. Therefore, the problem of ethnic accord is determined by studying the problems of history, demography and ethno politics through interdisciplinary communication.

Uzbek scientist R.H. Murtazaeva wrote in her scientific article titled “Tolerance – objective reality in the XXI century”: “At present, the issue of tolerance and interethnic accord at the world level is of great interest to all people. He is a tolerant person, a subject of human life, social harmony and fate in the modern world” (Murtazaeva, 2018: 83). Obviously, the study of interethnic accord and tolerance, and propagation of the right model of its model to the world is a requirement today.

Results and Discussion

The delegation of the Government of Singapore led by Lee Kuan Yu arrived in the Republic during the prospecting work to develop the Republic of Kazakhstan as a private independent state during the collapse of the Soviet Union. The transcript of this meeting was kept in the Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The two leaders talked about the development of the state. Lee Kuan Yu, arrived in Almaty on September 19, 1991 and gave some pieces of advice to President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev on the development of the state. For example, the issues of market economy development and modernization of the state were discussed (AP RK, Fund-7). President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev in his "Independence era," states that in the period of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan formed three basic principles of its domestic policy – peace, harmony and unity – in the first years of independence of the republic. Now it is easy to say it, but it was much harder to do in that difficult period. However, the result is evident. In 1989 the population became a common homeland with 126 nationalities living in the country.

Many residents of the former Baltic state officially legalized political and civil equality of all Kazakhstanis, regardless of ethnicity and state language, when we were unable to obtain citizenship and underwent major political rights following the disintegration of the USSR. On December 10, 1991, I swore to my people that the election was the beginning of the formation of the brotherhood of Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Koreans, Germans and other ethnic groups – all of them united and decided to build a bridge to the future of our republic. The formation and development strategy of the independent state, established in 1992, has settled the ideas of stable civil accord and interethnic accord, which cannot be realized without the intentional attempts of the Kazakh nation. Despite all the ethnic origin, all citizens of the country have been able to become united people under the common roof (Nazarbayev, 2017).

In the early years of Kazakhstan's independence, US public figure Graham Smith spoke in his second issue of the book "National question in post-Soviet states", concerning the ethnic situation in the country. Although the new nationalist nationalism is more prominent, the two ethnic groups are dominated by the author, and the nation is a multiethnic state. So far, President N.A. Nazarbayev maintains two main ethnic groups in a certain level. The political power is mainly concentrated in the hands of Kazakhs, and the Slavs are characterized by industry and education" (AP RK, Fund-5a) obviously. But in fact, in the Ottoman Empire the interethnic accord was formed with new achievements.

It is true that in the early days of the republic's independence, there was an uproar among representatives of different nationalities. The data stored in archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on these events are abundant. If we pay attention to it, these events did not have a massive mass character. This process was a legal phenomenon. The reason for this is that Kazakhstan was in the forefront of choosing a new road of independence. Which way do we choose: European or Asian? Such kind of the question arose. During this period, efforts were made to implement a system of modernizing a weak, democratic society. At the same time, there was

anxiety among the representatives of other nationalities about their future destiny. At that time, the issues of “nationality” and “double citizenship” were raised. This threat and suspicion is the result of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev. Mr. Nazarbayev dropped out (AP RK, Fund-5b). That is, he has begun the new reforms for the future in this direction. The father was protected by the rights of all nationalities. The country has been pursuing inter-ethnic peace and harmony, and the “Kazakhstani Way” has been launched in this direction.

At the initial stage of the country’s independence, the head of the Department of Internal Policy of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan gave the information to N.A. Nazarbayev, that the socio-political situation in the regions of Kazakhstan is stable. The territory of Kazakhstan is free from wars, ethnic conflicts and political tensions. This peaceful situation is in the eyes of the world community and the people of Kazakhstan. That is one of the most important achievements of our young state, the issue of inter-ethnic harmony” (AP RK, Fund-5c). If we look at the document stored in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “In 1993, according to our calculations, about 500 thousand Russians were migrated. Particularly, the displacement of Russian specialists from all positions of authority is of special significance. From these circumstances, the Russian side believes that the deepening of cooperation within the CIS depends on the settlement of the problem of ethnic Russians in the near abroad” (Archive of the Russian Federation of the Russian Federation of Funds (AVP RF, Fund-897).

Former US public figure, political scientist Zbigniew Bzezinski, who predicts and estimates political events and processes at the time when the Soviet Union collapsed in the post-Soviet countries, predicts that it can be ethnic conflict in his work “The Great Chess Toss: Homeland America and Its Geostrategic Imperatives” nine states. These are republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and additionally to Turkey and Iran (Bzezinski, 2013). Here, there were no ethnic conflicts in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which included the list of such countries as the “Euro-Atlantic”, that is, a potential conflict of ethnic origin. The reason is that President N.A. Nazarbayev since his arrival in the 1991 presidential election has begun the reforms aimed at keeping the issue of inter-ethnic accord in the country. For example, in 1992, he raised the idea of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan and created it as a consultative advisory body under the President in 1995.

Russian politician V.V. Zhirinovskiy, who expressed his opinion about post-soviet states during the collapse of the former USSR said, “Our party – the purpose and the conclusion of the LDPR party does not need to create national states of post-Soviet republics. In order to avoid transnational protests, a number of countries like Kazakhstan, the Baltic and Ukraine should be created as a single province of Russia, not as independent sovereign republics. There will be no interethnic conflict and problems” (Zhirinovskiy and Kulikova, 1997: 317). But it is clear that this is a personal opinion of a politician. In fact, the former Soviet Union (the Red Empire) went to the stage of history. It was a historic legal process. The fact is that empires, known from history, are flourishing and falling. That is why the CIS countries have been created as republics and have come to their own development paths.

General Secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan was in Astana on October 18, 2002. In his speech at the meeting with N.A. Nazarbayev he said “Kazakhstan is recognized among some of the CIS countries as its uniqueness. Peace and stability in the country have created a luxury, economic growth. The Republic of Kazakhstan also has a role model for the countries of the world. For example, there are many nationalities and ethnic groups in the country. Their interethnic accord is stable” (Ayagan, 2010: 88). British public figure, writer Jonathan Aitken speaks about The Republic of Kazakhstan and its President N.A. Nazarbayev “The surprise and stereotypes “called several achievements of our republic. The first achievement is the tolerance of the people of the republic. There are 140 nationalities and ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. Youth of the Republic are very active and look forward to the future. The country has interethnic accord, tolerance and trust in one another (Aitken, 2011: 15).

The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan is an advisory body under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan established on March 1, 1995 by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. President of the country N.A. Nazarbayev first announced the idea of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan in 1992 at the First Kazakhstan People’s Forum on the First Year of Independence. The need to establish such an institution was politically motivated, as well as from the standpoint of sustainable development of the newly created, independent, poly ethnic and polyphonic state. This initiative is a prime course in world practice, which provides a basis for a new stage in strengthening intercultural dialogue and allows solving issues of interethnic relations at a high level (Nysanbayev, 1998). In its twenty-year history, the Assembly has grown rapidly and has undergone significant changes. During its development, Kazakhstan’s model of interethnic tolerance and social harmony was formed. During these years the institutional structure of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan has been strengthened and the organizational potential of the society has become very important, it has become an important artery of national diplomacy. Today the Assembly is the constitutional body chaired by the President of the country. It determines its special status.

Established in 1995 in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Assembly will participate in the management of the people as the advisory body under the President. And in small towns, its small assemblies were also established. For example, in Pavlodar region on April 6, 1995 akim of the region D.K. Akhmetov: “The Small Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan is to be established as a consultative and advisory body under the Akim of the region” (SAPR, Fund-64), – the resolution signed. That is, smaller Assemblies have been created in all areas. Their own rules, functions and rights and responsibilities of these bodies have been shaped to serve. Ethnic and cultural centers were established in the regions, whose purpose was to promote interethnic accord and to organize good activities such as educational activities, cultural events and Sunday schools.

There are a number of ethno-cultural centers in the country, which contribute to the spiritual revival of the people of Kazakhstan. They were located in Almaty in 1995, according to the first sources. Looking back at the archive data and mentioning the national cultural centers, we would like to mention the following: 1) “Kazakh

Language” the republican society; 2) “Russian” community in the Republic of Kazakhstan; 3) “Russian Union”; 4) “Tatar” republican cultural center; 5) Association of the Tatar-Bashkir cultural center; 6) “Uigur cultural community”; 7) “Uyghur” republican association; 8) Kazakhstan “Council of the Germans”; 9) German society “Revival”; 10) City “German Cultural Center”; 11) “Turan” cultural-cultural center of Azerbaijan; 12) “Chuvash cultural center”; 13) “Korean Republican Association”; 14) republican “Chechen-Ingush cultural center”; 15) “Belarusian center”; 16) “Kyrgyz cultural center”; 17) “Uzbek cultural center”; 18) Urban “Armenian Cultural Center”; 19) “Greek cultural center”; 20) Republican “Polish Cultural Center”; 21) “Jewish cultural center”; 22) “Dungan Cultural Center” is registered (AP RK, Fund-5d). Cultural centers of different nationalities are engaged in the organization of traditions and traditions of Sunday schools of education and training. That is, ethnocultural centers also work to promote interethnic accord and peace among the people of Kazakhstan.

The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan is recognized as the basic legal guarantee of the ethno center interests. In our modern state, the legal basis for the abolition of the law, this has provisions that limit the right of citizens to ethnicity. No one shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex, nationality, race, language, religious beliefs, attitudes, place of residence or any other marks. It is clearly specified in Article 14, Part 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. And Article 74 of the Basic Law states: “Laws and regulations that restrict the rights and freedoms of individuals and citizens as enshrined in the Constitution shall not be enforced and shall be eliminated” (Mamyraymov, 2008). At present, more than 140 ethnic people live in our country. It is directly related to these interethnic relations, when the future of the independent country, which unites them, fades. In this regard, the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan has a special place.

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan announced 1997 the Year of the National Accord and Memory of the Victims of Political Repression. The historical significance of this document was enormous. Because, during the Soviet period, the people of different nationalities were deported, Kazakh intellectuals were repressed. Therefore, it was necessary to pay attention to the tragic pages of this story, to write about it and to explain to the people correctly (AP RK, Found-5e). The Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan published its research results in 1998 on inter-ethnic harmony and stability in the country. Experts noted that the issue of inter-ethnic accord was correctly resolved from the results of questionnaires, questionnaires and other research methods (AP RK, Fund-5f).

If we look at the data of the National Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan, located in the capital of the Republic, in 2001 there are data on the number of “Russian-speaking residents” and “European races” in the republic. There were many Germans among the immigrants. In migration there were skilled workers from the state, experts in the field of economics and so on. For example, the relocation of Germans to Germany was due to the return to their historic Homeland and to create conditions for future generations. They moved from the Southern Kazakhstan in the early 90’s to the late 90s from the central regions: Karagandy, Akmola, Pavlodar and

Kokshetau areas. In 2000, representatives of the German nationality – 29071 immigrants from the Republic of Kazakhstan (NA RK, Fund-53a).

On April 26, 2002 the Strategy of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan was adopted. The history of the Kazakh nation is full of history. However, when his fate was on the brink, the Kazakh people did not let their blood separated from them, and those who were not new. President Nursultan since the early years of independence has been keenly committed to maintaining peace, harmony and security in our multiethnic country, protecting its security and peace, maintaining interethnic and interfaith stability and solidarity, harmony and political stability. After declaring its independence, Kazakhstan declared itself a secular state. Our Constitution states: “The Republic of Kazakhstan establishes itself as a democratic, secular, and social state, its most valuable treasure – the human and human life, rights and freedoms” (Ayagan *et al.*, 2012: 173).

Information about the activities of the Minor Assembly in 2002 was presented in Astana. Looking at it, it is stated that the work under the Strategy of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan is being carried out in a consistent manner. For example, propaganda of national-cultural centers and traditions of ethnos, joint celebration of events, demonstrates stability and unity (NA RK, Fund-54a). In the context of the independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhs who had moved in difficult times before the near and far abroad began to return to their historical homeland. About 1 million people have moved there. For example, if you look at the 2004 migration data, 18,955 people (6,757) have moved to the country. They are distributed in quota areas (NA RK, Fund-53b).

As on January 1 in 2005, 13362 repatriates' families were registered in the Almaty region with 49970 people. Among them are Uzbekistan (24934), Mongolia (12660), China (8185), Turkey (1104), Russia (649) and Turkmenistan (1380) (NARK, Fund-54b). According to the data stored in the national archive, in the West Kazakhstan region in the first quarter of 2006, 2422 registered as oralman people (repatriates). Of these, 553 applications were received from the Russian Federation, 1836 from Uzbekistan, 30 from Turkmenistan, 1 from Kyrgyzstan, 2 from CIS, 28 from the Republic of Kazakhstan, to the CIS) (NARK, Fund-54c).

Juriko Shoji, the UN permanent Representative to the Republic of Kazakhstan on interethnic accord, said in his report: “Kazakhstan, located in the heart of Eurasia, has been among the strongest migration and demographic processes for centuries. Kazakhstan is a multinational state. All ethnic groups live in harmony and respect each other's traditions” (NA RK, Fund-53c). That is, a foreign expert has seen and appreciated the interethnic consent of the people of the republic. At the present stage of the state's historical development, issues of civil peace and interethnic consent have become an important part of the development strategy. In Kazakhstan, it was possible to create a unique model of inter-ethnic relations and implement it in a legal and institutional sense consistently. The national policy has been built on the basis of transparency and reality, including: searching for ways of interethnic interaction, strengthening the stability of the society, the rule of law and the independence of the state as the basis for a fair settlement of the national question.

In the sphere of interethnic relations, “our future strategic goal is to increase the unity of society and to form a unique Kazakhstani competitive nation” (Kamyrova, 2010). All conditions are created to solve this problem. First of all, it is a desire to reach agreement with our people patiently; and second, the active role of the state in establishing and strengthening the Kazakhstani model of interethnic relations. At present, the ethno-political situation in Kazakhstan remains stable and there is no clear and frank conflict between different nationalities. All-round research shows that the level of trust in the authorities on the issue of inter-ethnic accord is high.

President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev is concerned about interethnic relations in the country: “Interethnic accord is a very delicate, ordinary human body’s blood system. All our achievements in this year are due to the stability and peace in the country. This is our basic position. The activities of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan should be a contribution to stability, international experience and international solidarity. The problem of peace in the country is not my personal problem. The problem of the people of Kazakhstan, the problem of the state, the problem of our future” (Nazarbayev, 2010). The national composition of the population in the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to the last census of 2009, is as follows: Kazakhs – 63.1%, Russians – 23.7%, Ukrainians – 2.1%, Uzbeks – 2.8% Tatars – 1.3%, Uighurs – 1.4%, Germans – 1.1%, Koreans – 0.6%, Turks – 0.6%, Azerbaijanians – 0.5%, Belarusians – 0.4%, Dungans – 0.3%, Kurds – 0.2%, Tajiks – 0.2%, Chechens – 0.2%, Kyrgyzs – 0.1%, other ethnic groups – 1.1% (Asylbekov and Kozina, 2009: 32).

What role do the Kazakh people play in Kazakhstan? Is the state a nation or a polyethnic one of the people of Kazakhstan? Which side is preferred? This question is very relevant nowadays. Although Kazakhstan is a polyethnic state, it is the founder of the country, the titular nation – the Kazakh people. Firstly, it is defined in the Constitution, and secondly, if the people are the source of power, the majority of the population is Kazakh. That is why Kazakhs cannot be considered as one of the multinationals. As for the Kazakh problem in Kazakhstan, there is no need to discriminate or distract other nationalities in the country. But it is necessary to raise the role of the Kazakhs. It is a natural phenomenon for any country to have a state-like attitude. Well, the Kazakh nation is a nation that is a nation that is a country in its name (Omargazy, 2013).

Due to the multiethnic nature of the Kazakh people, the turmoil, tension between individual ethnics, as a whole, poses the greatest threat to the socio-political stability and security of the state. Therefore, the development of inter-ethnic accord and mutual understanding has become one of the strategic tasks for Kazakhstan. On this way, the country has achieved significant results. As far as interethnic accord is concerned, Kazakhstan has the right to say that Kazakhstan is a unique state among the post-Soviet states, and that is not to say it (Kaipova, 2010). Interethnic relations are a patriotism that is a structural element of culture. In his address to the nation, Nursultan Nazarbayev noted that “We should develop patriotic feelings and love for the country of all citizens of Kazakhstan”. From the moment of gaining independence, radical renewal processes, which are taking place in all the systems of Kazakhstani society, have largely affected its cultural and social development. Today

we are re-evaluating the historical experience of our people, changing traditional-moral principles and thus creating a new political consciousness of Kazakh people (Mukazhanova, 2010).

Kazakhstan is a country that has built a multinational and inter-ethnic accord. There are 11 languages in Kazakhstan. There are 64 nationalities represented in the authorities and the Presidential Administration. This case doesn't exist in any CIS country. Kazakhs have become "glorious nations" and cannot be ignored. The Kazakh language is the official language of the Russian language. The official language remains the language of interethnic communication not only in the country but also in Kazakhstan itself. Since the Kazakhstan model is not a copy of another effective economic model, this model cannot be copied in any other CIS or other countries. The Kazakhstan model only takes into account the geographical, political, historical, national and economic factors and circumstances that are unique to the country (Medvedev, 2006).

The People's Assembly of Kazakhstan has set the goals by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, which seeks to further development and strengthen tolerance, interethnic and interethnic accord, brotherhood and friendship of the whole Kazakhstan, settled in the establishment of a civil, open, secular, democratic, political and economically independent society of our settled multiethnic people (Bzhezinsky, 2013: 148). It is evidenced by the rapid development of the country's economy and political stability in the country, as well as the aspiration of all ethnicities and ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan to join the world's secular states. At the same time, it is important to note that Kazakhstan is a unique country in its history and entirety governmental life. It is clear that the period during which the responsibility for self-sacrifice and self-sacrifice was a part of national and ethnicity. Our happiness is that Kazakhstan has joined the leading world community in less time.

From the very first days of its independence, Kazakhstan has created a unique example of inter-ethnic relations based on the preservation of the identity and integrity of ethnic groups in a multiethnic and diverse society (Seydin, 2007). From the very first days of its independence, Kazakhstan has created a unique example of interethnic relations based on the preservation of the identity and unity of ethnic groups in a multiethnic and diverse society (Arzykulov, 2010). Our Constitution begins with the words: "We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historical destiny, create statehood on indigenous Kazakh land". These roads are important for the development of Kazakhstan (Aitaly, 2005). The Assembly has made a significant contribution to the maintenance of interethnic unity and harmony, thanks to which the interethnic relations in the republic and in the region have been stronger during the twenty years. Since the establishment of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, sessions have been convened to discuss key issues related to the further reform of the Kazakhstan society, strengthening the national accord. The final documents of the previous sessions fully support policies and initiatives aimed at strengthening inter-ethnic and interfaith harmony, strengthening national harmony, ensuring national security, and safeguarding the culture of the peoples of Kazakhstan. (Abdikeshova, 2005).

The emergence of this body has been supported by both people and ethnic minorities. After the Assembly started its work, many ethnic and cultural centers of ethnic minorities for the first time had the opportunity to modernize their language, traditions and implement it with the support of the state. Over 140 ethnic groups live in Kazakhstan. A few years later, in his book “Kazakhstan Way”, Nursultan Nazarbayev states: “We have created a unique tool of national relations on the example of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. Today, such a reputable and authoritative national policy tool does not exist in any country of the world. “Within the framework of the special program “Improvement of the Kazakhstan model of interethnic and inter-confessional accord” in 2006-2008, the special program 2009-2010 continued all the priorities of the Program being implemented in 2009-2010 (Telebaev, 2010).

One of the main conditions for the preservation of the integrity and independence of a multi-ethnic state, such as any other country in the world, is the issue of uniting its citizens into a nation-wide, unified society. Therefore, the Kazakh authorities have pursued a policy of unifying their citizens into a nation-wide society. In this direction, the focus is on the political consolidation of nationalities as a citizen of the republic and it should be based on the commonality of national interests and accounted for in the national policy of the state policy. From the very first days of its independence, Kazakhstan has created a unique example of interethnic relations, based on the preservation of the identity and unity of ethnic groups in many ethnoses and different religions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Kazakhstani model of inter-ethnic relations is working hard to maintain political stability and peace in the country. In our country there has been a solid dialogue of civilizational traditions that have passed hundreds of years of testing as a form of peaceful coexistence of different ethnic communities. Independent Kazakhstan has gained an exceptional experience of interethnic cooperation and mutual understanding. The main achievement in this direction is that despite the ethnic affiliation of Kazakhstan people have the rights to call themselves compatriots for their contribution to the development of the republic, mentality and mutual understanding. The phenomenon of friendship and co-operation of ethnic groups in Kazakhstan is not the subjective role of some, but was born with the historical experience of many countries. We must acknowledge that Kazakhstan is a form of self-determination, regardless of nationality of all its citizens. This is the most widely shared home for all national groups. Here, in the framework of a single state, there must be public and compulsory social standards, accessible to all, regardless of nationality. Only values that can be shared, symbols, and public order can make the state viable.

In general, the national policy in our country relies on the following principles: a reasonable combination of human rights and national rights; friendship, interethnic harmony and cooperation among nations, nationalities and peoples, mutual assistance and mutual support; stability and integrity of society; harmonization of national values and universal values; realization of constructive national-specific interests; Equality of

socio-economic and spiritual-cultural development of all nations and nationalities in the country. The common historical destiny that unites all nations and peoples in one place will also serve to their common ideals and values.

In the policy of transnational communication of Kazakhstan, the world space remains a typical country. Kazakhstani experience – the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan – has been praised by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on a global scale. Indeed, this is a striking phenomenon that draws the attention of the world community. The Assembly contributes to the effective solution of the problem of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and contributes to the international image of the country. The world countries are interested in the correctness of reforms in Kazakhstan in the area of ethnopolitical, political, spiritual and interethnic relations. Therefore, the public and statesmen of the neighboring republics are interested in the application of Kazakhstan experience in preservation and development of interethnic concord. At present, the ethno-political situation in Kazakhstan remains stable and there is no clear and frank conflict between different nationalities. All-round research shows that the level of trust in the authorities on the issue of inter-ethnic accord is high.

Recommendations

Based on the ongoing, interethnic relations in the independent Kazakhstan, it is a result of a policy based on the principle of equality between nations, which is based on the policy conducted by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Leader of the Nation, Nursultan Nazarbayev. This is especially important for education, training and personnel policy, and many others, strengthening the confidence of multinational people in Kazakhstan in their common homeland and promoting their sense of patriotism in Kazakhstan.

The role of the People's Assembly of Kazakhstan, which has been created and functioning at the initiative of the Head of the State, is very important in shaping this kind of relations among representatives of different nationalities. The activity of the given structure today attracts the attention of the world countries. Many leaders and statesmen take it as a new model of nation-building. Kazakhstan's experience in interethnic and interreligious harmony has long been recognized in the post-Soviet countries. Independence and peace of nations have become twins for both them and Kazakhstan. This is Kazakhstan's political brand. The history of modern Kazakhstan shows that the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan has become a masterpiece of the national policy pursued by the state of equality of all citizens. The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan has revealed a wide range of possibilities for the preservation of national forms of ethnic groups on the basis of a common civic interest in the socio-cultural system of the country. The role of the Assembly is characterized by the support and further development of cultural diversity, religious freedom and interfaith dialogue.

In order to further develop the model of interethnic consent in the Republic of Kazakhstan we believe that the following should be done in the future. They are:

– Firstly, the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan is to act as a coordinating officer, to ensure that the representatives of different ethnic groups living in the

Republic live in a balanced state, and have a constant activation of mutual understanding between them;

– Secondly, the Small Assembly of People’s Deputies of the regions should focus on updating their work in accordance with these requirements. That is, they must constantly seek new ways of ensuring inter-ethnic relations in the region in the conditions of equality;

– Thirdly, ethno-cultural centres in all regions of the Republic should carry out planned work and focus on its transparency;

– Fourthly, the work of the Peoples’ Friendship Houses is a must-have for the day, and the focus should be on the topics of the events, including all conditions for studying the native languages of ethnos;

– Fifthly, pay special attention to the implementation of special programs and implementation of national and regional mass media aimed at strengthening interethnic concord;

– Sixthly, focus on the translation and dissemination of research works on interethnic peace and unity of Kazakhstan – Kazakh, Russian and English;

– Seventhly, intensification of efforts to publish scientific articles in the high ranking world journals aimed at propagation of the model of inter-ethnic harmony in Kazakhstan at the international level.

It is known that the implementation of such recommendations in the implementation of the agreements and stability among the peoples of the Republic of Kazakhstan contributes to the results of this activity and to its transparency.

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**THE “BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION” OF VENEZUELA
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF POST-COMMUNISM
AND POST-DEMOCRACY (1998-2019)**

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Abstract

The main objective of this article is to analyze the so-called Bolivarian Revolution registered in Venezuela (1998-2018) in the framework of post-communism and post-democracy. In this case, we estimate that its evaluation is fundamental since it was the first experiment in Latin American revolutionary rupture that had the overcoming of capitalism as its goal, carried out after the break up of the Soviet bloc and the splitting of the bipolar world that came from the Cold War. From the point of view of the categories and traditional concepts, the evaluation of the process initiated by Hugo Chávez may be of significant importance, since the peculiarity of this experience has shown that categories such as democracy, dictatorship, revolution, and totalitarianism have been insufficient for a clear understanding of the social, political and cultural phenomenon that occurred in Venezuela. With the aim of achieving an interpretation that can contribute to the clarification of this process, in this paper we will first expose the appreciations and concepts referring to post-communism and post-democracy, taking into account various points of view and theoretical approaches, to then analyze the most important historical facts linked to the Chavez revolution and the internal transformations experienced in this process to finally establish a balance of this experience after twenty years.

Key words: *post-communism, competitive authoritarianism, post-democracy, revolution*

Introduction

When the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred on November 9 1989, a new stage in the history of the West associated with an overcoming of communism had apparently begun, in view of the failure of the implantation of the Marxist utopia in the case of the countries that experienced what in general terms was called “real socialism”. However, although in some countries ‘post-communism’ meant the exit of communism to enter into capitalism, in other nations the reverse process took place: leaving capitalism to enter into experiences associated with the construction of a new utopia, the idea of revolution, class struggle and to achieve the welfare of the poor and needy. But in this last modality, the abandonment of the approaches coming from Marxism-Leninism is observed, to be inspired by other elements linked to regional historical processes, nationalism and populism. This was the case of the revolution initiated in Venezuela by the commander Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, who after

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carrying out an attempted coup against the democratically elected government on February 4 1992, succeeded in obtaining power through the electoral process six years later (December 6 1998).

This circumstance generates an unprecedented fact, at least in the political history of Latin America: the record of the first revolutionary process in the historical coordinates framed in post-communism, post-democracy and post-modernity, understood as the latter, as a process in which a situation of disappointment with respect to political approaches, the ideologies and transforming processes are recorded, as the French philosopher Jean François Lyotard points out in his famous book, *The post-modern condition*. We point out this last aspect since, in contrast, while many Western countries initiate a process of revision and questioning of political doctrines and ideologies (many of them linked to Marxism), in Venezuela, from the Bolivarian Revolution there is a rehabilitation of political actions, social and economic policies apparently overcome, that will even lead to an ideological and doctrinal re-discussion that leads to the formulation of what Hugo Chávez called “Socialism of the 21st century”.

This process became a form of what the American political scientist Steven Levitsky called “competitive authoritarianism”, to derive in a “hegemonic authoritarianism”, leading in turn, as it happens in the current circumstances, in a totalitarian regime that has adopted the forms of “Chinese social control” and whose state apparatus is in a situation of “liquefaction”.

Between post-communism and post-democracy: definitions and concepts

For the purposes of this approach, it is worth explaining that the terms post-democracy and post-communism will work in a complementary manner because of the interrelationships that are recorded when placing them in the experience of Hugo Chávez’s revolution.

The concept of post-communism presents a series of difficulties, since its elaboration is still in the process of discussion, and also since it is related to the historical and social changes that arose at the end of the 1980’s and still has ramifications in the present.

In response to the previous idea, we observe that, in relation to post-communism as seen by Europe (for example, placing ourselves in Romania), the researcher Silvia Marcu, based on the views of Charles King defines post-communism as “the political regime that follows the communist, where the institutions of communism prevail over those of a liberal-type capitalist democracy” (Marcu, 2004: 115). In other words, although it tries to overcome the communist regime, Marcu points to post-communism as a kind of “political syndrome” derived from the inheritance of a totalitarian tradition with the survival of elements of concentration of political power typical of communist regimes, thus making the transition process difficult.

On the other hand, from a Latin American perspective, the Venezuelan sociologist and political scientist Carlos Raúl Hernández, at the beginning of the process initiated by Hugo Chávez Frías, interpreted post-communism as a way of confronting and fighting democratically constituted societies in the West before the

fall of communism in the Soviet bloc and the consequent intellectual defeat that such a situation implied, reformulating the idea of revolution.

As can be observed, at first sight post-communism is conceived as a stage of overcoming communism, regardless of the obstacles and the prevalence of authoritarian elements in order to enter into capitalism and inaugurate democratic experiences. Contrarily, in the Latin American case post-communism will mean the revival of revolutionary processes (structured from the Russian revolution to the fragmentation of the Soviet bloc) but with new components, and the replacement of Marxist-Leninist ideology by combined forms of populism and socialism to face capitalism. Inclusively, starting from a more global vision, Latin American post-communism will operate as the historical convergence of the different thesis on the revolutionary struggle elaborated between the sixties and seventies (of the 20th century) from Latin America, and the new situation produced by the fall of the Soviet bloc. To these processes we must add the appearance of the Sao Paulo Forum, all this in the framework of the globalization process and the consolidation of the free market system.

In this sense, and insisting on the idea initially provided by Hernández, post-communism is described as a movement characterized by rehabilitating social transformation, revolutionary practice, the fight against capital and the implementation of a justice system that would put an end to differences of social classes, but without taking into account the fundamental premises of Marxism, which would be replaced by what Raúl Hernández calls post-communist elements related to the proposals of Latin American political groups. On this last point, the approaches of the Zapatista Movement in Mexico, the Workers' and Indigenous Movements of Bolivia (under the leadership of Evo Morales), the Colombian Guerrilla Movement (FARC and ELN), and the Sao Paulo Forum are the areas where reformulation stands out using the new approach and initiatives of the Latin American left.

In an attempt to define post-communism in relation to the emergence of Chávez's revolution, the aforementioned researcher Hernández (2001) points out the following:

The Bolivarian movement is a post-communist attempt of nationalist and socialist facets, oriented to support the mobilization of popular sectors against minorities with the intention of deepening the control of the levers of power that still remain in the hands of civil society (civil society, education, unions, church), neutralize and dissect the parties politicians, to "ideologically" control the armed forces (Hernández, 2001: 161).

To this first conceptualization we must add the considerations about post-democracy, since it is part of the process of the Bolivarian revolution in terms of its theoretical and doctrinal components: in fact, post-democracy and post-communism are complementary elements, at least in the Venezuelan case.

On this last assessment it should be noted that with the advent of post-communism three scenarios can be registered: a- To leave communism to enter forms of representative democracy in an incipient capitalist development framework (which is the case of central European countries); b-To remain within the framework of communism (at least from the doctrinal point of view, preserving the structures of the communist party, which would be the situation of North Korea), but allowing the

establishment of capitalist structures (as in the circumstance presented by China); c-Implement revolutionary actions (under the seizure of power by violent or democratic ways) to get out of capitalism through socialist and populist actions, and replace the paths of representative democracy, with regressive post-democratic forms (which in the case of Venezuela were established in what was denominated as “participative and protagonist democracy” led by a leader).

In reference to this aspect, the British sociologist Colin Crouch points out that these post-democratic processes are the product of the disregard registered “in modern societies” with respect to the mechanisms linked to the tradition of representative democracy. This circumstance is recorded when experiences appear that show characteristics associated with pre-democratic political structures in a contradictory manner under the aegis of charismatic leaders, and where the values of equality and participation through the mechanism of suffrage and the election of representatives in congress are questioned.

In this order of ideas, Crouch points out that when registering the advent of a post-democratic experience, one can observe the restoration of forms of leadership prior to the democratic stage: in other words, if in the first pre-democratic phase messianic leaders, forms of leadership and the concentration of power existed, these were progressively overcome with the structuring of a design associated with the logic of Western democracies. At a later post-democratic stage, it could register the restoration of the old components of the pre-democratic form that would have supposedly been overcome (Crouch, 2004: 35-36). In this way, post-democracy is equivalent to forms of regression, to authoritarian structures, and to the loss of the freedoms obtained in the democratic stage.

From Crouch’s previous ideas regarding the Bolivarian revolution, the Argentine ideologist Norberto Ceresole was one of those who theorized and structured a doctrinal base that proposed the substitution of traditional democracy for a new project that he called post-democratic. This project advocated the construction of a participatory and protagonist democracy in which there was a direct relationship between the leader and the people (understood as the legitimate bearer of national sovereignty). At the same time, the only additional element of mediation between the people and the leader would be the army conceived by the people, to configure what Ceresole called the “leader-army-people axis”.

The Constitution of this axis implied that the people would not have to deposit their sovereignty in the traditional political parties, sheltered under the structure of representative democracy, but that the people could directly exercise their quota of sovereignty through the mechanisms of representative and protagonist democracy.

Regarding the categorization of the post-democratic experience within the framework of the Bolivarian revolution, as well as the detection of its origins, the researcher Guillermo Boscán Carrasquero interprets Ceresole’s statements in the following manner:

In order to carry out this categorization of the Venezuelan model as post-democratic, it resorts to look for the distinguishing characteristics of our independence models in front of the models established by the English and French revolutions of the 18th century. Thus we can find the precedents in national and popular movements, such as the Argentine Peronism that always governed within the

democratic channel, but with the permanent need for the participation of dignified citizens and a nationalized and industrialized army (Boscán, 2010: 63).

At this point, and based on an analysis for the understanding of Hugo Chávez's revolution (understood as a post-democratic historical experience in the framework of post-communism), we will introduce the proposal on competitive authoritarianism, since we estimate that what has been created in Venezuela since 1999 is a hybrid regime that will move from a "democratic-representative" structure, to a structure with characteristics of "competitive authoritarianism", then evolving to a "hegemonic authoritarianism", and finally reaching a situation of totalitarianism.

In this sense, for the understanding of the concept of competitive authoritarianism, we start with Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way who define it with the following characteristics: a-Elections strongly contested and competitive, abuses of power by the state, lack of transparency and manipulation by the autocrat; b-Presence of a legislative branch that tends to be relatively weak, although it can sometimes become a focal point of opposition activity; c-Subordination of the judicial branch, through persecution, bribery, and extortion; d-Certain tolerance with the independent press as long as it does not jeopardize its legitimacy and political control. Otherwise, bribery, selective advertising, manipulation of debts and taxes, and the promotion of internal conflict are encouraged (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

The Bolivarian Revolution in the framework of post-communism: stages

The Bolivarian Revolution has a particularity that differentiates it from other Latin American revolutionary processes, such as the Cuban revolution, or the Sandinista revolution, as it has been established by electoral means. However, the rise of Commander Hugo Chávez and the MBR 200 (Bolivian Revolutionary Movement 200) had a military style that was characterized in the failed coup attempt carried out on February 4th, 1992. From that warlike action, Chávez and his movement initiated the progression process until power was obtained by means of free and democratic elections which took place on the 6th of December 1998.

In order to evaluate this experience, we will then establish the following division in stages, in order to specify the evolution of the aforementioned revolutionary process, from a competitive form of authoritarianism, to reaching its current phase in which the configuration of an autocracy is consolidated since the advent of Nicolás Maduro Moros, after the death of Chávez Frías on March 5, 2013. In this sense, we can establish the following timelines:

1-The first stage that we will call "Transition from Representative Democracy to Competitive Authoritarianism (1999 to 2013)" has its beginning in 1999, being characterized precisely by the changes of forms of political organization and the exercise of strictly democratic court powers to forms of competitive authoritarianism. It should be noted that, at the beginning of the revolutionary process, there were democratic features expressed with the holding of elections, freedom of the press and the existence of political parties, in addition to the relative independence of public powers.

However, from the very beginning, authoritarian elements began to appear in the leadership of Hugo Chávez Frías, such as discretionary control of the legislative and

judiciary powers, the creation of shock forces known as the “Bolivarian Circles”, the harassment of the media and the progressive elaboration of an increasingly aggressive discourse by the first president of the republic.

At the same time, the authoritarian strategy will take shape through the implementation of a National Constituent Assembly for the revocation of the Constitution of 1961 and its replacement by a new constitution enacted for the year 1999, adapted to the needs of the revolutionary government.

At this point, it is important to briefly note that the Constitution of 1999 is the most important documentary evidence of that phase since it proposes from the legal point of view the substitution of representative democracy for participatory and protagonist democracy, as stated in the preamble of the aforementioned fundamental law: “Establish a democratic, participatory and protagonist, multi-ethnic and multicultural society in a federal, decentralized justice system” (Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic, 2000: 5-6).

The aforementioned reference reveals the post-democratic nature of that constitution, and at the same time accounts for the ideological profile and political intentions of the Bolivarian revolution in terms of the intention of replacing the representative democracy that had been established since 1961. At the same time, with the approach of participatory and protagonist democracy, we observe the link with post-communist content introduced in the proposals on post-democracy raised by Norberto Ceresole.

In this sense, one of the fundamental lines is related to the elimination of both the parties (as elements of mediation), as well as the institutions of the previous representative democracy, and the establishment of the leader-army-people axis. Some of these proposals will be included in the “Bolivarian Constitution”, through the establishment of mechanisms aimed at promoting protagonism and the participation of the people in the exercise of their sovereignty in the political sphere (Constitution of the Bolivian Republic, 2000: 62-63), as established in Title III, Chapter IV “On political rights and popular referendum”.

To be more precise, the project of “participatory democracy” as a post-democratic modality, is specified in Article 62 whose text points out the necessary participation of the people in “public management” as the only alternative to achieve “protagonism”, which in turn guarantees development of both the individual and the collective, at the same time the State should guarantee the methods of participation.* For this purpose, and in order to guarantee the aforementioned forms of protagonism, the mechanisms contemplated in the constitutional articles were the following: a- Public office elections; b- The referendum; c- The popular consultation; d- The revocation of the mandate; e- Legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives; f- The opening of a town hall; and g- The assembly of citizens.

* Article 62. All citizens have the right to participate freely in public affairs, directly or through their elected representatives. The participation of the people in the formation, execution and control of public management is the necessary means to achieve the leading role that guarantees their complete development, both individually and collectively. It is the obligation of the State and the duty of society to facilitate the generation of the most favorable conditions for its practice (Cf. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, p. 58-59).

These means are those contemplated by the constitutional letter for the exercise of popular sovereignty from the political point of view according to Article 70. In this sense -according to the participatory and “protagonist” practices -, the “open chapter” and the “assembly of citizens” become important, since from the judicial point of view, the decisions taken by these two organizational entities with constitutional rank would have a binding character.

At this point, and insisting on the thesis of Ceresole referring to post-democracy and the impersonation of political parties as fundamental forms of previous representative democracy, the aforementioned articles of the Constitution of 1999 that seek the incorporation of participatory and protagonistic democracy will have their effective concretion with the creation of “The Bolivarian Circles” having as legal basis the articles of the Constitution of the year 1999.* Within the framework of this pro-government initiative, whose main creator was President Chávez himself and according to the official version, the “Círculos” were conceived as the basic organizational system of the town in order to stimulate the participation of the different sectors of society in the process of the “Bolivarian Revolution”, but in the long run they will become groups of paramilitaries in government service, with a structure similar to the Cuban CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution).

2-The second stage called “From Competitive Authoritarianism to Hegemonic Authoritarianism” (2013 to 2017) begins with the death of Hugo Chávez on March 5th, 2013 resulting in the holding of elections by the government for the formation of a second National Constituent Assembly on July 30, 2017.

Upon the death of the leader of the revolution, presidential elections are called on Sunday April 14, 2013 to elect the successor of Hugo Chávez Frías. Nicolás Maduro participates on behalf of the government (which included the United Socialist Party of Venezuela and the so-called Patriotic Pole) and Henrique Capriles for the opposition (representing the Democratic Unity) with Nicolás Maduro winning with 7,587,579 votes (50.61%), against 7,363,980 (49.20%) votes obtained by Henrique Capriles. In this second phase, the political dynamic is adjusted to the final parameters of a Competitive Authoritarianism, but little by little it loses strength, until it adopts the elements of a hegemonic authoritarianism.

During this stage, among other facts, there is a marked idealization of the National Armed Forces in addition to their participation in activities related to the political parties associated with the government, a significant increase in the repression of the public forces especially against the opposition, including the use of firearms and the appearance of the so-called “Collectives” which are groups of armed irregulars who use motorcycles as a means of transport and are dedicated to intimidating and repressing the opposition population.

On the other hand, during this second period is when the historic popular mobilizations of 2014 generated by the precarious economic situation, crime and personal insecurity, had its formal start with the call of opposition leaders Antonio

* One of the articles that serves as support for the Bolivarian Circles is No. 62 which promotes *the participation of the people in the formation, execution and control of public management*. It also establishes that it is ... *the obligation of the State and duty of society to facilitate the generation of the most favorable conditions for its practice*.

Ledesma, María Corina Machado and Leopoldo López on February 12th, 2014 with the important participation of the student movement. Finally, after several days, the protest culminated with a total of 43 dead, more than 400 injured and an approximate number of more than 1800 detained. As a result of the protests, the opposition leader of the “Voluntad Popular” party, Leopoldo López, is arrested and tried.

On the other hand, and in causal relation to the series of protests that occurred during the first half of that year, the cycle of the second “oil boom” begins to close, which was characterized by high incomes with no prior antecedents in the economic history of Venezuela- initiated during the year 2003 and ending just in 2014. It should be noted that the populist model established by Hugo Chávez had its basis of support precisely in the use of high income in dollars, which served to finance social programs for strictly electoral and populist purposes.

However, until that moment, the government with Nicolás Maduro Moros as president was still in the electoral issue, within the parameters associated with “Competitive Authoritarianism”, in which, despite the lack of transparency and the discretionary use of the power to manipulate electoral processes, there was a possibility of obtaining certain management positions in the state apparatus through suffrage, and that is what happened in the elections of December 2015.

In this regard, on December 6 of that year, the votes were taken to elect the representatives to the National Assembly for the 2016-2021 parliamentary term, which were won by the opposition, organized under the coalition called the Democratic Unity Table (MUD), obtaining 7,728,025 votes (112 seats) against the government that achieved 5,625,248 million votes (55 seats).

These elections are going to mark the last milestone of the dynamics linked to the stage of the aforementioned “Competitive Authoritarianism”, from then on, to enter into a political logic that will lead to more autocratic, totalitarian and restrictive forms, which will be evident in the following facts: a-Hindrance of a recall referendum to the government of Nicolás Maduro to be held in December 2017, proposed by the opposition National Assembly; b- Attempt by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (controlled by the Maduro government), to disqualify the National Assembly accusing the legislature of disrespect by means of sentence n° 156 issued on March 20, 2017; c-Repression of the protests of the population of Venezuela with a balance of more than 163 deaths, and 5,051 arbitrary detentions; e- Illegal convocation, by the government, for the election of representatives to a new National Constituent Assembly, held on July 30, 2017.

3-The third stage called “From Hegemonic Authoritarianism to Totalitarianism” (2017 to the present) will have as one of its fundamental characteristics the development of a deep economic crisis which has its conjunctural cause, according to the researcher John Magdaleno, in the “severe fall in imports [...] that contributes to the reduction of aggregate supply; an increase in scarcity, with variable cycles that impact on various items (among which are products of first necessity); [and] a fiscal deficit estimated between 20% and 25% (Magdaleno, 2018: 155). This crisis will increase scarcity, hyperinflation and public debt to levels never recorded in the contemporary history of Venezuela.

In addition to this, it will add an increase in the poverty rate by 87%, a decrease in access to education by the population ages 2 to 24 years by 78%, a decrease of 11.4 kg in weight per person, an increase of up to 68% in sectors of the Venezuelan population that do not have medical attention, and an increase in homicides towards the end of 2017 at a rate of 89 murders per 100,000 inhabitants (Magdaleno, 2018: 155-156).

In this socio-economic context, which will lead to a decline in the popularity of the revolutionary process and Maduro's leadership, there will be a closing of democratic areas and an increase in repression. This circumstance will lead to a clear situation of "hegemonic authoritarianism" in the process of transition towards a totalitarian phase, in which forms of social control are beginning to be registered by the Venezuelan government linked to the social control system used by the governments of both Cuba and China.

It should be noted that these systems of repression used in Venezuela, receive very important support and in many cases they have even delegated their functions to the dictatorial Cuban Castro government. The role played by Cuba in terms of social control and intelligence, geo-strategic support and counselling, espionage and propaganda has been widely disseminated and recognized throughout the Venezuelan revolutionary process, as well as the presence of the Cuban G2 (Cuba's Intelligence Service); just to give a figure, it is estimated to have a presence of more than 24,000 Cuban spies in Venezuelan territory.

On the other hand, since 2008 with Chavez as the head of power, the Chinese government through its technological companies has participated in the construction mechanisms of social control. In that year Chávez contacted the company ZTE (Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment Company Limited) in order to strengthen the citizen identification system. This company is the one that has collaborated in the creation, at the beginning of 2016 and under the mandate of Maduro, of the so-called "Carnet de la Patria", a system of identification "parallel" to the official one but with a QR code, which records citizen information including their participation in the electoral processes or their inclusion in a popular aid program. At the same time it gives access to various social benefit bonds, subsidies, CLAP (Local Supply and Production Committees) scholarships, possibility of accessing rationed gasoline, etc. This mechanism is both an instrument of control and of social exclusion, since, on the one hand, it conditions everyone who needs help to comply with the regime and thus alleviate their needs and, on the other hand, discriminates against those who do not need to be registered because they do not have access to social benefits.

Balance of the Post-Communist Revolution and conclusions

Before establishing a balance and pointing out some brief conclusions regarding the data and information aforementioned, it is important to point out that while this research work is being carried out, an important social mobilization process has taken place, under the leadership of the current President of the National Assembly Juan Guaidó (from the "Popular Will" party), who on January 23 of this year 2019, was sworn in at a Citizen Council held in Caracas, as President in charge of the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela. For this purpose, article 233 of the Constitution has been used, in which it is stated that, faced with an absence of power in the Head of State, the President of the Congress must assume the presidency of the Government and call elections. The use of this article of the constitution is based on the fact that the election held last May, 2018, in which Nicolás Maduro was re-elected for another presidential term of six years, was declared illegal.

In this framework, the Venezuelan opposition led by Juan Guaidó has the support of a large sector of Venezuelan society, in addition to the support of the international community with the United States, Canada, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina among other countries of the American continent, and several nations of the European Union such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain. Starting from this situation whose process is ongoing, in any case a balance can be established on what has been the revolutionary experience frame worked in the styles of post-communism and post-democracy.

Under this framework, one of the most important characteristics that we can register in this last stage of the Bolivarian revolution is that, despite the consolidation of a totalitarian government, the country has not been stabilized. In its logic, this contradictory situation can be summarized in a dilemma in which, although Maduro's government has social control of the population, however, it does not get control of certain parts of the Venezuelan territory. On this point, researcher Ysrael Camero points out that Venezuela: "... it is the only case of totalitarianism that has weakened the State. This implies that power operates under two levels simultaneously, concentrated in some areas, liquefied in others" (Ysrael Camero, 2019. 2a2.2-2.2)

This circumstance is observed in the presence of the ELN (Army of National Liberation of Colombia) in areas of southern Venezuela, where they control productive areas of the mining arc rich in gold, diamonds, coltan and oil (states of Bolívar and Amazonas). The same situation is registered in the control exercised by drug trafficking in the Venezuelan coastal areas, or the presence of factors linked to Islamic terrorism on the island of Margarita.

The problem described above leads us to conclude provisionally, that the post-democratic revolutionary process, as has been proposed in Venezuela, has led to a weakening of the State apparatus, or a liquefaction of administrative power and government control.

Second, if we consider the "Bolivarian Revolution" as the first revolution initiated in Latin America after the fall of communism, we believe that although there has been an intention to change, it has operated predominantly in formal and discursive aspects. The socialist revolutions pursue the transformation of reality to advance to new stages of welfare, justice and substantive benefits for the majority, although in practice they never achieve their objectives. Therefore, the underlying problems that have plagued Venezuelan society in the years prior to the arrival of Hugo Chávez to power, not only have not been resolved, but have become more acute, leading to an increase in the indexes of poverty, marginality, external debt, corruption, dependence on oil income, delivery of wealth to international capital and the lowering of the Venezuelan's standard of living in general.

On the other hand, regarding the course of the process and its characteristics, we observe that the “Bolivarian Revolution” can be interpreted as a historical moment in which there has been a new concentration of power, (this time with greater features of militarism, improvisation and empiricism) at the same time that it marks forms of regression to circumstances, procedures, political modalities and organizational structures prior to the democratic stage inaugurated in 1958. Therefore, the experience promoted by Chávez could be associated with pre-modern elements, that is, pre-democratic, even when the electoral variable has been a frequent practice but distorted by the regime that, although they had emerged from elections, appears as authoritarian and caudillistic, with a notorious populist personalism.

Finally, it is worth pointing out a final component that may mark an important difference with other revolutionary processes, such as the structuring of a narco-state with the presence of a group of criminals, drug traffickers and smugglers in government positions. This situation led Evan Ellis, a professor at the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Army War College in the United States, to point out that what was happening in Venezuela was not “... a matter of politics or international relations, but an insertion of large-scale organized crime: A group of criminals has taken control of the State and assaulted its treasury. The underlying problem is that there is no international legal mechanism or a model of regional cooperation that allows rescuing a State in these circumstances without violating its sovereignty” (Romero-Castillo: 2017).

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**NATIONAL CODE: METAPHYSICS AND UNITY
OF HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS**

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Abstract

The long development history of literature has formed a new kind of artistic thinking system. Generally, there was an influence of internal potential of each nation's literature on it apart from classical basis. Artistic thinking has enriched the cognitive perception and fantasy of a man. The nature of the speech art of any nation is too deep. Man generally recognized the language itself, specific features of the speech art, and deepened its meaning over epoch. Even the power of the word has become a reflection of the people's customs and religious beliefs. The tradition of their life and national-ethnographic peculiarities were illustrated by words and a diversity of peculiarities in a form of signs, paralanguage and symbolic characters were supplemented. They highly emphasized the powerful character of the word and the tradition, ritual, and customs of their life were conveyed through various forms of expression. It came from the folklore genres of our nation. These features have accumulated in the centuries-old space and have reached these days. The people were constantly retrieving their cognition, memory, concepts and ancient images. It later focuses on the stability that identifies the formation of the nation, its history, socio-political status, and cultural phenomenon. Thus, the national code, established in the cognition of people, has formed. Its significance is to analyze the nature of phenomena in the national consciousness, to determine its role in the past and future and thereby to demonstrate the uniqueness of the national identity.

Key words: *nationality, history, cognition, metaphysics, code, person*

Introduction

During the independence period, the nation's peculiarities were characterized by a change in the socio-political situation of every nation, its impact on its spirituality and its future purpose. It is known that the imperial dominance, which hindered the stabilization of the national identity and the acquisition of a full-fledged nationality,

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has blinded the minds of the people. In this case it is unlikely that the national consciousness will be able to overcome and show an individual image. "The process of formation of historical consciousness has been intensively taking place in the history of our country for more than a decade. In our society, the whole nation starting from the President to the ordinary citizen has turned their focus on our national history. Everyone was striving to find out about his origin, genealogy; each citizen looked at the past of his country and by these searched for answers to many current questions. It was a remarkable phenomenon that demonstrated the high level of national culture. Because only that nation that hopes for the future, is eager to know their past. If people are indifferent to the past, then their hope for the future will be lost" (Nurpeyis, 2005: 5). The formation of the nation is directly related to its history, socio-political situation, and cultural phenomena. Independence, first of all, is valuable in order to deepen the essence of these rarities (Kozyrev *et al.*, 2016).

The notion of metaphysics was first used by Aristotle's work. Unlike other sciences metaphysics defines notions which meanings are eternal. What is world? Is there a God? How were consciousness and kindness in human's nature formed? Why was man born and why does he die? That is metaphysics that defines notions related with nature, which questions go along with its answers. G.I. Spasskii's work called "Kyrgyz Kaisaks of Big, Middle and Small hordes" was one of the earliest works on the history and ethnography of the Kazakh people in the Russian oriental literature (Karasayev *et al.*, 2018; Yensenov *et al.*, 2016; Sailaukyzy *et al.*, 2018). It hasn't lost its significance till these days. By collecting information about the history of countries of Central Asia he published its systematic versions in the journals such as "Siberian Bulletin" and "Asian Bulletin". The researcher's essay about the traditions, customs, economy and household of the Kazakh people, in which he has accurately described situations observed by himself, is rich for nomadic life of the Kazakhs. Historian relies and compares lots of historical facts in the process of classifying the genealogy of khans (Nurpeyis, 2011; Doronina *et al.*, 2018).

Works of the researcher L.N. Gumilyov deeply studied the history of human society and deepened the evolutionary interval between the period of mythical existence and the relationship between the nations. The scientist, M. Kozybayev, stated: "The concept of L.N. Gumilyov doesn't show the evolutionary derivation of humanity, but the inner type of it and by making a scheme of studies of the integration period between different tribes and races he intends to show humanity through the worldwide history which gives an imagination of Babylonian movements. His theory is complicated till nowadays. It is wrong to understand that the theory of human relativity cannot be understood in terms of the reduction and expansion of the category of time, the mystery of the interaction between ethno-genesis and biosphere. The scientist introduces the term "ethno-sphere" and defines the inseparable connection between development of humanity and nature. The major step in the studies of nation was a national unity and the formulation of the national association (Beisembina and Kozhabaeva, 2012: 128).

Humanity civilization has always been under evolutionary development. It also reflected a nature of passionarity, which is, in particular, self-sacrifice of individual nature for the sake of society and mass; and in which knowledge and understanding

are dedicated for the sake of humanity through special activeness. According to L. Gumilev, passionarity is a stable set of characteristic features of the whole ethnos in a certain era. It is equal to metaphysical specificity as a special phenomenon of human existence (Kataeva *et al.*, 2015).

It was shown in the works of Aristotle, I. Kant, Rubinstein, M. Bakhtin, al-Farabi and Balasagun in each era and the system of national concepts was considered (Bondaletov, 2014).

The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking

There are a lot of unsolved issues in metaphysics according to scientists in different fields. That's why it's topical. It was also supposed that metaphysics would be removed as a scientifically unfounded subject in the history of thinking. Metaphysics, however, is a precious knowledge of the many situations in life, thus it increases the interest in the phenomenon of creation and its secrecy. Philanthropist Immanuel Kant himself, who is a founder of radical critical thinking on metaphysics, recognized it as phenomenon of human spirit: "The process of abundance of metaphysical research by the spirit of humanity is the same as the process of a complete stop of breath for fear of polluted air. Metaphysics will always be present in a conscious person's mind" (Kant, 2017). The literary word has its own metaphysics. The nature of metaphysical thinking is complex and wide. Consideration of human life within a variety of spaces makes literature different from other types of art. Concepts of metaphysics such as god and man, spirit and body, sacredness and sin, life and death, freedom and law, fate and chance are reflected in authentic literature (Nyssanbekova *et al.*, 2015; Kostruba, 2018). It doesn't mean that literature is a branch of philosophy that simply conveys idea and thought in a form of images. It's true that metaphysics as one of branches of philosophy considers the laws of worldview, the diversity of nature and high accuracy. Theater and fine art, religion and politics, language and music have their own metaphysics. Thus metaphysics differs from philosophy in broad and narrow sense. On the one hand, metaphysics is just one branch of philosophy along with epistemology, ontology, ethics, and aesthetics. On the other hand, philosophy is a field of metaphysics such as literature, theater, fine art and music. One of the many themes of metaphysics is how human beings come to this world and why he leaves it. Metaphysics is not only about the eternal phenomenon of nature but also it is an area of different issues concerning human nature.

Metaphysical phenomena do not directly take place in literary works. In fact, metaphysics is reflected in the literature through images, style, vocabulary, detail, and self-use of authors. Sometimes metaphysical concepts last for centuries. Accordingly, the study of art of metaphysics requires a different approach than the metaphysics' tract. Even the author's direct thoughts aren't faced: there the whole idea of artistic and literary work is discussed. But this system of thinking may sometimes be unknown to the author. Thus, the literature researcher will meet many indirect materials, textual and inter-textual interactions. Here we can come to the conclusion that the artistic metaphysics is much more profound than the philosophy that studies the common concepts and categories.

Metaphysics in literature is a visual, long-lasting or eternal thinking system lasting from centuries to century and transmitting from one writer to the other. Metaphysics in the literature has two meanings: literature transmits and visualizes certain metaphysical concepts; on the other hand, it's an object of metaphysical research. According to the researcher's point of view, "Russian literature is an authentic Russian philosophy that is a wonderful philosophy of word which has its unique and diverse set of colors like a rainbow. Very significant issues of human spirit are always rooted from its depth" (Esalnek, 1985). This characteristic of metaphysics has proved its relevance about the study of eternal values (Kataeva *et al.*, 2016; Mnaidarova *et al.*, 2017). The main idea in the metaphysics of Russian writers of the 19th century such as Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tyutchev and L. Tolstoy was firstly discovered in the works written by Russian thinkers of the Silver Age such as Rosanov and Merezhkovsky, Shestov and Berdyaev. The period of metaphysical thinking and consequence of the results of the Russian literature of the 20th century is the Silver Age that corresponds to the beginning of the twenty-first century.

It is known that the spiritual treasures of humanity are always ahead of time. It is well known from the history that the poem "Kutty bilik" written by Zhusip Balasagun in the 11th century has an important role in the life of the country. The author was awarded by the title of "khas khadzhib" (a chief counselor or a grand vizier) for this work. Zhusip Balasagun's work, which was preceded by time, has been acknowledged as a valuable historical manuscript that has not lost its significance. The issues, discussed in the Balasagun's work, are of great importance today in the era of globalization. The actuality of the principles of morality, humanity, goodness, justice, and literacy during the governing the country raised by that era has not lost its significance and value till these days. The main purpose of the poem is to create a happy society and to form a generous and prosperous country. Principles starting from forming a family to the establishment of the state and even to the management of the country are included. The creation of a happy, strong-willed society is a desire of humanity that hasn't lost its topicality since the moment of the birth of man. In the poem, the author states: "Now let me tell about a man, I'm a person who mastered wisdom and knowledge" (Balasagun, 2007: 12). We know that human beings are not born intelligent and smart at once. These qualities come to the human being through labor. Family upbringing and discipline, good and bad happenings in the environment, social construction, and social status of the population – all these factors can affect the human beings. It is necessary to have a strong education and knowledge in order to differentiate the distinction between these pleasant and unpleasant phenomena. Only in this case an ordinary human can live with intelligence, reason, and rationality.

During the post-Soviet period the discourse of "Eurasianism" and "space" sought to appear in the foreground. From the point of view of the Eurasian, there was a huge impact of western influence for a certain period of time. Because the world of artistic expression has eternal inseparable ideas for centuries which satisfy the highest intelligence of humankind. They all form the meta-narrative. Metaphysics was mostly associated with meta-narrative. Each metaphysical branch leads to a meta-narrative. It means that there are themes and style of narration that peculiar to all literature. In most cases meta-physicality of literature is expressed with the help of interpretation of

the image and signs of the idea. As T. Carroll states, “The symbol also includes confidentiality which means that both silence and speech are interconnected and have a bilateral meaning” (Kravets, 2005). In fact, everything is expressed by characters, not by the writer. According to the researcher M. Bakhtin, “the created image (that is the first author) cannot be entered to the image made by him. Anything can be expressed from the behalf of the writer. That’s why the first author always remains in silence” (Bakhtin, 1996). It means that the author cannot enter to the image completely which leads to the metaphysical secret in the artistic world. The secret of the fiction is the silence of the “first author”. As a result, the reader keeps thinking after narration. Artistic word carries a certain meaning. The ancient traditions and customs of the Kazakh people can prove it. For example, the secret of the word is kept starting from puzzles and proverbs in folklore to all genres. For example, the Kazakhs utters word by adding color and meaning.

The proverb “The intellect comes from the young and the jewel comes from the stone” has both simple and concrete meaning. This proverb can carry a lot of meaning and many issues can be discussed within its scope. A short saying expresses a concise and clever statement full of wisdom and truth. The reader will interpret the idea behind it by himself. The richness of the word is a distinctive feature of the people’s vocabulary fund. Bi and sheshen (orators) kept the unity of the country owing to the power of speech and word. The founder of metaphysics – Aristotle stated, “The amazement of the people has led to philosophy.” Our people’s speech expresses deep wisdom. Don’t the heroic poems of the folklore narrate the traditions of the people, the love and care for the generation along with the heroism of the country? For example, the poem “Kambar-batyr” starts from the ancestral ritual, “Fellows, let me start my poem from prayers, first of all, to God, then to deities” and continues with the praise of Azimbay “who is helpful for those who are hungry and without transport and who is kind for cattle and who is ready to help people and the country in time of need” and he has six sons and beautiful daughter called Nazym (Aidashev, 1987: 5). These characteristics are peculiar to any poems about heroism.

The beginning of heroic poems starts from meta-narrative like a dastan (poem). This is because the hero himself comes from the country, so his homeland, his native land, his parents and the state of his country should be included in it. This prologue is accompanied by amazing events. By attracting the reader, the writer points out the heroism and heroic acts of the character, describes his wise wife and clever horse, shows the origin of the heroism and bravery and numerates its peculiarities. It collects metaphysics. It means that the hero is a special character and a unique person from his birth to raising a horse. This image was born of the people’s dream about a man who will defend his country. So the hero should not be vulnerable: “he is a legendary figure often of divine descent endowed with great strength or ability and he is a person who, in the face of danger, combats adversity through feats of ingenuity, bravery or strength”. The noble nature of the hero, who is a great fighter for the country, should also be seen from his wife, horse, his noble qualities, and the most formidable military fights.

The cultural code of the people is a system of information that identifies the culture and literature of the country. Socio-cultural codes are transmitted in the world

history in accordance with epoch, state policy and cultural level, but the basis of the national identity and life of the people is preserved. Culture – is a life of the people and it is past, present and future of their intellectual development. Each nation preserves, retains and transmits its own spiritual values within the scope of the development history of all human civilization. A number of manuscripts have been reached the public within the framework of the state program “Cultural heritage”.

Many events, which were gone through by the Kazakh people, are kept in the history of the Great Steppe. Al-Farabi, Mahmoud Kashgari, Balasagun, Ibn Sina, Yassawi, Ulugbek, who lived in different eras, contributed to the development of the world civilization. The great works of these outstanding figures of the great steppe led to the European renaissance. At the present stage of integration and innovative search, the process of globalization also allows to recognize the nature of each nation. Therefore, the personality of the individual, the dialectics of the soul, the concept of the individuality, the character of action are taken into account.

The National Identity Code of Kazakhstan

The national code of the Kazakh people is unique. Generally, it is evident from the socio-ethnographic, cultural and literary nature of its development. And its artistic expression reflects the ethnic identity of our people and the peculiarities of the artistic thinking system. The world ethnographic picture is a phenomenon of worldview. The first world model is formed at the earliest stage of ethnos development, and it is a mythical entity. Mythology is not isolated from the nation, it is a spiritual “foundation” of the nation and its first history. The most importantly it identifies the national character and develops throughout the whole lifetime with that nation. However, mythology also has elements of interethnic and universal character. Concepts of “meken” (dwelling) and “ui” (home) can be used as a proof of it. It takes universal feature for all people of the world.

The mythologeme of “home” has had a significant impact on the world literary process as a noteworthy concept. In every artistic illustration this concept has its own philosophical and moral meaning. Of course, this concept has a conventional character among the Kazakhs who lived in a nomadic way of life. The Kazakhs raised cattle on great steppes throughout all seasons, built their dwellings and settled on those locations. The place, where they settled for a season, was considered as their home. Therefore, home has a wide and diverse meaning for the Kazakh people. The land, which was the ancient home of our ancestors for centuries, is measured with the width of the steppe. The genetic memory of our people broadened through this. The mythologemes of “meken” (dwelling) and “ui” (home) have got a specific cult, and our people are proud of the sacredness of the kara shanyrak (it’s a dwelling of the Kazakhs in a form of yurt that means a continuation of the family passed on from generation to generation and revered by sons as a sacred place).

Defeating the country, keeping peace and unity was a task for the nation. There were bis (judges) and defenders who managed the nation in order to preserve the unity of the country and left their prints in the history of the nation. Thus, the concept of “meken”, “turak”, “konys” (dwelling, home) is conceptual for our people. All these have deepened the metaphysical nature of human existence. It was important to keep

the peace and to find a place for the livestock. So when the land was in danger and surrounded by the enemy, first of all zhyraus (a poet) and orators convened. They led the country acting on the situation in the country. Finding a safe place for protection, putting a horse-rider on the horse, choosing his five weapons, mobilization against enemies, the processes of negotiation and agreement – all of these have to be done in a certain order. And that was the only way to save the nation. All these have formed the attitude towards environment, surrounding space in the human mind and formulated notions such as the essence of life, well-being of the future generation, life and death, faith and spirit. The national code is a preserved, stabilized sign of the nation's worldview and consciousness. It is transmitted from generation to generation. Of course, it is not in that state, it is transmitted with a complete changes and modifications.

The current state of the nation and its lifestyle influences it. It maintains a unique characteristic. Type of struggle for survival formulated in mind has a priority as well. For example, blessing, wishes, prayers to God, gratitude, curse, sacrifice, predicting dreams, myth and legendary stories – all these broadened the metaphysical nature of the human. Man's worldview reminded him of the past and contemplated the future, and emphasized his attention on various para-signs. Some archetypal concepts, hidden in the depths of consciousness, came forward. Spatial and time-dependent relations are characterized by idyllic quality. It means that the ratio of space was specified so that human beings has given a special attention to their native land, settlements, ancestral homeland and kept every detail in memory. It means that unity of the space synchronized cradles and graves, childhood and old age, and simultaneously conceived the concepts of the past and future in human consciousness.

In the modern literary science, the problematic field of mythologeme is broad and contradictory. Because the concept is connected with philosophy, sociology, political science in terms of cultural and scientific paradigm, and mythologeme is constantly added with new, secondary meaning. At the same time, the scientific discourse about mythologeme considers it as one of the most central issues in terms of mythological expressions of literary text. The reason for this is that the space of artistic text can simultaneously consider two fields – the ancient archaic thinking and mythological expression of the individual-author. The crisis of civilization in the development of society, the vulnerability of consciousness, and the uncertainty of the humanity in the future made them look at the past and at its nature, and search for the harmony of the surrounding environment. It means that it led to consider the ancient mythologeme, fixed in the memory of the people, in terms of neo-mythology. Nowadays new perspectives of ancient concepts of man are revealed and perceived. It means that our people's attitude towards local policy has expanded from the unity to the privacy. This mythologeme reveals the interaction of human cultures. Thus, the image of the ancient steppes, dome, ordain is associated with the civilization of today's new era. In this way, the image of an ancient cognition can be formulated in the minds of the human beings. And in fiction they are formed on the basis of mythological plots and images. In any time, the people expected good things from the future. These are widely described in fairy tales, legends and poems.

Classical art really appears in the place where its release is fully recognized. Of course, the infinite value of classical works has been recognized in the centuries-old network. This frankness of classical art coincides with the classical philosophy found before Hegel. Its further continuation continued in the works of thinkers like Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche. At the same time there is another side of it, which is an aesthetic “acceptance”. Hence, humanity is elevated to spiritual heights by perception of art types.

“Doubts and trust” are contradictory notions. The analyst S. Kierkegaard analyzed this paradox in his work “Fear and Trembling” (Kravets, 2005). The avant-garde art is characterized by religious, confidential, and unconsciously structured recognition. If everyone looks at his genetic background with great skepticism, then his feeling can lead to a variety of uncertainties, suspicions, and contradictory thoughts. A sense of duality and a sense of having a dream in human cognition are caused by this. Nature of human beings is very close to mysterious phenomena according to the ancient heritage. In the process of solving this mystery, he learns how to fight, act, think, and evaluate correctness or incorrectness of his work. Man experiences a different state of being such as predicting the future, imagining, inventing, applying different approaches, asking for help from deities, and praying.

“Civil society” is a social inequality in the slave ownership, feudal or bourgeois society. At this stage ideological contradiction was prevailed. Hegel called this process as a process of personalization, a self-determination and personal aspiration of his own personality. This type emerged in Europe in the 11-12th centuries and it was marked by the signs of the humanist worldview of the renaissance period and it was dedicated to the preservation of human rights on the earth. This type has gone through the evolutionary way of its development and its direction has been broadened over epoch, and now it protects not just the moral and ideological rights of individual people, but also the interests of individual countries and groups. Thus, substance type possesses one of the most advanced power and consciousness of the nation. Equivalent of the term “personality” in the West European language is a persona, which is a notion that defines individuality of an individual. In determining the notion of a person, apart from his personality, it is necessary to determine the period in which he lived and the real time-spatial relations. The distinctive feature of a person is that he stands superior by his actions and the deepness of his thoughts. The person preserves the national traditions of his nation and foresees perspectives of its far future.

The preservation of the tradition is directly related to the cultural memory of the nation. Folklore heritage of our nation is full of all that life of the nation. Of course, “ready-made forms” in folklore were the basis for the plot, genre, and for types of storytelling. However, the ontological horizon of the world has been mastered within the framework of artistic, rhetorical tradition. In other words, good living conditions, comfortable settlements, well-being of our people and future generation are common to the peoples of the world. In order to maintain this balance, every nation is pursuing different actions – struggle, conflict, peace, migration (Sulyagina, 2014). Particularly, tradition and customs that have passed from generation to generation differ by their topicality. Traditions are kept not only in the oral traditions of our people, but also in

writing. In this sense, the tradition does not limit the creativity of the artist. On the contrary, it relies on advanced traditions of its era. Tradition and conventionality have been preserved as a cultural phenomenon in the historical era. Each tradition has its own basic directions. According to the researcher V. Khalisev, “breaking conventionality has expanded the tradition of literary creativity and broadened its essence as well” (Nikolyukin, 2001). Of course, major changes in social and political life have a tendency to be reflected in artistic creativity. In this regard, “ready-made forms” also appear in the literature. For example, there were literary works similar in plot and ideological compositions describing characters of the rich, poor and the orphaned which were peculiar to the literature of the beginning of the past epoch. According to this, the system of characters as the fighters, the needy and of those, who suffer from tradition of *kalyń mal* (a marriage of convenience) have been formulated. They have become an active force in society. The reason is that their personal situation showed the problem of the whole society.

It is known that human consciousness can not be taken out of history. The nature of a person determines his social feature. The social atmosphere of that environment changes due to the more shifts in human condition and factor. This is because a person is in a position of priority in society. The inner nature of a person is a psychological world. Deep and more specific aspects of human psychology are identified as it goes deeper. According to researcher S.L. Rubinstein the psychological aspect includes psychic mechanisms and processes. Because the personal psychological state of a person has a general characteristic specific to his own environment (Rubinstein, 2012). Scientists such as S.G. Yakobson and N.A. Menchinskaya, who have studied this issue in their research, have made efforts to determine the mechanisms of formation and functioning of moral principles and forms of scientific worldview (Yakobson, 1962). From ancient times, psychologists have discovered that the processes of thinking, perception and understanding in people are at different levels. It means that it involves the conscious, unconscious, normal and habitual actions of a person. The psychologist P.V. Simonov refers this psychological consciousness to the type of consciousness beyond human existence.

In contrast to general psychology, social psychology studies the psychological reaction of a person in a specific environment. From this point of view, social psychology deepens the essence of general psychology, because social itself identifies the person’s ethnicity, environment, tradition and morals. But the daily state of a person in the mass environment is not always consistent. His personality in the same environment can be distinguished as distinctive due to his knowledge, experience, attitude, and behavior. The study of the structure of the person determines his humane, behavioral, intellectual, and cognitive features of his character in the same environment. The more distinctive person’s feature is, the more unique his personality is. Morality in a society is the result of a person’s actions. Meanwhile, humane and moral values are the essence of society. The fate of the people who became leaders in the history of the nation proves it. At one time, Bukhar zhyrau (poet) was a mediator between the khan and the people and made efforts to preserve the integrity of the people. Zhyrau could direct the khan concerning incorrectness of his policy and poet could even manage the whole tribe with his witty speech. Sometimes he predicted the

future and asked both the khan and the people to calm down. He contributed to the maintenance of requirements of ethics and the peaceful life among people being a poet, writer, negotiator and a predictor. This unique feature of Bukhar was necessary for the khan who ruled the country. Thus, zhyrau could freely interfere in the domestic and foreign policies of the country, and became adviser of the khan. This character of zhyrau distinguished him from other figures. That is why zhyrau's word is wise, sharp, and deep.

From the beginning of human existence on earth, he endeavored to draw closer to life, happiness, goodness, faith, humanity, compassion, and wisdom. Here comes the question of the essence of life, eternal values in the mind of man. Abu Nasr al-Farabi, a teacher of all humanity, states in his treatise "On Views of the Citizens of the Virtuous City": "If a person's goal of life is to attain the greatest happiness, he must know what happiness is and he must set it as his aim and pursue it. Then he must know what to do to make him happy. From the various characteristics of different individuals, the following conclusion is drawn: The things that should be known and the happiness are not always possessed. This is not peculiar to all human being. A wise teacher is needed to do this. Some people need a little guidance, while others need more. But even if these two forms of guidance are manifested, that person, who has been taught or taught without the exterior motivation, does not fulfill all those learnt and taught advice. This situation is typical for most people. Therefore, he needs those who can teach them all and motivate them to do the right actions (Nurpeyis, 2005: 409).

The most intelligent figure – Zhusip Balasagun – states his thoughts about happiness: "The happiest person is a person who is generous and happiness happens to the one who gives happiness" (L.N. Gumilev and problems of steppe civilization, 2012: 206). It means that if generosity and openhandedness prevail, then the one is an owner of the happiness. The call of everyone to goodness as a teacher is the same as being a judge. The scientist Zhusip states that judges know how to deal with people and they lead people to goodness and kindness. People are taught to learn their knowledge and respect them. Man's position on the essence of life is formulated according to the decision how to handle them and the direction to which his character must be focused. Abay was a person who expressed his opinion on that issue. A person who brings up "a complete man" must be a perfect teacher. Only a person who has reached the level of "a complete man" should be worthy of the title of a national teacher (Kunanbayuly, 2005).

The essence of human beings is primarily inclined to independence. It is characterized by a common characteristic of each nation that is the identity of the nation. The Kazakh nationality is characterized by features that identify the person such as sincerity, vastness of thought, reasonableness, accuracy of speech, history of the past, motives of the ancestral tradition. Hence the theory of personality is formulated. And each person is aware of the changes, peculiarities, and circumstances of his environment. It empowers his emotionally-sensual, intellectual and spiritual strength. He is always in dialogue with his environment. According to the scientist M. Bakhtin: "Speaking is necessary for others. People communicate and interact in order to make human thoughts realistic. So they get to know each other. This interaction is

realized in the form of meaningful, composite-linguistic communication. This leads to “dialogue” (Bakhtin, 1987). The dialogue format is different. It includes aitys (a contest centred on improvised oral poetry spoken or sung to the accompaniment of traditional musical instruments), agreement, negotiations, various interiors in the history of our nation, weapons, clothing patterns, traditions and customs. For example, “... according to us, the most important procedure in the khan election is the ritual of lifting up the new khan on a white felt mat that is a welcoming process of the newly elected khan. It consists of the following two moments: 1) The ceremony of putting the new khan on a white felt mat; 2) The coronation of lifting up the new khan on a white felt mat. This is the culmination process of coronation of the khan” (Borash, 2007: 76). This is a model of dialogue between the people and the khan. This procedure, which is performed before the people, means that the khan is elected by the public and now he is in power, his word is law. It also means that people must appreciate and respect the khan.

Human history does not only solve political issues in society. In the history of human development, all issues must be topical. Established phenomena in history must be considered from different perspectives in the process of historical recognition. It involves a person, a person’s intelligence. Historian scientist Kh. Abzhanov states: “The owners of civilizations in the east of the Eurasian continent – those who left pictures of wild animals in Kulzhaby in the III millennium BC, those who brought Begazy-Dandybay culture in the Bronze Age, the Kazakhs, who were captured by the ancient Turkic people, continued the ancient tradition and formulated two rational models of preservation, systematization, and propaganda of the history even at the time when professional social sciences haven’t completely formed. The first thing to do is to tell the events of the history that happened in the past. The second thing is a genealogy. According to the first, the historical process is characterized by the intervention of the people, kagan (a king), khan, batyr (a hero), bi (a judge) and bek (a head), while the second type gives priority to the individual. Cause and reason, beginning, procedure of the history in both of them are concluded by witty statements and thoughtful sayings” (Abzhanov, 2007: 3-4). The calmness and tolerance inherent in the nature of our nation contributed to worldview. In many cases, the tradition of ancestors was performed by the word. Following our steppe law, our people have found answers to many secrets offered by nature, and have made it a part of their daily lives. People sometimes ask rhetorical questions to the mass, environment, and even to their descendants. People accepted the metaphysics of creation and constituted the image and style. Even though a human being dies, he acknowledges that his soul is eternal, and he prayed for the ancestor. People formulated concepts that are eternal, believed in the magic power of the word.

Academician S. Kaskabasov claims: “Works of the artistic folklore have another way of performance. It is an expository way, that is, interpretation. Such a style appears in the art of highly skilled artists and in fairy tales. They do not just narrate or tell a fairy tale. They occasionally express their attitude towards the story, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly without interference with the event” (Kaskabasov, 2011: 40). Emotional openness of human being and inclination to communication are reflected in their mother tongue. Language culture of human is characterized by its

national identity as the development of its ethno-social and cultural-historical integrity. The etiquette of the Kazakh people has formulated and developed over the centuries. Its usage depends on society's development, social status, and age. The researcher L.S. Scherba, in his study of linguistic practice, puts forward the idea of introducing the dyad of "language-speech" as follows: "... All language dimensions that we support are shaped by our speech and understanding as a future concept and become a" language material". The culture of speech is formed as a result of all these things" (Shcherba, 1957). It functions as a tool of understanding a person and observing his nature.

Conclusions

The Kazakh people experienced many wars, struggles and tragic events in their past history. It was the country, the vastness of the land, and the wealth of the steppe that the enemy was trying to capture. But bravery heroes who were fired by arrows, orators who were witty and smart invoked the country to stand aside from situations that could bring tragedy for the nation. This is the feature of the nation. The Kazakh people have expressed their centuries-old dreams and wishes, wisdom about life in their witty words, tradition and customs. The unique consciousness and cognition of the nation have been formulated through this. This defines a national code.

Literature of any country is a reflection of the culture and national consciousness of the people. The literature reflects hope for the people's freedom, independence, and for future. Therefore, social inequality, struggle, and general state of people are constantly reflected in literary works. Literature has its own metaphysics. The complexity and broadness of metaphysical thinking, consideration of limited and unlimited situations of human life differentiate the literature from other types of art that quickly change the mood of the person. This proves the potential of literature, the integrity of artistic and cognitive power.

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**GEOPOLITICAL USES OF THE SPEECH
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS
OF COOPERATION BRIC AFRICA**

*Hanse Gilbert Mbeng Dang**

Abstract

The new configuration of the international system has favoured numerous changes in the international order. One of these major changes is the reorientation by state actors of their foreign policy practices. From this perspective, discourse occupies a prominent place in the direction and conduct of foreign policies. It is even at the heart of the practice of new international relations. The shift of the world towards a multipolar model, the formation of numerous geopolitical entities on the basis of political and economic solidarities, revived the debate on the geopolitical uses of discourse in international relations. This debate finds its foundation and its relevance in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the world with the advent of new geopolitical and geo-economic entities like the BRICs recently become the BRICS or BRICAS. As a result, multilateralism emerges as a form of international cooperation par excellence. In this new framework, Africa is positioning itself more as an actor who makes sense. This repositioning of Africa on the international scene is taking place through the new impetus given by African leaders to relations with emerging countries. The structural and conjunctural transformations of the world system call on Africa to renew its relations, particularly with the BRICS. In this context, the present proposal aims at identifying the elements of analysis of the Africa-BRIC cooperation on the basis of the reciprocal speeches of the plenipotentiaries of the two entities.

Key words: *geopolitics, discourse, international relations, Africa, BRIC*

Introduction

The rise of the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, understood as the BRIC, has provoked a new geopolitical reconfiguration. The formerly unipolar international system, characterized by an American-European preponderance over the world economy, is today challenged and challenged by the rise of the BRICs. These “new masters of the world” to takeover (Ziegler, 2002: 11) have burst onto the African scene and seems to rise as a partner of choice for this continent that vibrates to the rhythm of emergence. African geopolitics, as well as global geopolitics, are being reconfigured (Mbeng Dang, 2016: 185). Formerly considered as the preserve of the European powers, Africa is now courted by the BRICs. The Africa-BRIC relations mark then constitute one of the major determinants of the renewal of Africa in the international partnership. The main challenges of this partnership lie in the sustainable growth of the African economy, its openness to international market civilization and its integration into the world economy (Chouala, 2003: 57). Only, the Africa-BRIC cooperation seems to be maintained by many speeches which convey the illusion of a balance of the balance of

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power between the two entities. As a result, the analysis of the discourse in international relations seems to impose itself as a grid of reading making it possible to better identify the new stakes of the partnership. Discursive production in Africa-BRIC relations is from both a theoretical and practical point of view an important element in understanding and apprehending the posture of the principal plenipotentiaries. While discourse is the driving force in the implementation of states' foreign policy, its geopolitical uses are at least a vector of power that determine and influence power relationship between them. Considered as a combination of words, discourses reflect the aspirations and the degree of power of states through the guarantors of foreign policy. It is in this that one must perceive the relevance of the expressions "words of power" or "power of the words".

That said, the objective analysis of discursive production in the theoretical field of international relations cannot be better operationalized than by a preliminary conceptual clarification. The concept of discourse is much more used in the field of linguistics and language sciences. For semiotics, discourse analysis seems to have invested the field of interdisciplinary. Several definitions are then proposed depending on the nature of the discourse as well as its purpose. The French dictionary Larousse gives some definitions. Oratory development, on a specific subject, said in public, and in particular on a solemn occasion by a speaker speech of circumstance. Written or oral manifestation of a state of mind; set of didactic writings, oratory developments held on a theory, a doctrine Marxist discourse. Benveniste defines discourse as "any enunciation supposing a speaker and a listener and in the first the intention to influence the other in some way" (Benveniste, 1966: 242). Discourse is a statement or set of statements considered from the point of view of the mechanism of its production, in other words a statement or set of statements in a situation of communication. In the context of international relations understood as interactions and exchanges between several actors, discourse refers to the production of ideas, their transmission and the reception of the effects they produce.

The geopolitical uses refer to the capitalization of the effects produced by the actors of the international system in a well-defined space according to the stakes, the context and the available resources. The production of a discourse on the international scene is then conditioned by its capacity to influence a public opinion national or international and its faculty to establish an interaction. This interaction must provoke a play of balance or influence of the balance of power. In the cooperation between Africa and the BRIC countries, the speeches of the principal plenipotentiaries are those which lay down the bases of all the observed interactions in terms of stakes, perception, actions and purpose. Thus, can we not say that speech has always been what has always participated in the legitimization of the foreign policy of states in international relations? How can one assess the relations between Africa and the BRIC countries on the basis of discursive production? These are some questions that can help feed this reflection.

Africa as seen by the BRICs: panorama of an altruistic perception of an actor in hegemonic posture

Never before has a continent been the subject of many pessimistic (Dumont, 1962: 10) optimistic, ambivalent, contradictory and unanimous speeches like Africa. The pessimistic discourses on Africa show that Africa is a continent that is slow to take off economically and emancipate itself politically because it has remained connected to the Western world (Traore, 1999: 15). Pessimists see Africa as a land of natural disasters, endemic diseases, poverty and food insecurity, lack of democracy and human rights and governance deficit. The optimists, (Edem Kodjo, 1985: 5), meanwhile, see Africa as a continent full of hope, one containing all the assurances with regard to certain economic and socio-demographic indicators. With a young and dynamic population, abundant natural resources, advances in the field of industrialization, the vision of optimistic discourses seems to put off because of the pessimistic theses of an actor who appears more under-represented than resigned (Kabou, 1991: 17). But these discourses, despite the fact that they are contradictory, all agree on the fact that Africa is a player in the international game. More than a continent, Africa is a geopolitical entity and an important geo-economic actor with regard to the new geopolitical and geo-economic reconfiguration of the world. If Africa is the subject of a debate between pessimists and optimists, what may be the vision of the BRIC countries to this continent that has become one of their big partners in this new cooperation?

Africa land of peace and attractiveness: strategy of the legitimization of the presence of the “big four” in Africa

Africa is seen by the BRIC countries as a land of peace and attractiveness. The new development theories that have developed since the end of the 2000s are ample proof of this. Only this view of the BRIC countries seems to be in contradiction with the pessimistic theses that regard Africa as a land of chaos. An Africa of war, coups and huld up elections according to the pessimists appears as a land of peace for the BRIC countries. How to understand then the attitude of the BRIC countries towards Africa presented as a land of peace and attractiveness? Is it a philanthropic speech and simply an apology? These queries, relevant as they may seem, are more questionable in the light of the pessimistic discourses densely produced on Africa. Speaking of peace in Africa, Pierre Kipre says: Africa, perhaps more than other continents, is sick of violence and war. Political violence, certainly, with its procession of civil wars and border conflicts; but also economic violence with the various forms of predation of collective wealth painfully collected; social violence also with the growing impoverishment of peoples and the most brutal forms of exclusion; finally, cultural violence with more or less pernicious forms of acculturation, in addition to the scientific and technological gap. These multiple forms of violence are constant threats to peace in Africa because violence here leads to war or creates objective conditions (Kipre, 2003: 133).

In the light of this analysis, we understand that the BRIC countries' discourse seems to be moving away from realities. The political discourse of the BRIC countries on Africa as a land of peace is an apology because it has a geopolitical and geostrategic

purpose to win the sympathy of African states. With its many natural resources, Africa is then courted by the BRIC countries that paint it as a land where life is good. If Africa seen by the BRICs appears as a land of peace, it can also be explained by the rhetoric of friendship on the grounds of courtesy in the practice of international relations. Yves Viltard already evokes the fact that, depending on their interests, states build friendships that are both “horizontal” and “vertical” (Viltard, 2009: 127).

Far from the idea of triumphing the views of Afro pessimists, we must still recognize that Africa seen by the BRIC is in perfect contrast with certain facts. The notion of peace conveyed by the BRICs appears ambiguous in the African context. Peace, whether considered as the absence of war, the absence of violence, the absence of turmoil, political stability or a state of tranquillity, encompasses all these considerations for this continent with complex and multifaceted realities. If peace in Africa takes on all its dimensions, then we understand that the vision of the BRIC countries is a more or less narrow vision; departing somewhat from reality. It is based on discourses whose geopolitical uses contribute to legitimizing a presence with an economic and strategic focus. This results in an intense diplomatic presence of the BRIC countries in Africa.

Table 1: The diplomatic presence of the BRICs in Africa

Country	Number of permanent diplomatic missions in Africa
<i>Brazil</i>	35
<i>Russia</i>	40
<i>India</i>	29
<i>China</i>	49

Sources: <https://www.embassypages.com/inde>, accessed October 23, 2016

Moreover, the BRIC’s vision of Africa as a land of peace contrasts with Afro-pessimistic views because Africa is a land of peace and stability. While economic investments presuppose a favourable political atmosphere, the attractiveness argument of the BRIC countries in Africa finds all its relevance in the stated discourses. With its economic potential and the absence of war and other forms of violence in the states, Africa appears to the BRICs as a land of peace and attractiveness. In a context marked by the rise of asymmetric threats, economic activity has fallen sharply on a global scale because of the decline in the index of peace. However, despite the multiple backlashes of insecurity faced by African states, sub-Saharan Africa seems to be doing well with the best peace index for 2015.

Thus, the perception of peace by the BRIC countries in Africa is a construct whose purpose is to legitimize their presence on African soil. The speeches of the BRIC countries on the peaceful character of the African continent have a geopolitical use which aims to reassure African leaders of the welcome and tranquillity offered by their states to foreign investors. The same is true of the question of democracy and human rights on the African continent.

On the subject of democracy and human rights in Africa: the ambivalent speeches of the BRICs

The new globalization is not only characterized by the domination of capitalist ideology, but also carries certain values such as democracy and human rights. While it is true that democracy and human rights are values of Western origin, we must nevertheless recognize that they have managed to universalize and are now accepted by the majority of human societies. However, some BRIC countries like China seem to be undermining the issue of respect for democratic values and the protection of human rights in Africa. By placing its relations with African countries on the immutable and sacrosanct basis of “neutrality and non-interference”, Chinese diplomacy seems to be a hindrance to the emergence of the rule of law in Africa. At the same time, it delays the political integration of the continent while giving Beijing the means of its influence in international bodies at the expense of competing powers (Mbaye Cisse, 2016: 2). However, while current data shows that China seems to be undermining the issue of democracy and respect for human rights in Africa today, the old data show quite the opposite. While African states were still under European rule, China supported the latter in their decolonization movements. Accompanying China in the process of decolonization in Africa was part of the promotion of human rights that was now being divested in Africa (Dorna, 2007: 23).

All things considered, notwithstanding certain palpable facts, China’s thesis of denial of human rights in Africa reveals some of a geopolitical instrumentalisation stemming from the Western vision. The Western discourse on Chinese politics in Africa in its geopolitical uses, seems to make China a “bad master” in terms of democracy and respect for human rights towards the student that is the Africa. Thus, Africa continues to be in the eyes of the Western world, a bad student of globalization (Abwa, 2003: 474). If Western discourses make Africa a bad student of globalization in reference to the lack of appropriation of values that it considers to be universal, this is a paradox. The colonial West, very much looking at the question of respect for human rights and democracy on its own land, has however most obviously contributed to the violation of these same principles in Africa. We can then understand the denial of democracy and human rights in Africa is discursive constructions that fuel the game of international relations. This calls for reservations about the judgments to be made about China’s vision of respect for human rights and democracy in Africa.

On the other hand, if China is presented as a “bad master” of democracy and human rights in Africa, this is not the case for the other BRIC countries. The latter remain watching over the consolidation of the rule of law through the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights in Africa. Despite the divergence of views of these countries with those of the Western bloc, they remain unanimous on the need to universalize certain values such as democracy and respect for human rights. Despite many structural shortcomings in the legal and institutional arrangements of these states, we must still recognize the BRIC’s significant progress in respect of human rights and the promotion of democracy. Brazil, once considered a democracy and a state of lawlessness (Pinheiro, 2016: 3), seems to be gradually becoming an example to follow. In this regard Paulo Sergio Pinheiro stay that:

In the last twenty years of the twentieth century, despite the political transition of 1985 and the fact that Brazil has become a country different from that of the time of the military dictatorship, its income distribution model remains one of the most iniquitous in the world. Brazil is the Latin American country whose income distribution is the most unequal. It has an extraordinary stability, apart from a rapid decline observable in the period 1989-1992, during the “Cruzado Plan” (Pinheiro, 2016: 4). As for Russia and India, these two nuclear powers somewhat opposed to Western ideology seem rather sceptical about the question of democracy and human rights in Africa. Through an attitude of neutrality that characterizes Russian and Indian diplomacy in Africa, these two countries, far from denying the need for Africa to appropriate democracy and respect for human rights seem not to grant too much importance to these notions.

If the BRIC countries seem to ignore or undermine the question of respect for human rights and democracy in Africa in their speeches, it contributes to safeguarding the economic interests of these states in Africa. Therefore, failing to impose on African states the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, the BRICs prefer to have a neutral attitude for economic needs. It can also reflect respect for the independence and sovereignty of African states, which is one of the foundations of BRIC-Africa cooperation. It is on the basis of this courteous and neutral stance that Africa exalts international solidarity in this cooperation.

Words and words to transform the world: Africa and the exaltation of international solidarity

In the beginning was the word as reported by Judeo-Christian cosmogony based on biblical literature. It simply means that speech and speech are the foundation of any initiative. Without wishing to go into the apologetic theology of the Bible, it is indisputable to say that words and words in international politics have meaning and change. Words therefore remain a great vehicle of information. The latter is decoded from a perception that differs from one individual to another (Buhler, 2011: 491).

Words and words, Africa has been able to produce and convey over time. In the context of cooperation between Africa and the BRICs, words and words play an important role, especially when Africans believe that these can transform the world. To do this, African leaders have repeatedly exalted international solidarity for the advent of cooperation in which all actors would succeed in safeguarding their mutual interests (Dan Bariah, 2013: 7). Contrary to the leaders of the BRIC, for whom Africa is a land of peace committed for several decades on the ways of reinforcing democratic principles, Africans differently view BRICs according to their interests. The issues of international solidarity and the strengthening of partnership are at the heart of Africa’s discourse production with regard to the BRICs.

Deepening friendship and strengthening partnership in Africa-BRIC relations: hope for Africa?

BRICs are a chance for Africa? The question may seem trivial but meaningful because of the perception of the African authorities of their new partners, Brazil, Russia, India and China. Africa calls for the deepening of friendship and the strengthening of partnership in its relations with the BRIC countries. Friendship and

partnership, these are the key words of the African leaders towards the BRIC countries to which they base a hope through their speeches. Should Africa then hope to deepen the friendship and strengthen the partnership with the BRIC? On the basis of speeches, the affirmative seems to be the answer to this question. But to look closely at the facts, one seems to move away from these idealistic considerations Africans make in terms of friendship and cooperation. The leaders of African states have a contemplative stance towards the BRIC countries. Throughout the many speeches, they continue to exalt and magnify the relations that their States maintain with the BRICs. As an illustration, here is what President Paul Biya of Cameroon thinks about China-Cameroon relations: “*The cooperation between Cameroon and China is characterized by important achievements covering fields as diverse as agriculture, health, education, infrastructure, telecommunications, culture and sport. And I like to say, China is one of the safest and most faithful of these external partners. It is also an opportunity for me to highlight the remarkable work accomplished in the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and to express our gratitude to the Chinese authorities...*”. In the light of this discourse, an observation emerges, that of an Africa which considers the BRICs as the bearer of the salvation of a continent qualified as a minor actor and a resigned protagonist. The deepening of the friendship and the strengthening of the partnership that Africans call all their wishes has for geopolitical ambition to allow Africa to position itself as a player that makes sense. If the speeches of the Africans happen to be manifestly not carrying power, it is none the less true that they hide the latent desires of a geopolitical entity in search of power. To abound in the same direction as the Cameroonian President, Ibrahim Boubakar Keita displays the same idealistic and contemplative posture towards India in these terms: “*We are here again for the third time to continue our dialogue, deepen our friendship and strengthen our cooperation. (...) The India-Africa partnership, an expression of South-South cooperation, is today essential to boost economic and social development at the scale of the Planet. Hence, the need to maintain and strengthen our partnership by putting in place an appropriate monitoring mechanism. (...) Africa and India must intensify their strategic partnership to promote the vital interests of developing countries in the management of major international issues*”.

Table 2: lexical-syntactic indicators of African discourses on BRIC

Cooperative determinants	Lexical Fields	Finality
<i>Economy</i>	<i>economic prospects, development, economic development, economic recovery</i>	<i>To impulse the economic and social development on the scale of the Planet.</i>
<i>Policy</i>	<i>major international issues, dialogue, consultation, international community, South-South cooperation</i>	<i>Promote Political dialogue Between states</i>
<i>Technology</i>	<i>Telecommunications, digital divide, technology transfer, digital revolution,</i>	<i>Promote sustainable development through the transfer of technology</i>
<i>Security</i>	<i>Peace, security, terrorism, extremism</i>	<i>strengthen cooperation in the crucial area of peace and security</i>

Source: realized on the basis of the speeches of the African presidents and adapted by ourselves

By implicitly calling for the deepening of friendship and the strengthening of partnership, Africa is also drawing the outlines of an actor who wants to assert himself in the international system. The manifestly sweet and exhilarating discourse of Africa aims to influence or modify the attitude of its receiver. One can then take the risk of asserting that Africa, just like the BRIC countries, also produces discourses whose uses have a purely geopolitical basis which consists in passively defending their interests. In a world where the actors of the international system are cunning and responsible (Badie, 1999: 304), Africa finds it necessary to hold a discourse of non-power in order to establish itself as a power. This is why Africa has focused its strategy on the promotion of international solidarity that guarantees equitable and sustainable cooperation.

International solidarity, responsibility and “win-win” partnership: Africa’s expectations of the BRICs

The term “international solidarity”, more recent, is more the expression of a mutual commitment, which implies a sense of mutual responsibility. In a world where poverty is increasing and in which globalization accentuates the interdependence between countries, it is a question of building together, countries of the “North” and “Southern” countries, solidarity projects aimed at reducing these inequalities and guarantee access to fundamental rights (education, food, health, access to water, etc.). Partnership, from the point of view of the theoretical renewal of international relations, is also part of a dynamic of international civilization of political mores. It is in this perspective that it is a frame of political enunciation, which conveys a vision of the world whose key elements are liberalization of the political and economic markets, institutional and economic reforms, rule of law, human rights, governance, decentralization, technocracy, civil society, etc. In relations between Africa and the BRICs, the expectations of the black continent boil down to more international solidarity, to state responsibility and to the advent of a “win-win” partnership. Victim of the deterioration of the terms of trade and the extraversion of its economic structures, Africa is positioning itself as an actor seeking international assistance. Through a plethora of speeches, the leaders of the African States are trying every day to solicit the humanitarian intervention of their partner, including the BRICs. If Africa was yesterday a chance for some Western powers like France, it now believes that the BRIC are a chance for it. This reversal of situation may seem first sight banal but, it is bearer of meaning. A continent formerly courted because of its economic potentialities by Westerners today in position of minor actor in the international game. Africa today counts more than ever on redefining the terms of cooperation for the advent of a “win-win” partnership. A win-win partnership, of which China is the main advocate in its policy of cooperation with African states.

Conclusion

Peace, attractiveness, investment, democracies, human rights, international solidarity, win-win partnership, only words that underlie cooperation between Africa and the BRICs. Africa-BRIC relations are based on a production of many discourses that contribute to influence, determine or condition the actions of these two

geopolitical entities in a position of altruistic mistrust and mutual assistance. Through the discourses produced by the two entities, there emerges a desire to transform an international universe characterized by the cunning of certain states or transnational groups animated by a hegemonic will and a desire for power. While Africa calls for greater cooperation and deepening of friendship, the BRICs call on Africa to respect democracy and strengthen the rule of law. Words and speeches to transform the world. Only, do the words translate the acts? The question arises in all its relevance as it is true that by scrutinizing relations Africa-BRIC, one realizes that beyond the speeches, each actor instrumentalises the speech to better defend its interests. Without wanting to refute the idea of a will of transformation of the world through the discourses, one must nevertheless admit that the speeches sometimes hide hegemonic ambitions and the desires of powers. That said, words, though meaningful, are full of latent issues that often hide the actions. All in all, speeches on the international scene, contribute to the legitimization of the hegemonic ambitions of certain states and the reduction to the status of marginalized or underrated actors for others. This, in our humble opinion, emerges from the analysis of BRIC country speeches and their African partners. In short, the discourse in international relations is a geopolitical resource in the hands of the States which make use of it as complex as the international system.

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ALBURNUS MAIOR / ROSIA MONTANA – A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS

*Florian Olteanu**

Abstract

The article wants to present exclusively the historical importance of the Alburnus Maior/Rosia Montana site, marking the main discoveries made during the entire history. The political debate over the contemporary mining project of RMGC will be presented soon in another work, much extensive (a book) because of the complex legally, economic, strategic and patrimonial importance of the site of Alburnus Maior-Rosia Montana, for Romania and for the mankind.

Key words: *Rosia Montana, Alburnus Maior, Roman mines, wax tablets, historical importance*

Introduction

The present article reveals the main aspects concerning the historical importance of the site of Rosia Montana. The site had entered in the mass media attention and in the scientific world attention in 1999, twenty years ago, when the Romanian-Canadian Company- RMGC-Rosia Montana Gold Corporation obtained the license of mining No.47/1999. Main stock holders were Gabriel Resources and Romanian State. The license was transferred from Mininvest Deva, Romanian State Company and was not obtained by auction. In 2006, the mining activity was stopped. The public international opinion and debates stopped for the moment, the evolution of the complex project of gold exploitation for environmental and cultural, historical reasons, the site being enlisted to be registered in the frame of UNESCO world monuments.

As we can see in the history, the natural, mineral reserves had a great geopolitical role in all the historical ages, especially in the ages of the great empires, in the Ancient, Medieval, Modern and Contemporary times.

Geographically (<https://www.adoptaocasa.ro/despre-rosia-montana/date-generale>), Rosia Montana is located in Apuseni Mountains, placed at 11 km distance from Abrud, 15 km distance from Câmpeni, 41 km distance from Zlatna, 76 km distance from Alba Iulia, 135 km distance from Cluj-Napoca. Alongside Rosia river, is a Hollow, which is guarded by Mountain Massifs: Rotundul, Vârsul, Curmătura, Ghergheleu, Cetate, Orlea, Tille, between the confluence of Rosia and Abrudel, to the natural amphitheatre, formed by Mountain Massifs Jig, Cârnic, Lety, Șuley, on a distance of 6 km. Mountain Massifs Orlea and Jig (North) Cetate and Cârnic (South), are old mountain volcanoes cons in which were located the gold, and silver ore reserves.

The tradition of gold reserves exploitation is attested in the Apuseni Mountains in the Dacian Époque. Even Rosia Montana is documentary attested in 131 A.D., during

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the reign of the Roman Emperor Hadrian; the living of the Dacians in the region is attested many centuries before in literary sources and proved by archaeological discoveries. For example, the Roman-Greek geographer Claudius Ptolemaios (87-165 AD) from Alexandria (Roman Province of Egypt) mentioned 12 Dacian tribes. One of them was the Dacian tribe of the “Apuls”. Apuls were the native who gave the name “Apulum” (present Alba-Iulia) of the Roman city settled after the Roman conquest of Dacia.

Jerome Carcopino (Carcopino, 1934: 73-86) evaluated the treasury of the last King of Dacia, Decebal (87-106 A.D.), captured by the Romans in 106 AD helped by a Dacian traitor, Bicilis, former Decebal confidant, at 165 tons of gold and 331 tons of silver. Apuseni Mountains, the Valley of Aries River were known for great reserves of gold. Romans, after the conquest of Dacia decided to bring Dalmatic and Illyrian specialists in mining, because they were highly specialized and more confidants in the eyes of the Roman occupants, than the former Dacian gold miners.

Attested in the Roman Empire Age, the site of Rosia Montana/Alburnus Maior was known by its gold reserves, and its gold mines. After the Roman Retreat, ordered by Emperor Aurelian (270-275 A.D.), the site remained unknown until the Modern Age, when the Habsburg Authorities started the gold exploitation, in the ancient Roman gold mines. Known alternatively as Goldbach (Golden River) in German, or Verespatak (Red River) in Magyar, Rosia Montana entered in the attention of the archaeologists after the discovery in the ancient Roman mines of the “*tabellae ceratae*”, some wood tablets (collated two or three), covered with wax on which were made mathematical calculations or were signed contracts (Ardevan, 1998: 292-296). In the Roman archaeology, the wood and wax tablets from Alburnus Maior have the chance to be well conserved thanks to the environment of ancient mines where they were deposited from 1500 years until their discovery in the XVIII-XIX centuries.

Precisely were discovered during 1786 and 1855. Totally were discovered 40 wax tablets, but only 25 of them remained safe and could be interpreted (Rusu Abrudean, 1928: 7-12). Only one tablet, dated February 6 131 A.D. comes from the age of Hadrianus (117-138 A.D.), which marks the documentary attestation of the name “Alburnus Maior” (archaeologically, the site is attested before 131 A.D.). The rest of the tablets are dated on the age of Roman emperors Antoninus Pius (138-161) and Marcus Aurelius (161-180).

Another major importance of the site is represented by the system of mining galleries, unique in the Europe. In the site we can find more than 7 km of Roman galleries, more than 80 km of Medieval and Modern mining galleries which have a major importance for the “mining industrial archaeology”. Due of the extensive exploitation, the site is no secure for touristic activities. From 2001, National Museum of Romanian History started intensive archaeological researches in Rosia Montana site.

I will present a short synthesis of the main conclusions made by the historian Radu Varga: “*Beside various chance discoveries, the history of the settlement became better known through the extensive archaeological researches which were carried out beginning with 2001. Around the mining area settlements were formed at Tăul Țapului, Hăbad-Brădoaia, Hop-Botar which included also cemeteries, the latter being attested also at Părăul Porcului – Tăul Securilor, Țarina,*

and Tăul Cornei. Regarding the population of *Alburnus Maior*, the corresponding inscriptions attest 192 individuals, most of them being of Illyrian origin, specialized in mining activities. The *aurariae Daciae* belonged to the Roman emperors, but the mining areas were rented out; in the case of *Alburnus Maior* the mining activity started with the conquest of Dacia and ended during the reign of Aurelianus, once with the abandonment of Dacia. Regarding the military presence in the area, regular material with the stamp of the *legio XIII Gemina* has been attested here, as well as the dedications of some *beneficarii consulares*” (<http://hiphi.ubbcluj.ro/Community-statutes-ideology/Monographic%20files.pdf>). We can conclude that, at *Alburnus Maior*, all the epigraphic sources offer precious information about the ethnical origin and main occupation of the inhabitants. The 192 mentions are referring to the Illyrian population as ethnical origin and to the mining activities as main economical occupation.

Ancient Roman mining galleries and ancient wood/wax tablets

During Roman administration installed by the Emperor Trajan (98-117 A.D.), after 106, in the perimeter *Alburnus Maior* (*Rosia Montana*) – *Ampelum* (*Zlatna*) – *Apulum* (*Alba Iulia*) were established colonists from Illyricum and Dalmatia (today Croatia, respectively Albania) specialized in mining activities. Geographically, the mining complex was established between *Câmpeni* and *Abrud* in *Orlea Mountain Massif*, the localities being connected by a Roman road, which followed the water course of *Ampoi River*. The administrative headquarters was placed in *Ampelum* (*Zlatna*). The official operations were conducted by a “*procurator aurarius*”, but the mining activity was also entrusted to the private concessioners. The security of the gold prospectations and exploitation was provided by *Numerus Maurorum Hispanorum* (Petolescu, 2002: 137-138).

The site is important for the investigation of the technique of gold exploitation (Timoc, 2008: 96-106). A Roman mining gallery (*cuniculus*) had a trapezoidal form, had small dimensions (0, 70 m width, 1 m high). Miners followed the golden source, digging in steps, until 300 m, in deepness ([http://enciclopediaromaniei.ro/wiki/Rosia Montana](http://enciclopediaromaniei.ro/wiki/Rosia_Montana)).

The perimeter in which were discovered wood/wax tablets were: *Mount Igren* (*Lorincz Mine*, the only wood/wax tablet written in Greek), *Mount Letea* (*St. Joseph Mine*), *St. Catherine Mine*, *Ohaba St. Simion Mine*, *Mount Cârnicu Mare* (*St. Ladislau Mine*).

We can observe that in the Medieval and Modern Ages, the mining activities were conducted in the former Roman galleries, using new techniques.

The historical information is very important: a society for funeral helping, contracts (concession, buying houses and slaves), bills, fees documents. Many tablets remained in Romania, other were taken in Berlin or Budapest Museums. Is generally considered that, during the Marcomanic wars (II century A.D.), during Marcus Aurelius reign, some of the holders of these tablets had put them in the galleries where they were found later, during the Modern Age. It is possible that, the holders of the tablets made some *safe houses* in the mining galleries, for protecting their lives and their goods.

The first historian who examined, interpreted and published with illustrations the wood tablets from Alburnus Maior was Theodor Mommsen, the creator of Latin Corpus of Inscriptions (*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum-CIL*), in 1873.

Ion Rusu Abrudeanu published at Bucarest, in 1928 the work *Moșii, calvarul unui popor eroic, dar nedreptățit* (“*Moșii*” (*people of Apuseni Mountains*) *the Calvary of a heroically but wounded people*), at the “Cartea Românească” Publishing House.

We can consider that the wood tablets from Alburnus Maior can be considered as being at the milestone from the Roman Epigraphy and Roman Paleography.

Modern and contemporary excavations on Rosia Montana site

After the strategic retreat of the Roman Emperor Aurelian (271/274 A.D.), the former Roman territories (present time territories of Banat, Transylvania, Oltenia and Western Walachia, the South-Eastern corner of Moldavia – the rest of Walachia and Moldavia were inhabited by the free Dacian population) were, in the first centuries of the Medieval Age, on the way of the Great Migrations. The Romanian local governments emancipated in the Middle Age from Magyar authority (Walachia and Moldavia) or entered under Magyar authority (Banat, Transylvania) were very rich in natural reserves and the great neighbour powers tried to control them. Romanian population with Dacian-Roman origins and Slavic, Cumanic influences had a small military defensive and offensive force, being under a permanent pressure of the neighbour militarized forces. The Byzantine Empire (former Eastern Roman Empire) was in a permanent involution, collapsing in May 29, 1453, when the Ottomans had conquered Constantinople. Poland, Hungary and later the Habsburg Empire, Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire tried to have an effective domination over the Romanian Principalities because their geostrategic position (Carpathian Mountains, Danube and Black Sea) and their rich natural resources.

It was normally for a great political force as the Habsburg Empire (whose origins can be placed in the Medieval Europe) whose ethnical basic territory (Austria, the Carolingian Ostmark - the Outpost from the East, placed on the Middle Danube Valley) was poor on natural resources, to find territories with great reserves in gold, iron ore sources, forest exploitation and agricultural territories. After the last defeat of the Ottoman armies in the front of Vienna (the Vienna siege), in 1683, Austria tried to extend its territory and to make great alliances with Spain. But, first of all, Austria had to face with a great opposition of France led by Louis XIV. The King of France had tried to put Austrian Empire in difficulty helping the “*Curutz War*” (1703-1711), in Transylvania (“*Curutz*” was a term derived from “*crusaders*”). The strategically manoeuver of the King Louis XIV tried to involve the Ottoman Empire for weakening Austrian force. Prince Francisc (Ferencz) Rakoczy II tried to emancipate from the Austrian rule, helped by Nichita Balica, Bucur Campan and the famous Romanian “*haiduc*” (Balkan term for outlaw), Pinte the Brave (Pinte Viteazul). In August 11/21 1690, Romanian Prince-ruler Constantin Brâncoveanu had rejected a Habsburg attack at Zărnești, near Krosntadt (Brașov), keeping the control of Walachia and gaining some authority in the eyes of the Habsburg Empire, being named “*Baron of the Holly Roman-German Empire*”. In 1711, Moldavian ruler, Prince Demetrius Cantemir tried to emancipate Moldavia from the Ottoman suzerainty, making an

alliance with the Russian Emperor Peter the Great, but the Moldavian-Russian allied forces were destroyed at Stănilești, near Prut River (Ottoman forces being arranged and trained by Carol XII, former king of Sweden, who establish its residence at Tighina-Bender, a city controlled by Ottoman Empire near the Dniester River). The Prince-ruler Constantin Brâncoveanu tried to emancipate Walachia, playing a dangerous game, between Russians and Habsburgs, being discovered and executed in 1714, by the Ottoman Empire, with the secret help of Louis XIV (according to some sources, the French Ambassador in Constantinople assisted personally at the execution of the ruler Constantin Brâncoveanu, his sons and his son in law). In 1699, Transylvania was occupied according to the Karlowitz Treaty by Habsburg forces. Romanians had the possibility to embrace the Union confession (The Greek-Catholic Church), to safeguard their language, and a social status, but the great majority of Romanians remained Orthodox and without political and social rights. Romanian monks Sofronie from Cioara and Vissarion Sarai had tried to fight for the Orthodox faith, because the Habsburg authorities placed Romanian Orthodox subjects under the control of Serbian Metropolitan Siege of Karlowitz (which denied the confessional service in Romanian, using Serbian, during the divine services). The Peace from 1711, signed in Satu Mare, ended the war with a Habsburg victory. In 1718, at Peace Treaty of Passarowitz, Vienna Imperial Court took the control of Banat (occupied by the Ottomans after Mohacs battle in 1526) and Oltenia (from Cerna to Olt River). At the Peace Treaty of Belgrad in 1739, Oltenia was reunited with Walachia under the Ottoman suzerainty. After the War of the Succession of Austrian Throne (1740-1748), the Habsburg Empire would be conducted by the Empress Maria Theresia, according to the "*Pragmatica Sanctio*" (1713). The Habsburg Empire was interested in keeping the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, her son future Emperor Joseph II being counselled by the experts in geopolitics not to accept Tsarist Russia's actions to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor Joseph II concentrated its attention in Poland (where was located a great coal reserve in Silesia), making approaches with Prussia, Russia, against the Ottoman Empire. Poland was finally smashed and divided in three parts losing its independence and its territorial integrity. In the same geopolitical context, Austria and Tsarist Russia, had make an arrangement after the Peace of Kuciuk Kainardji (1774) the Habsburg Empire gaining the control of Bukovina (Northern part of the Romanian Moldavia) in 1775, and in 1776, after the Palamutka Convention obtained another "set" of 46 Moldavian villages.

Practically, between 1699 and 1776, thirteen years before the national movement of Horea, the Habsburg Empire had gained the control of a lot of Polish territories rich in mineral resources, Romanian territories with natural mineral reserves (Transylvania), agricultural, salt, forest, zoo technical exploitations (Oltenia, Bukovina).

After the installation of the Austrian authority in Transylvania, after Karlowitz treaty in 1699, at Rosia Montana would be constructed a mining settlement, in which the pipelines for water alimentation and other technical arrangements, underground galleries, mining surface facilities totalized 140 km.

From 1700, to 1846, the gold mining site of Rosia Montana (Goldbach) was administered by private concessionaries, under the control of the Habsburg

authorities. In that time, the great majority of the miners had Romanian ethnic origin and was in a social and political condition of serfdom. The Habsburg Empire was dependent by the gold of Apuseni Mountains, in which Rosia Montana had a major role.

It is necessary to understand that in all the great empires which dominated parts of the Europe, the scientific researches were helped by the royal and imperial courts because these researches helped the policies conducted by them: historical rights on some territories, natural resources which could help the economy of these kingdoms or empires, geostrategic importance of some relief forms: plains, mountains, rivers, deserts, gulfs, lakes, seas, oceans etc.

The Habsburg Empire did not make an exception. In 1824, Romanian boyar Dinicu Golescu made a trip in Transylvania, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, Northern Italy, Trieste, Banat (Anghelescu, 1982: 13-52), and published his impressions, in a book, published in Pest, in 1826, in Romanian language, book entitled "*The transcript of my trip*", in which he mentioned that in Vienna, the great capital of the Habsburgs he visited Universities, Libraries, Museums. He had mentioned also that Vienna had a Military Academy, being as Paris, one of the most important educational and cultural centres in Europe.

We can understand that the Habsburg authorities (and after 1867, Austrian-Hungarian authorities) had the interests in publish works about the history, people and especially the resources of Transylvania. Today we know the works of Martin Opitz (*Dacia Antiqua*) and Eduard Robert Roesler. Eduard Robert Roesler had elaborated his work to deny the continuity of Dacian-Roman population in Transylvania (beside the rich evidence of the Middle Age sources favourable to Roman-Dacian continuity) for rejecting the Romanian requests of national self-determination and, of course for giving the reason of exploitation of the Romanian land mineral and natural resources (especially the exploitation of the valuable metals). By these reasons, the first scientific researches on Rosia Montana sites were made by Ignatz Eden in 1774.

In 1784, Transylvania was troubled by a great popular revolution of the Romanians. The leaders of the uprising were Romanian origin Habsburg subjects Horea (Nicola Urs), Closca (Ion Oarcă) and Crisan (Marcu Giurgiu). Presented in many ways, the Romanian Revolution of 1784 was a national and social movement. Some sources accredited the idea that Horea (<http://www.stelian-tanase.ro/masonul-ursu-nicola-zis-horea/>) was responsible with the gold exploitation in Apuseni Mountains (<https://saccsiv.wordpress.com/2010/10/30/rascoala-lui-horea-closca-si-crisan-un-experiment-masonic-aurul-motilor-sursa-de-finantare-a-revolutiei-franceze/>), as confident of a great Austrian representative of the Imperial Court of Vienna, Ignatius Born (who had in his own propriety, some important gold mines in Apuseni Mountains), an important Free Mason of his time. Some sources (Chindriș, 2009: 54-59) accredited the idea that Horea was a Free Mason (nationalists in the XX-th century, and in present times, considered that the quality of the Free Mason of Horea was "created" by the Magyar nobles for accusing Horea as an "Austrian agent" (<https://luceafarul.net/rascoala-lui-horea-de-la-1784-o-resurectie-religioasa-si-de-eliberare-politica-a-romanilor-ortodocsi-din-ardeal>), but this affirmation is not real). The action

of Horea is presented by a well-known Free Mason, Jean Pierre Brissot who had sent a letter for “misconduct” to the emperor Joseph II beside Horea national movement, comparing the principles of Horea with the principles of the new created United States of America. According to some sources Horea had a mission to send more gold in Austria to Joseph II (Horea was initiated in Free Masonry in Vienna, in “Zur Wahren Eintracht” Lodge). But Horea would in exchange, the right to raise his people against Magyar nobility abuses (*Unio Trium Nationum* – 1437, *Werboczi Tripartitum* – 1517 considered Romanians as tolerates). Romanians who accepted the Union with Catholic Roman Church (1699-1701) had some rights, but Orthodox Romanians (more of them miners in the Apuseni Mountains had no political and national rights). Joseph II would to use the Romanian Gold in undermining France which was on the way to start the Revolution of 1789. An international conflict with Netherlands obliged Joseph II to sacrifice the Horea National Movement, Habsburg military commanders receiving order to pacify Transylvania (Prodan, II, 1979: 5-30).

Horea had understood the situation and prepared the resistance in the autumn of 1784. At Zlatna, was founded the “Superior Council of Mining”, as in the Roman times. Romanian revolutionary troops had entered in the Rosia Montana on November 6, 1784, after a great fight with Austrian troops. After the defeat of the Romanian Revolution, Count Anton Jankovic made some inquiries and succeeded to capture Romanian revolutionary leaders, who were executed on February 28, 1785 near Alba Iulia (Horea and Closca, smashed by the wheel, Crisan committed suicide in the prison).

In 1789, the year of the start of the French Revolution, a very skilled analysis is made by professor Muller von Reichenstein. In 1863, Rosia Montana region is included and described in “*Geologia Siebenburgens*”. Other precious information on Rosia Montana mineral potential were described in works signed by B. Cotta (1861), M. Palfy, G.T. Posemny in 1905 and 1912.

Great libraries and archives of Vienna had in their ranges a lot of important information about the gold exploitations of Rosia Montana. After the discovery of the wax tablets (at the end of XVIII-th century and the beginning of XIX-th century), and their publication in 1873, by Theodore Mommsen, the gold exploitation had continued ignoring the legitimate right of Romanians who were as their ancestors, the best miners in the region.

Romanian researchers N. Petruțian and V. Brana had signed studies on Rosia Montana on 1934 and 1952. R. Popescu, A. Cioran continued the researches in 1978. Gheorghe Popescu, Gabriela Tamaș-Bădescu published their researches in 2007 (Iatan, 2008: 6-9).

In 1846, on July 1-st, “Royal Gallery Holly Cross Orlea” was founded the first Austrian State industrial factory for gold exploitations and prospections. Galleries were dug on 60 m deepness. In 1850, la Aprăbuș, at the entry of the Orlea Mine, will enter in use a railway (small rail track gauge) long of 3,1 km. In 1852, other mining facilities will complete the image of the new industrial mining site: an inclined plane of 570 m, a water alimentation facility (channel) from Abrudel River, and the industrial facility for the ore grinding.

In October 22, 1848, Chamber Director Nemegeyi Janos, the representative of the State Gold Exploitation Office in Zlatna, was asked by some Romanian members of the Romanian Revolutionary Guard (they had a personal initiative, it is proved that Avram Iancu, the leader of Romanian Revolution did not know nothing) to re-enter under Imperial authority. Avram Iancu (Dudaș, 1998: 78-90), the leader of the Romanian Revolution did not know about the initiative of Romanians to occupy Zlatna and to disarm the 300 members of the Magyar Revolutionary Guard. There was established a round of discussion for mediation between Romanian and Magyar representatives (Nemegeyi János, George Anghel, dr. Knöpfler – form Zlatna citizens and Magyar Revolutionary Guard and prefect Petru Dobra, Ioan Nobili, priest Milidon – for the Romanian side), but they had failed. On October 23, 1848 a conflict was started between Romanian and Magyar Guard members. Magyar attacked Romanian who had their lunch, killing 8-10 Romanian Guard members. On October 24, 25, 1848, after the Magyars killed 8-10 Romanian Guard members, Romanian civilian who were living in the neighbouring villages of Zlatna, alarmed by the fact that Magyars for escaping by Romanians had put fire on Romanian houses, had come in Zlatna, in a great number and had make revenge acts against Magyar civilians. On October 26 1848, Avram Iancu had come personally in Zlatna and gave the order of ceasing fire, and to protect the Magyar civilians, against the violence of Romanians.

After 1918, until 1948, the Rosia Montana site was exploited by privat and state facilities. Form 1948, “Rosia Montana Mining Exploitation” until 1999, Romanian state have had the monopoly of gold exploitation. The industrial facility was closed in 2006.

How many gold quantities were exploited on Rosia Montana during Modern Age?

In the Ancient Roman Age, was considered that from Alburnus Maior in the Roman Empire treasury entered more than 500 kg gold by year. From 107, until 271, we can consider that from Rosia Montana were exploited more than 82 tons of gold.

Romanian geologist Aurel Sântimbreanu (<https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/actualitate/articol/cat-aur-a-dat-rosia-montana-intre-1852-1938>) discovered on County Office of National Archives in Alba Iulia, a precious document “*Framework of the production of the Exploitation Rosia Montana during 1852-1938*” which presents the gold quantities exploited on Rosia Montana in this period: 249 ore tons grinded in 1852, offered 1,30 kg gold and 0, 63 kg silver; 4306 ore tons grinded in 1867 offered 25,46 kg gold and 17 kg silver. In 1905, 12.235 ore tons offered after grinding – 89, 8475 kg of gold, 42, 4871 kg of silver. In 1908, at Rosia Montana were exploited 106,710 kg of gold and 44, 4550 kg of silver. In the 1918, Union Year, 12.805 ore tons offered 28, 140 kg of gold and 18,812 kg of silver. In 1938, 25,780 ore tons offered, after grinding, 123,864 kg gold, and 67,763 kg silver.

From 1852, the Modern and Contemporary Age gold exploitation of Rosia Montana site produced until 1938, 2,473 tons of gold (Sântimbreanu &Wollmann, 1974: 240-279).

Conclusions

By the data presented in this article we can see that Rosia Montana is a historical site which has an industrial continuity from the Ancient times until the Contemporary Age. The name “Rosia”- “Red”, translated by Hungarians with the same expression is in connection with the red ore which coloured the waters of the River Rosia, which is crossing Rosia Montana site.

The gold of Rosia Montana was a very important part of the international relations of the Modern Europe. The Habsburg Empire succeeded to preserve the right of exploitation on Rosia Montana site for ensuring the gold necessary in the state treasury in Vienna. It is very difficult to establish what was, as a total quantity, the real quantity of gold extracted from Rosia Montana from Antiquity until 2006. The secret quantity of gold offered by Horea (according to the various sources) to the Emperor Joseph II (himself an Illuminated Emperor and a Free Mason), for helping the start of the French Revolution (that gold was never registered in the official papers of the Imperial Court Administration), the private exploitations until 1846, the Soviet influence in Romania in the XX-th Century (Red Army stationed between 1944-1958 on Romanian soil), the secret of the gold quantities preserved during the Communist period in Romania, between 1958-1989 are important elements to be considered in order to offer the conclusion that, we can never know how many gold was exploited at Rosia Montana until 2006.

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IN MEMORIAM

In Memoriam – Ștefan Ștefănescu (May 24, 1929 – December 29, 2018)

The life and deeds of a man are in direct relation to the geographic, social, cultural and geopolitical environments of an existential period of time. Facing the challenges of these life environments makes any man add to his name different dimensions to define him as a human personality, to bind him with the epithets of the celebrity and to perpetuate him as a model for his contemporaries and future.

The fullness of a personality, measured by deeds, is a sum of the unravelling path that one chooses in life. The transition from a horizon of knowledge and understanding, to another one, from a native domestic environment to the more distant parts of the intellectual light centers created by multiseular ages of humanity, preserves in the beings of a person the local seal as the starting point and the river of history as a level of human self-indulgence. In the Romanian space, a man escalates the stages of becoming; bearing in his layers the inheritance of the traditions and individualities of each part of Romania, a certain patrimony of spirituality.

In this auctorial canon, Ștefan Ștefănescu's personality, as a great Romanian, born on 24 May 1929 in Dolj county, in the village of Goicea Mică, and contemporary with us until 29 December 2018, climbed the stairs of childhood and the first schools at Goicea, those of secondary school at the "Nicolae Filipescu" Military National College from Dealu-Predeal Monastery, continuing his studies at the Faculty of History in Bucharest and postgraduate studies in the specialization of Byzantinology and the History of South Slavs at "Lomonosov" University in Moscow, and afterwards in Paris (France) at the Ecole Nationale des Chartes, the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes – the 5th Section of the College of France and the Sorbonne. By the age of 37, the horizons of Ștefan Ștefănescu, from Goicea to Târgoviște and from Bucharest to Moscow and Paris, in the most powerful stage of a life of scholarly accumulations and social experience, shaped a danubian from Oltenia region into a complex personality of European essence, more capable than others at a time of multiple necessities which reappeared from the ashes of the Second World War and from the re-establishment of the world in the parameters of post-war geopolitical order. His conceptual heritage of life, of Oltenian essence, correlated with the spirit of Oltenia, the roots, the permanent activism, the pristine Romanian nationalism, the openness to other horizons (Balkan, Western, Eastern) and the universality and modernizing perspectives provided him with vigor and human strength, intellectual and creative capabilities, and even pride (as a noble Romanian feeling) competitive with himself and with the great values and figures of the established and eternal history in the national affective memory.

We could perfectly comprehend this enumeration of stylistic qualities that partially form and identify a psychological portrait only by reminding us of another nearby scholar from the Oltenia Plain, Ilariu Dobridor, who made it clear that "in the underground of the nebulosity of the human soul all the germinations and efflorescences [that] seem possible" (*Oltenia*, Craiova, 1943). Ștefan Ștefănescu, in

times of socio-political upheaval, in the Orthodox spiritual cleansing kept in his father's house at Goicea, chose his path, intuitively, based on the traditional canons of life, which in 1943 (in wartime), Victor Papilian reveals them as a future perspective for young people in the settling of a centuries-old tradition, an emulation basis for their formation.

In an anticipation of post-war changes, he underlined that "Tradition creates an environment that any researcher feels. It is the utmost environment for meditation. It brings an emulation, which comes not only from the present and from the contingent, but it also arises from centuries-old hard work, attended by the spirit of the great masters, the whole breath of the cultural landscape, the students, the societies and the population, the geography of the country, the picturesque province and the locality. Here lies, invulnerable and impetuous, the very precious tradition of the province! It forms the closest, more intimate circle of the production environment" (*Ibidem*).

The "Oltenian" dowry of the young man Ștefan Ștefanescu immersed him in a restitutionary, patriotic and revitalizing calling in antithesis with the imposition of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine brought on by the all-powerful foreign policy-makers after 1944-1947. In the sense of this formative process, the young Ștefan Ștefănescu, in the midst of regaining freedom in the space of life and creation of the Romanians, was a part of this destiny. The History of Bania, a vice-princely or vice-voievodal institution in Wallachia in the Middle Ages, from 1965 to 1966, completes a complex historiographical recovery based on the entire scholarly construction of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the 20th century. Through this fundamental work, at that time, the Romanian mind was reestablished in relation to the troubled Romanian medieval history. Through it, Ștefan Ștefănescu became a follower of the "Arhivele Olteniei/Archives of Oltenia" magazine (1922-1946), a historiographical polarizing center during the interwar period, succeeding in the first synthesis of the history of the studies and documents published on the pages. The author of the book was thus beyond the Marxist-Leninist dogmas of the historiography imposed and promoted by Roller, but in perfect harmony with the major political changes of the years 1964-1966 that shaped the independent position of Romania in the socialist camp. The book, which responded to the "thirst for the future" of the era, subsumed and guided at the same time the national history, proof being the printing of the second historiographical work of great scientific opening and conception, *Țara Românească de la Basarab I până la Mihai Viteazul* /The Romanian Land from Basarab I to Mihai Viteazul (Bucharest, 1970).

Thus, the years of training in the Romanian horizons were the time that marked the personality and destiny of Ștefan Ștefănescu, surpassing him by the nature of his soul and by the historiographical creation of pure nobility and importance through political-ideological consequences, preceding the great revival of the historical science from the last seven years of the last century.

The great historian Ștefan Ștefănescu pieced together the old period of the great modernist positivists Dimitrie Onciul, N. Iorga, C. Giurescu, Constantin C. Giurescu, Petre P. Panaitescu and others, divided by the Second World War and the Romania's communist process. His work on the Great Bănie of Oltenia became a scientific landmark in rewriting the history of the Romanian people.

At the same time, all informational accumulations (of documentaries and ideas) of the historical science were published in a second edition of this work in 2009, with new additions, ideas and new interpretations.

The works before 1965, in a time still avant-garde, derived from the needs of the sixth decade of cultural censorship years (the “obsessive”), revealed him socially. For the virtues of his works, excellent in balance and the measure of interpretative judgments, he climbed the professional stages of researcher (1950-1960), scientific secretary and head of the Middle History Department and old Romanian institutions at the Institute of History “Nicolae Iorga” (1960-1966), PhD in History (1967), University Professor at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest (after 1975), Romanian Academy Award winner with “Nicolae Balcescu” Prize, or administrative and social-political director of “Nicolae Iorga” Institute (1970-1990), Dean of the Faculty of History (1975-1977) and of the Faculty of History-Philosophy (1977-1984), member of the central bodies of the state.

Under his tutelage, in a team with several other important historians of the country – Andrei Oțetea, Ștefan Pascu, Dan Berindei, Camil Mureșan, Gheorghe Platon, Dinu C. Giurescu, Ioan Scurtu etc., a few prerequisites of Romanian historiography have been accomplished, namely the compilation and publication of valuable national history syntheses – *Istoria României*/The History of Romania (1964), *Istoria poporului român*/The History of the Romanian People (1970), *Istoria Dobrogei*/The History of Dobrogea (1971), *Istoria medie a României*/The Middle History of Romania (1966), *Istoria Românilor*/The History of Romanians (2001) – and *Documente privind istoria României* (the Corpus of Documents on Romanian History) and *Documenta Romaniae Historica*.

His work of theatrical diversity, comprising over 400 titles, includes studies for the entire geographic and chronological range of the History of Romanians and for many aspects (political, social, demographic, economic and cultural), with “documented approaches”, lacking in “speculations and ambiguities, hazardous hypotheses of empty phraseology”, cultivating “the precept that science is less likely to progress perceptibly when it is tied down by axiomatic verdicts” (after Victor Spinei, *Rigoare și obiectivitate profesională pilduitoare: Academiciantul Ștefan Ștefănescu*/Profound professional rigor and objectivity: Ștefan Ștefănescu, in vol. *Studia Varia in Honorem. Professoris Ștefan Ștefănescu Octogenarii*, Ediderunt Cristian Luca et Ionel Cădea, București-Brăila, 2009).

For the city of Craiova, which he carried in his heart for all his life as the place where all the Oltenians were heading, or as a station to other sightings, the great historian exhibited an attraction of special scholarly essence, starting from the consideration that “the life and prosperity of the cities was tightly linked to the state of the surrounding land, whose specifics expressed and influenced him”. Craiova was an urban metropolis for his native village, Goicea, and “a true metropolis of Romanian culture”, its history being a matter of the dignity with which he geographically identified. Several stories of Craiova’s history are undoubtedly the most representative and essential chapters of a future monograph on this subject (*Începuturile Băniei de Craiova. Pe marginea unui document recent publicat*/The Beginnings of Craiova Banie. On the side of a recently published document, in “Studii și materiale de istorie medie”,

vol. I, pp. 325-332; *Craiova în statistica din 1833/ Craiova in the statistics of 1833*, in *Sub semnul lui Clio. Omagiu Acad. Prof. Ștefan Pascu*, Cluj-Napoca, 1974, pp. 244-250; *Repere în istorie/Milestones in History*, in “Magazin istoric”, Special issue, 2007, pp. 5-9 etc.).

In addition, under his tutelage, Craiova formed a nucleus of historians, whom he proudly called the Historical School of Craiova, which proved to be very productive in the final years of the last century and the beginning of the new century.

The prestige of the great historian was recognized by his contemporaries, for which he was elected member of the National Committee of Historians of Romania and member of several international academies, centers and commissions of historical studies (European Academy of History in Brussels, the history of the State Assemblies, the International Commission for Slav Studies, the Center for Italian-Romanian Historical Studies in Milan, the Joint Romanian-Yugoslav History Commission), a correspondent member (1974) and permanent member (1992) of the Romanian Academy, or titles and orders such as “Honorary Citizen” of Goicea and Craiova Municipality, honorary member of “Mihai Viteazul” Cultural Foundation – Călugăreni, Cultural University “Nicolae Iorga” – Vălenii de Munte, “Romanian Writing/Scrisul Romanesc” – Craiova, “The Romanian Village/Satul Românesc” – 3rd Millennium, “Historical Store/Magazin Istoric”, “Civitas Nova” – Brașov, the orders “Scientific Merit/Meritul științific” (1966) and “St. Metodiu and Chiril” – Bulgaria, the title of doctor honoris causa of several universities (including from the University of Craiova, which the Senate approved but which, for medical reasons, he did not collect) and the “Man of the Year 1995” by the American Biographical Institute Research Association.

For all Romanians, the decease of the great historian at the end of 2018 means a loss of a great Romanian who, through his personality and his work, set the positive coordinates and desiderata of an era of profound changes and spectacular events for over seven decades, both in writings, as well as in facts.

Through everything that Ștefan Ștefănescu represented, he remains in the heart of all Romanians, a symbol of the vocation of national historiography, the patriarch of Romanian Medieval Era in our contemporary history, the great historian to whom we owe gratitude and eternal memory.

Ad perpetuum rea memoriam, aere perenius...

Dinică Ciobotea

**In Memoriam – Titu Georgescu (23 February 1929 – 28 July 2004)
90 years from birth**

We bring to the attention of the lovers of history in the country and abroad, the remarkable personality of a professor and researcher, which some will discover later and due to the modesty and dignity that characterized his whole life.

Born on 23 February 1929, in Corabia in Olt County, in a modest and dignified family, the young Titu Georgescu follows the first classes in his hometown, then he is admitted to the prestigious “Frații Buzești High School” in Craiova.

The good results obtained in the studies recommended him to participate in another contest, being admitted to the “Military National College Nicolae Filipescu” from the Dealu Monastery (near Târgoviște), also known as “Predeal Military High School”, where the high school functioned after the earthquake in 1940.

At this elite military institution of inter-war Romanian education, he built, in a soldierly and competitive atmosphere, a wide range of knowledge including language learning.

Humanist skills and passion for history have been decisive in the choice of the future professor. Thus, between 1948-1952 he attended the courses of the Faculty of History and Geography of the University of Bucharest, being trained by professors such as Barbu Cămpina, Alexandru Elian, Dumitru Almaș, Andrei Oțetea, Vasile Maciu and others.

Being remarked by his teachers, he is coopted as an university lecturer from the first years of his studies (1950-1952), then he rises into the university hierarchy from assistant to university professor (1968). Four years later, in 1972, he was awarded the title of Docent PhD, and in 1980, acknowledging his merits in scientific research, he is a laureate of the Academy Award.

He was editor-in-chief of the magazine “Annals of History” and founder of the magazine collection “The Little History Library” and “Evoke”. At the same time, he was the initiator and mentor of the magazine “History Store” published in 1967, in a favorable context to revive our historiographic tradition and to enhance contacts with scientific centers in Europe.

Also, Titu Georgescu was editor-in-chief of the university course “Fundamental problems of history of Romania” and scientific leader of numerous PhD students. He represented our country in colloquies, international meetings and congresses of history in Europe.

Among the works published by the professor we mention: *Nicolae Iorga împotriva hitlerismului*/Nicolae Iorga against Hitlerism (1966), *Intellectualii antifasciști în publicistica românească*/The antifascist intellectuals in Romanian journalism (1967), *Mărturiile franceze despre 1848 în Țările Române*/French Testimonies about 1848 in the Romanian Lands (1968), *A Concise History of Romania* (1980), *Argumente ale istoriei pentru o nouă ordine internațională*/Arguments of history for a new international order (1977), *România între Yalta și Malta*/Romania between Yalta and Malta (1996), *România în istoria Europei*/Romania in the history of Europe (1997), *Tot un fel de istorie*/Another kind of history – three volumes – (2000-2004).

Since his youth he has entered the historiographical front of his time, Titu Georgescu was part of the team of young historians who had engaged in the struggle for eliminating the theses imposed by Mihai Roller in the early 50s and for the reinforcement of the national values as a whole. It was an attempt to integrate the history of the workers’ movement into the history of the Romanians as part of it (Ioan Scurtu).

Among his initiatives we recall the publication in 1976 of the course titled “Fundamental problems of history of Romania” which, at his insistence, was taught in all the higher education institutions in our country.

A wider form of this work to which historical documents were attached was to be published in 1986, summing up 486 pages and considered by some specialists to be the best synthesis of the history of Romanians before 1989.

In fact, Professor's competence, skills and scientific rigor have been recognized not only in the country but also abroad, where remarkable names of European historiography as: Maurice Baumont, Roger Gheysens, Jacques de Launay, Jacques Lévesque, Catherine Durandin, Henry Michel, they appreciated his research, inviting him to many events organized in Paris, Milan, Moscow, Barcelona, Dublin.

Since 1965, Professor Titu Georgescu has received from the Ministry of Education the right to coordinate PhD theses of the great Romanian researchers and foreigners from countries such as Greece, Japan, Israel, Egypt, Iraq.

Parallel to the prestigious didactic and scientific activity, Titu Georgescu has also been given administrative functions, which he has achieved with positive results. The first responsibility was that of the rector of the University of Craiova, which he exercised between 1971-1974.

Overwhelmed by the many administrative problems faced by the young university in Bans Fortress, the new rector finds the time to attract ambitious intellectuals from Craiova, such as: Marin Sorescu, Alexandru Firescu, Adrian Păunescu, Petre Gigea, Florea Firan, Amza Pelea, Tudor Gheorghe, Emil Boroghină, metropolitan bishop Nestor Vornicescu and many others.

In the context of the necessity of connecting the University of Craiova in Balkan and European academic relations, Titu Georgescu's initiative was to complete the twinning with the University of Skopje (Macedonia), because it motivated the rector of Craiova "I wanted to establish contact with Macedo-Romanian academics and intellectuals toward reconnect with south-Danubian Romans, too forget".

At the same time, he intensified academic ties with the university centers of the country, from Bucharest, Cluj and Iași. We keep in mind the projects he had, especially the one of attracting as associate professors of the university, known names of Romanian literature, such as Marin Preda and Marin Sorescu. Since 1975 he has been the Pro-Rector of the University of Bucharest, responsible for the research activities at the Faculty of History, Philosophy, Law, Sociology, as well as at the institutes of the Romanian Academy.

In order to stimulate the scientific research of teaching staff that is teaching history in pre-university education, Titu Georgescu recommended to teachers the realization of local monographs, so that the spiritual values of the Romanians would be revealed at national level.

Moreover, at his initiative, as a Rector in Craiova, a team of authors elaborated a thematic guide as a working tool for those who chose to make a village monograph. More than 40 scientific-methodical works, representing local monographs were developed under the guidance of the Professor, some of which were later published by the authors. It also captures the variety of themes over which Titu Georgescu has stood. We recall from those: national unity and independence, anti-fascist and anti-war movement, the place and role of intellectuality to affirm and defend the country's fundamental desideratum, emphasizing the valuable traditions of the material and spiritual treasure throughout the territory of Romania.

The model of professional dedication, permanently mastered by a true patriotism, the Professor contributed to the formation of a generation of specialists in history and diplomacy.

In his 75 years of life, Titu Georgescu created a vast work, tackling themes appropriate to the historiography of his time. After retiring, in 1994, he worked at “Spiru Haret” University until 2004. Through his entire didactic, scientific and managerial activity, Professor Titu Georgescu has effectively contributed to the development of historical knowledge, his qualities are imposing him as a remarkable specialist in the field of historical research, which he served with devotion. If we add to this, the personality of Titu Georgescu, sensitive, generous, volunteer, we recompose the profile of a genuine intellectual.

Constanțiu Dinulescu

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Reference citations

I. Reference-List Entries for Periodicals (APA Style)

a. An Article in a Journal with continuous paging

Harrison, R.L., & Westwood, M.J. (2009). Preventing vicarious traumatization of mental health therapists: Identifying protective practices. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 46, 203-219.

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b. An Article in a Journal with separate paging

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c. An article in a monthly magazine

Madu, C. (2010, March-April). A cure for crime. *Psychology Today*, 43(2), 12.

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II. Reference-list entries for books and other separately published materials

a. A book by one author

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The 1990 book: (Sternberg, 1990: 45)

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All four works in the same citation: (Sternberg, 1990, 2003a, 2003b, 2007)

Damean, S.L. (2004). *România și Congresul de Pace de la Berlin (1878)*. București: Mica Valahie.

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III. Archival Documents and Collections

a. Collection of letters from an archive

Benomar, Fr.M.C. (March 1875-December 1876). Legación en Berlin. Correspondencia confidencial y reservada con los Ministros de Estado. Cartas a los mismos (Tomo I, Signatura 9-32-7-7401). *Royal Academy of History*, Madrid, Spain.

In-text citation (Benomar, Fr.M.C., 1875-1876, Benomar, Fr.M.C. to F. Calderón Collantes, June 5, 1876)

b. Unpublished papers, lectures from an archive or personal collection

Suțu, C.N. (1863). *Propunerea lui C. Șuțu în numele lui D. Jose de Salamanca*. Fond Ministerul Lucrărilor Publice (dosar 100). National Historical Central Archives Service, Bucarest, Romania.

In-text citation (Suțu, 1863)

Universidad Central (1868). *Espediente Vizanti y Basilio Andrés*. Universidades, Sección Filosofía y Letras (Signatura 6887, expediente 1). National Historical Archive, Madrid, Spain.

In-text citation (Universidad Central, 1868)

Gullón E. Iglesias, P. (1898, April 18). *Memorandum adresat de Guvernul Spaniei Puterilor prietene asupra insurecției cubane*. Fond 71 (Problema 21, Dosar 69). Diplomatic Archives Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucarest, Romania.

In-text citation (Gullón E Iglesias, 1898)

IV. Reference to a web source

J.G. (2016, April 11). 7 Deadly Environmental Disasters. Retrieved April 25 2016, from <http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>

In-text citation (<http://www.history.com/news/history-lists>)